The Well-Founded Fear of Persecution Standard in Asylum Proceedings: The Promise of Solace for Refugees after *INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca*

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I. INTRODUCTION

The history of laws providing asylum to aliens in this country is marked by varying and confusing standards for the granting of asylum. The Refugee Act of 1980 was enacted to provide a discretionary means by which the Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien who meets the statutory definition of a refugee. The standards to which the alien was to be held in order to meet that definition, however, remained controversial.

On March 9, 1987, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Luz Marina Cardoza-Fonseca. The Court held that, in discretionary asylum proceedings under section 208(a) of the Refugee Act of 1980, an alien must demonstrate that she has a "well-founded fear of persecution" if she is deported. The Court refused, however, to describe the content of a "well-founded fear".

This Note will provide an analysis of the ramifications on immigration law of the decision in Cardoza-Fonseca. First, background information will be discussed, including the history of refugee legislation in this country, the development of the asylum standards at issue in Cardoza-Fonseca, the enactment of the Refugee Act of

1. See generally Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9 (1980). The authors characterize pre-1980 immigration and asylum legislation as discriminatory in nature, with the availability of asylum based upon restricted categories to which the alien must belong. Id. at 10-12.
3. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 33-57 and accompanying text.
5. 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987). Justice Stevens wrote the Court's opinion and was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate concurrence. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment only. Justice Powell wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White joined.
6. 107 S. Ct. at 1222.
7. Id. See infra notes 58-103 and accompanying text.
1980, and the pertinent case law from 1980 to 1986. Next, a detailed description of the lower court and Supreme Court decisions in *Cardoza-Fonseca* will be provided. Finally, the Note will raise questions regarding the impact of the holding on immigration law and will discuss some recommendations for future proceedings in light of the *Cardoza-Fonseca* decision.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Refugee Law Prior to 1968

1. Withholding of Deportation

In 1952, Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act (the "INA"), creating section 243(h). That section authorized the Attorney General to withhold deportation if an alien could demonstrate a "clear probability of physical persecution," or a "likelihood of physical persecution" if the United States forced the alien to return home. Section 243(h) was discretionary and allowed withholding of deportation for as long as was deemed necessary by the Attorney General. The relief was available, with certain exceptions, to aliens who were unlawfully present in the United States and subject to deportation. In 1965, Congress amended section 243(h), changing the requirement that the alien show a clear probability of physical persecution to one requiring a showing of a clear probability of persecution based on race, religion, or political opinion.

2. Asylum

Since 1947, refugees seeking asylum-like relief at the United States border have been generally subject to an agency policy which gives an immigration preference to refugees fleeing persecu-

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10. Id.
11. Id.
12. The exceptions included instances in which the alien applying for withholding of deportation actually participated in the persecution of another person, or was convicted of a serious crime and constituted a danger to the community or the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(A)(B) (1964).
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976). The provision read: The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion or political opinion and for such period of time as he deems necessary for such reason.

Id.
tion. Under section 203(a)(7) of the INA, the Attorney General was authorized to allow "conditional entry" to limited numbers of aliens who were fleeing Communist-dominated areas or the Middle East "because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion or political opinion."

B. The Period 1968 to 1980

In 1968, the United States acceded to the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the "Protocol"). The Protocol was formulated to provide increased protection to the rights of refugees world-wide. As the Supreme Court explained in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic, "the Protocol bound parties to comply with the substantive provisions of articles 2 through 34 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees..." The Protocol expressly required the use of a "well-founded fear of persecution" standard, and it was assumed generally that the Protocol was essentially consistent with existing United States law. It was also assumed that any apparent differences could be reconciled administratively by the Attorney General.

One of the most significant developments in the law of refugees and asylum to take place between the accession to the Protocol and the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980 was the Board of Immigration Appeals' (the "BIA") decision in In Re Dunar.

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17. See generally Anker & Posner, supra note 1, at 20-64.
19. Id. at 416.
20. The Protocol defines "refugee" as one who:
Owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable, or owing to such fear is unwilling to return to it.
22. Id.
23. 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (1973). The Seventh Circuit provides a succinct discussion of the procedure to be followed in asylum applications in Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984). The Attorney General's discretionary power to grant asylum is
involved a request for withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of the INA.\footnote{24} The deportee argued that accession to the Protocol had changed the standard required for withholding of deportation from a showing of a “clear probability of persecution” to a showing of a “well-founded fear of persecution,” and that a conjectural possibility of persecution would satisfy that standard.\footnote{25} The BIA rejected Dunar’s arguments, and specifically stated that a likelihood of persecution was required to establish a “well-founded fear.”\footnote{26} This decision had a significant impact in the courts of appeals, and thereafter a number of courts equated the term “well-founded fear of persecution” with “clear probability of persecution” and “likelihood of persecution.”\footnote{27}

C. The Refugee Act of 1980

Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980 (the “Act”) in an effort to reform United States refugee law.\footnote{28} The Act removed the Attorney General’s discretion in section 243(h) proceedings,\footnote{29} and provided a new statutory procedure for granting asylum to refugees. Specifically, Congress added section 208(a) to the INA, requiring the Attorney General to provide a procedure by which an alien, who is physically present in the United States, or at the border or a port of entry, can apply for a discretionary grant of asylum.\footnote{30} The

\begin{footnotes}
\item[25] Id. at 319.
\item[26] Id.
\item[27] See Stevic, 467 U.S. at 419 n.12, for collected cases. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit subsequently stated that a “well-founded fear of persecution [must be] satisfied by objective evidence,” and in practice this standard would “converge” with the “clear probability” standard. Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1977). For further discussion see infra notes 42-57 and accompanying text.
\item[28] See Anker & Posner supra note 1. The authors stress the humanitarian emphasis present in the debates of legislation proposed in the late 1970’s. Id. at 10-42.
\item[29] 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1980). This section provides, in pertinent part, that the Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien to a country if he determines that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened there due to race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Id.
\item[30] 8 U.S.C. § 1150(a) (1980). The section provides:
\end{footnotes}
Act requires aliens to fall into the statutory definition of a refugee as one who is outside her country of origin or last country of habitual residence and who cannot or will not return to that country. Further, the alien's unwillingness or inability to return must be due to persecution or a "well-founded fear of persecution" because of race, religion, national origin, political philosophy, or group affiliation.

D. INS v. Stevic

In 1976, Predrag Stevic came to the United States from Yugoslavia to visit his sister in Chicago. Subsequently, Stevic married a United States citizen. Shortly thereafter, Stevic's wife was killed in an automobile accident, and he was ordered to surrender for deportation to Yugoslavia. Stevic sought an order withholding deportation under section 243(h) of the INA as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980. Stevic claimed that he had become active in an anti-Communist organization and that his father-in-law had been imprisoned in Yugoslavia because of membership in that organization. Stevic, therefore, feared he also would be imprisoned if he returned to that country. The BIA refused to withhold deportation, stating that section 243(h) required prima facie evidence of a clear probability of persecution and that Stevic had failed to pres-
ent such evidence.\textsuperscript{38}

The United States Supreme Court agreed, holding that "an alien must establish a clear probability of persecution to avoid deportation under Section 243(h).\textsuperscript{39}" Although the Court refused to define "well-founded fear of persecution," the Court indicated, in dicta, that the "well-founded fear" standard was not coterminous with the "clear probability of persecution" standard.\textsuperscript{40} Moreover, the Court adopted the Second Circuit's assumption that the latter standard was the stricter one, but held nonetheless that it was applicable in 243(h) proceedings.\textsuperscript{41}

E. 1984-1987: A Conflict Among the Circuits?

Despite the dicta in \textit{Stevic} indicating that the "well-founded fear" and "clear probability of persecution" standards should not be equated, the BIA and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit continued to treat the standards as coterminous.\textsuperscript{42} In \textit{Matter of Acosta}\textsuperscript{43} the BIA acknowledged that the word

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Id.} at 410-11. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that aliens requesting withholding of deportation should no longer be held to a "clear probability of persecution" standard; rather, deportation could be avoided by demonstrating a "well-founded fear of persecution." \textit{Id.} The court believed that Congress had changed the standard of proof required under section 243(h) of the Refugee Act of 1980 to conform to the "well-founded fear of persecution" language of the United Nations Protocol. \textit{Id.} at 412-13. \textit{See supra} notes 27 and 36 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Stevic}, 467 U.S. at 413. Note that Justice Stevens authored the unanimous opinion. The Court refused to define a "clear probability of persecution" beyond noting the fact that it requires evidence which establishes that it is "more likely than not" that the alien would be subject to persecution if deported. \textit{Id.} at 429-30.

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Id.} at 425-30. The issues and arguments involved here and those in \textit{In re Dunar}, \textit{supra} note 27 and accompanying text, were very similar. The \textit{Stevic} court discusses \textit{Dunar} as it relates to section 243(h) proceedings, and the subsequent equation of the "clear probability" and "well-founded fear" standards, but never expressly overrules \textit{Dunar}. \textit{Id.} at 424.

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{See Matter of Acosta, Interim Decision \#2986} (BIA, Mar. 1, 1985); Sankar v. INS, 757 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1985). For discussions of the BIA's decisions, and the decisions of the various Courts of Appeals, see Gumbol v. INS, 815 F.2d 406 (6th Cir. 1987); Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986); Cruz-Lopez v. INS, 802 F.2d 1518 (4th Cir. 1986); Farzad v. INS, 802 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1986); McLeod v. INS, 802 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1986); Ganjour v. INS, 796 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1986); Yousif v. INS, 794 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1986); Guevara Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1986); Bahramnia v. INS, 782 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1986); Larimi v. INS, 782 F.2d 1494 (9th Cir. 1986); Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1986); Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1985); Boalanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1985); Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985), \textit{cert. granted} 106 S. Ct. 1181 (1986), \textit{aff'd.}, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987); Moosa v. INS, 760 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1985); Youkhanna v. INS, 749 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1984); Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984). These cases are discussed in detail in the analysis section of this Note, \textit{infra} notes 120-61 and accompanying text.
“fear,” as used in the Refugee Act of 1980, refers to a subjective, emotional awareness. The BIA held, however, that the standards for discretionary grants of asylum and withholding of deportation were not significantly different and that they converge in practice. Furthermore, in *Sankar v. INS* the Third Circuit held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by equating a “well-founded fear” with a “clear probability.” The court refused to follow the dicta in *Stevic*, relying instead upon the Supreme Court's statement that it was not deciding the meaning of “well-founded fear of persecution.”

Other circuits, however, have held that the asylum and withholding of deportation standards are not coterminous. For example, in *Carvajal-Munoz v. INS*, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that section 208(a) required an asylum applicant to present specific objective evidence indicating that the alien had been subject to persecution or has a “good reason to fear” being singled out for persecution. The court recognized that, in some instances, the applicant's testimony would be the only evidence available. Even in those cases, however, the court held that the testimony would have to indicate strongly that she had a good reason to fear persecution. The court also noted that this formulation of the asylum standard is similar to, but not

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43. Interim Decision #2986 (BIA, Mar. 1, 1985).
44. *Id.* at 14.
45. *Id.* at 25. *But see infra* notes 104-19 and accompanying text.
46. 757 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1985).
47. *Id.* at 533.
48. *Id.*
49. *See cases cited supra* note 42.
50. 743 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984).
51. *Id.* at 574. The court explained their formulation of the standard as follows: "The applicant must present specific facts establishing that he or she has actually been the victim of persecution or has some other good reason to fear that he or she will be singled out for persecution . . . ." *Id.* (emphasis in original).
52. *Id.*
53. *Id.* The court stated: “Ordinarily, this must be done through objective evidence supporting the applicant's contentions. Sometimes, however, the applicant's own testimony will be all that is available regarding past persecution or the reasonable possibility of persecution." *Id.* The court went on to explain that the alien's uncorroborated testimony would not suffice to meet this burden unless it was:

[C]redible, persuasive, and point[ed] to specific facts that [would] give rise to an inference that the applicant has been or has a good reason to fear that he or she will be singled out for persecution on one of the specified grounds, or, alternatively or in addition thereto, must show through testimony and corroborative objective evidence that he or she has good reason to fear persecution on one of the specified grounds.

*Id.* (emphasis in original).
identical to, the "clear probability" standard. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the "well-founded fear of persecution" standard was subsequently adopted by both the Sixth Circuit in Youkhanna v. INS, and by the Ninth Circuit in Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS. Each court specifically relied upon the dicta in Stevic which assumed that the asylum and withholding of deportation standards were not coterminous.

III. INS v. CARDOZA-FONSECA

A. The Facts of the Case

Luz Marina Cardoza-Fonseca and her brother, both citizens of Nicaragua, entered the United States as visitors in 1979. Cardoza-Fonseca remained longer than permitted and failed to depart voluntarily. The INS then began deportation proceedings against her. She admitted that she was in the country illegally, but requested withholding of deportation under section 243(h) and asylum as a refugee under section 208(a). To support her claims, Cardoza-Fonseca explained that her brother politically opposed the Sandinistas, and had been imprisoned and tortured because of his opposition. Although the rest of her family was still in Nica-

54. Id. at 574-75.
55. 749 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1984). In Gumbol v. INS, 815 F.2d 406 (6th Cir. 1987), the court pointed out that there was a division of precedent in the Sixth Circuit as to whether the "clear probability" and "well-founded fear" standards differed, but concluded that the Stevic dicta required that the cases holding that the standards did in fact differ were correct. Id. at 411. See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
56. 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted 106 S. Ct. 1181 (1986), aff'd., 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987). It is interesting to speculate at this point whether the interpretation of the standard adopted by the courts of appeals for the Fifth and Second Circuits is the same as that adopted by the Seventh. In Guevara Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1986), the court stated that the standards for asylum and withholding of deportation are not identical, and cited Carvajal-Munoz with approval. Id. at 1250. The court held, however, that a reasonable person standard should be applied, but also stated that "[i]n so holding, we stand with the Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits . . . ." Id. at 1249. In Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986), the court specifically adopted "the standard recently articulated by the fifth circuit in Guevara-Flores v. INS . . . ." id. at 68, indicating that the Second Circuit implied some difference between the interpretations of the Seventh and Fifth Circuits. See also infra notes 161-90 and accompanying text.
57. See Carvajal-Munoz, 743 F.2d at 573; Youkhanna, 749 F.2d at 362; Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d at 1451 (noting that the Court in Stevic "clearly alerted the circuit courts and the Board to the distinct possibility that there is a significant different between the two tests.") For a discussion of whether the difference is significant, even after the Supreme Court decision in Cardoza-Fonseca, see infra notes 120-64 accompanying text. 58. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1209 (1987).
ragua, she contended that if she was forced to return home, the Sandinistas would interrogate her about her brother's activities and whereabouts. Her own political opposition would then likely be brought to light, and she would be tortured. 62

B. The Lower Courts' Decisions

The immigration judge and the BIA applied the same "clear probability of persecution" standard to both Cardoza-Fonseca's application for withholding of deportation and to her application for asylum as a refugee. 63 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Cardoza-Fonseca did not challenge the BIA's denial of her section 243(h) withholding of deportation claim. 64 Rather, she argued that both the immigration judge and the BIA had erred in applying a "more likely than not" standard rather than a "well-founded fear" standard to her section 208(a) asylum application. 65 The circuit court agreed and applied the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the "well-founded fear" standard to her application. 66 Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court granted the government's petition for certiorari. 67

C. The Opinion of the Court

The United States Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the Ninth Circuit, held that the "well-founded fear" standard is more generous than the "clear probability" standard. 68 Justice Stevens began his analysis for the Court by noting that the Attorney General had the discretion to grant asylum to an alien meeting the

62. Id. at 1209-10.
63. Id. at 1210.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 106 S. Ct. 1181 (1986). Justice Stevens notes that certiorari was granted "to resolve a circuit conflict on this important issue." Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1210. As discussed above at notes 42-57 and accompanying text, the principal conflict was between the BIA and the circuit courts, as the Third Circuit in Sankar v. INS relied specifically upon their own precedent and the Stevic Court's refusal to define "well-founded fear." 757 F.2d at 533. Furthermore, Justice Stevens explains in a footnote that Cardoza-Fonseca's claim was not rendered moot by the enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, principally because of the differences in subsequent adjustment of status under the 1986 Act as opposed to that under the asylum procedure. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1210-11 n.3. Justice Stevens noted also that because asylum for refugee practice was unaffected by the 1986 Act and the question presented in Cardoza-Fonseca "will arise, and has arisen, in hosts of other asylum proceedings," certiorari was not improvidently granted. Id. at 1211 n.3.
68. Id. at 1222.
definition of refugee under section 208(a) and further, that the "persecution or well-founded fear of persecution" standard was applicable.69

1. The Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980

Justice Stevens next analyzed the legislative history of the Refugee Act of 1980.70 First, the Court looked to pre-1980 practice under section 203(a)(7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.71 That section authorized the Attorney General to allow "conditional entry" to specific numbers of refugees fleeing from communist-dominated areas or the Middle East "because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion."72 The Court cited BIA decisions that held that the standard applied under section 203(a)(7) was less strict than the "clear probability" standard applied in section 243(h) proceedings.73 Furthermore, the Court pointed to a BIA finding that the language in section 243(a) requiring proof that the applicant "would be" subject to persecution was significantly different from the "fear of persecution" language of section 203(a)(7).74 The Court concluded, on the basis of legislative history, that the legislature had added the "well-founded fear" language to section 208(a) of the Refugee Act of 1980 to incorporate the language of the United Nations Protocol, not to change the standard that had been used under Section 203(a)(7).75

Next, the Court analyzed the meaning of the phrase "well-founded fear" in relation to the Protocol.76 The Court recognized

69. Id. at 1211. Justice Stevens also noted the holding in Stevic that section 243(h) applications required a "clear probability of persecution" standard. Id. at 1212. Most significant, however, was his note that the reasoning in Stevic was of no avail in this case because section 208(a) expressly provides that the "well-founded fear" standard governs eligibility for asylum. Id.
70. Id. at 1213.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1213-14 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976)).
73. Id. at 1214 (citations omitted).
74. Id. (citing Matter of Adamska, 12 I. & N. Dec. 201, 202 (1967)).
75. Id. at 1214-15. Justice Stevens rejected the government's argument that Congress intended to perpetuate the standard applied in informal parole proceedings (a "would be subject to persecution" standard) not the section 203(a)(7) standard. Id. at 1215 n.17. Justice Stevens again reasoned using the different formulations adopted for refugee status and withholding of deportation, and argued that Congress was more likely to adhere to prior statutory practice rather than regulatory practice (as was that in informal parole proceedings). He also argued that the Government's (and Justice Powell's) reliance on the Senate Report of the debates on the Refugee Act of 1980 was misplaced, noting that the Senate version of section 208(a) was ultimately rejected by Congress. Id.
76. Id. at 1216.
that one of Congress' primary purposes in redefining the term "refugee" and passing the Refugee Act of 1980 "was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with [the Protocol]." The Court concluded that this provided a clear indication of Congressional intent that the "well-founded fear" standard was less strict than the "clear probability" standard.

Finally, the Court emphasized Congress' rejection of the Senate version of the Refugee Act of 1980. Although the House version authorized the Attorney General, in his discretion, to grant any refugee asylum, the Senate version did not allow a grant of asylum unless "deportation or return would be prohibited under section 243(h)." The Court reasoned that the Senate version's restriction would simply limit the Attorney General's discretion to grant asylum under section 208(a), without affecting the standard used to determine refugee status. The Court concluded that the Senate recognized a difference between the "well-founded fear" standard and the "clear probability" standard, but intended to restrict the Attorney General's grants of asylum to cases in which the "clear probability" standard was met. Thus, enactment of the House

78. Id. at 1218. In its analysis, the Court pointed out the near identity of the Congressional and Protocol definitions of "refugee," and a number of statements suggesting that Congress intended the new statutory definition to be interpreted in conformance with the Protocol's definition. Id. at 1216. The Court looked also to the history of the United Nations' development of the Protocol definition, and found no indication that an alien should be required to prove that persecution would be more likely than not to occur in order to be considered a refugee. Id. at 1216-17. The Court noted that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Geneva, 1979) states that an applicant's "fear should be considered well-founded if he can establish, to a reasonable degree, that his continued stay in his country of origin has become intolerable to him for the reasons stated in the definition, or would for the same reasons be intolerable if he returned there." Id. at 1217 (quoting the U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS (Geneva, 1979), Ch. II B(2) (a) section 42. Justice Stevens went on to state that "[t]here is simply no room in the United Nations' definition for concluding that because an applicant only has a 10% chance of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, that he or she has no 'well-founded fear' of the event happening." Id. Only a reasonable possibility of persecution, not a situation which would probably result in persecution, need be established, and again the court emphasized the difference in the mandatory language of section 243(h) as amended by the 1980 Act and the "precatory" language of section 208(a) as supporting the Protocol's and Congress' intent that "well-founded fear" is a lesser standard. Id. at 1217-18.
80. Id. at 1218 (quoting S. REP. NO. 96-256, p. 26 (1979)) (footnotes omitted).
81. Id. at 1218.
82. Id. (footnote omitted).
version reinforced the Court’s opinion that Congress intended a less strict standard be applied when aliens apply for asylum as refugees.  

2. The Government’s Arguments

The government made three principal arguments for reversal of the Ninth Circuit’s decision. First, the government argued that the standards are in fact coterminous. Second, it argued that because section 208(a) affords potentially greater benefits to aliens than section 243(h), it would be anomalous for section 208(a) to have a less stringent standard of eligibility. Third, the government argued that the BIA’s construction of the Act should be given substantial deference, even if the Court concluded that the court of appeals’ interpretation of the statute was more in keeping with Congressional intent.

Regarding its first contention, the government argued that an applicant may demonstrate a “well-founded fear of persecution” only if he proves a “clear probability of persecution” and, therefore, the standards are coterminous. The Court disagreed, stating that the language of the Refugee Act of 1980 “does not lend itself to this reading.” The Court compared the objective component in the “would be threatened” language of section 243(h) with the subjective “fear” element contained in the section 208(a) standard and concluded that there was a clear difference in emphasis between the two standards “on the face of the statute.” Accordingly, Justice Stevens stated that there could be no question that Congress meant the standards to differ.

The Court rejected the government’s second argument because it did not account for the discretionary nature of section 208(a) asylum decisions. Even if an alien meets the standard under section

83. Id. at 1219. The Court notes the significance of Congress’ rejection of the Senate bill’s language as an indication of their intent not to enact that language sub silentio. Id. (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 1212.
85. Id. at 1219.
86. Id. at 1220 (footnote omitted).
87. Id. at 1212.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1212-13. Justice Stevens noted also that the BIA recognized the subjective aspect of “fear” as used in the statute. Id. at 1213 n.11.
90. Id. In particular, Justice Stevens noted that the two standards were incorporated into the separate sections by the same Congress, simultaneously. He then quoted language from earlier cases indicating that under such circumstances it is presumed that Congress is acting deliberately in its choice of language. Id. (citations omitted).
91. Id. at 1219.
208(a) and, therefore, is considered a refugee, she is merely eligible for asylum.\(^9\) The Attorney General may exercise his discretionary authority and choose not to grant asylum.\(^9\) An alien meeting the stricter standard under section 243(h), however, automatically is entitled to relief.\(^9\) The Court did not consider this statutory structure to be anomalous and rejected the government’s contention that the discretionary/mandatory distinction had no practical significance.\(^9\)

The Court also rejected the government’s third argument.\(^9\) Although the Court acknowledged that agency interpretations of ambiguous terms must be respected,\(^9\) the Court characterized its task in Cardoza-Fonseca as much more narrow, and certainly within the province of the judiciary.\(^9\) The Court did not attempt to provide a precise definition of the well-founded fear test.\(^9\)

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92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. (footnote omitted).
95. Id.
98. Id. at 1222.
99. Id.
Rather, the Court concluded that the immigration judge and the BIA incorrectly held that the “clear probability of persecution” standard and the “well-founded fear” standard were coterminous. Finally, the Court stated that the language of the Act, its similarity to the United Nations Protocol, and its legislative history necessitated the conclusion that an alien should not be required to prove that it is more likely than not that she will be persecuted in order to demonstrate a “well-founded fear of persecution.”

The Court refused to describe how the standard should be applied, but made it clear that a showing of much less than a fifty percent chance of persecution could suffice.

D. The Dissent

In dissent, Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, argued that the BIA’s interpretation of the statute was reasonable. Justice Powell noted that the BIA had adopted appropriate sources from which the INS should derive the meaning of the “well-founded fear” standard, because he perceived the agency’s prior interpretation of the term to be “strikingly contrary to plain language and legislative history.” Justice Blackmun cited the language of the Act, the Protocol, and “the well-reasoned opinions of the Courts of Appeals” as such sources. Although Justice Blackmun noted some differences among the courts of appeals regarding the exact formulation of the standard, he believed that “[t]he efforts of these courts stand in stark contrast to ... the years of seemingly purposeful blindness by the INS ....”

For two reasons, Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment only. First, he objected to the Court’s detailed analysis of the legislative history of the Refugee Act of 1980. He argued that because the Court saw the language of the statute to clearly indicate that the two standards were different, there was no need for any analysis of legislative history. The Court had argued that the history must be analyzed for an intent contrary to the language of the statute. Should such a contrary intent be discovered, the Court must “question the strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it chooses.” Justice Scalia also worried that lower courts might now find such analyses “generally appropriate (or, worse yet, required)” in similar situations. Second, and more significantly, Justice Scalia believed that the Court’s discussion of whether the INS’s interpretation of the “well-founded fear” standard was entitled to deference was both unnecessary and erroneous. He argued that the Court was implying that reviewing courts could use traditional methods of statutory construction to overrule an agency’s interpretation of a statute whenever the court is able to determine the “correct” interpretation of the statute. Justice Scalia saw this as an “evisceration” of Chevron, and as a dangerous misinterpretation of settled administrative law. He also noted that in Chevron the Court deferred to the EPA’s “abstract interpretations” of the statute at issue.

100. Id. (footnote omitted).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1217. Justice Blackmun, although joining the Court’s opinion, wrote a brief concurrence. Id. 1222-23. He wished to stress that he understood the Court to be indicating appropriate sources from which the INS should derive the meaning of the “well-founded fear” standard, because he perceived the agency’s prior interpretation of the term to be “strikingly contrary to plain language and legislative history.”
104. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1225 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell be-
a four-part test which required aliens to demonstrate that there was a "realistic likelihood" of persecution actually occurring, and that, in the Board's experience, this test seldom differed from a demonstration that persecution was "more likely than not" to occur.105

Moreover, Justice Powell did not view the language of section 208(a) of the Refugee Act106 to be as clear as the Court found it.107 He contended that the Court put too much stress on the subjective aspect of the word "fear" and too little on the objective "well-founded" requirement.108 He argued that whether the objective aspects of the "well-founded fear" and "clear probability" standards truly differ in practice should be decided by the agency that Congress had assigned to apply the standards.109

The dissent also asserted that the legislative history on which the Court relied was ambiguous and of little guidance in interpreting whether the two standards differ.110 Justice Powell argued that prior agency practice under section 203(a)(7) of the INA was irrelevant to asylum procedures,111 that any reliance upon the materials interpreting the United Nations Protocol was also irrelevant,112 and that, contrary to the Court's arguments, there was no significance in the rejection of the Senate version of section 208(a) of the

105. Id. at 1226-27 (citing Matter of Acosta, Interim Decision #2986, 22 (BIA, March 1, 1985)). The four-part test is as follows: "the evidence must demonstrate that (1) the alien possesses a belief or characteristics a persecutor seeks to overcome in others by means of punishment of some sort; (2) the persecutor is already aware, or could easily become aware, that the alien possesses this belief or characteristic; (3) the persecutor has the capability of punishing the alien; and (4) the persecutor has the inclination to punish the alien." Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1226 (quoting Matter of Acosta, at 22).

106. This is the section defining the term "refugee." See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.


108. Id.

109. Id. at 1227-28. Justice Powell believed that the Court "ignore[d] the practical realities recognized by the expert agency and instead concentrate[d] on semantic niceties" by setting out mathematically based hypotheticals which could lead to a different result by application of the Court's interpretation of the standards. Id. at 1228. He dismissed any basis in "[c]ommon sense and human experience for a persecution-by-numbers scenario," and said that in light of the types of evidence usually presented in asylum cases the BIA was making "a qualitative evaluation of 'realistic likelihoods'." Id. (emphasis in original).

110. Id. at 1228.

111. Id. at 1229 (citing S. REP. 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 256, 9, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 149). See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.

112. Id. at 1229-30. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
Finaliy, Justice Powell wrote that even if there was a difference between the two standards, he would reverse the court of appeals because the BIA had applied a lower standard to Cardoza-Fonseca's asylum application. Further, Justice Powell asserted that the absence of any substantive evidence supporting her claim of a "well-founded fear of persecution" other than her brother's past persecution, combined with her family's presence in Nicaragua, was of particular significance. Justice Powell noted also that the BIA had in fact applied three different formulations of the "well-founded fear" standard. Specifically, the BIA applied a "clear probability" test, a "good reason" test, and a "realistic likelihood" test and found that Cardoza-Fonseca had failed to meet any of those formulations. Justice Powell asserted that by concluding that the Board had applied the wrong legal standard, the Ninth Circuit ignored the factual and legal bases for the BIA's decision. He believed that the court of appeals gave no consideration to the Board's application of the three formulations of the standard and misunderstood its proper function in reviewing agency decisions.

IV. ANALYSIS

The most significant question raised by the narrow holding in Cardoza-Fonseca is what practical effect the decision will have on aliens' applications for asylum as refugees under section 208(a) of the 1980 Act. The Court has left undisturbed, if not approved, the formulations of the "well-founded fear" standard developed by the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits in the cases decided prior to Cardoza-Fonseca, which are discussed below.

113. Id. at 1230. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
114. Id. at 1230-31.
115. Id. at 1231.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1231-32.
119. Id. at 1232. Justice Powell notes that the Court could properly consider whether the Board's conclusion was proper in light of the evidence, but should not have assumed an improper test was applied when the BIA's opinion showed otherwise. Id.
120. Id. at 1223 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the opinion and in the judgment).
121. Obviously the opinion of the Ninth Circuit below, relying upon much of the language used by the Seventh Circuit in Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984) was upheld and left unaltered. Several insightful articles have addressed these matters, albeit without the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in Cardoza-Fonseca. See generally Blum, The Ninth Circuit and the Protection of Asylum Seekers Since the Passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 327 (1986) (reviewing standard of
The interpretation or formulation of the "well-founded fear" standard as set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in *Carvajal-Munoz v. INS*\(^{122}\) has been explicitly adopted in the Sixth and Ninth Circuits,\(^{123}\) and has been cited with approval or as one available formulation, by the other circuit courts which have addressed the issue.\(^{124}\) It is likely, therefore, in at least three circuits, that the Seventh Circuit's formulation will now be routinely applied in section 208(a) applications. The Seventh Circuit's formulation requires the applicant to establish that she has been subjected to persecution or has a good reason to fear that she will be singled out for persecution on the grounds specified in the statute.\(^{125}\) Objective evidence generally will be required.\(^{126}\)

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122. 743 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984). See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. It is interesting to speculate at this point whether the fact that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985) was affirmed by the Supreme Court will lead to a general acceptance of the Carvajal-Munoz formulation. See infra note 190.
124. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text. See also Cruz-Lopez v. INS, 802 F.2d 1518, 1522 (4th Cir. 1986). Cf: McLeod v. INS, 802 F.2d 69, 94 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing the Ninth Circuit decision in *Cardoza-Fonseca* as authority for the proposition that the "well-founded fear" standard is more lenient). See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
125. Supra note 51 and accompanying text.
126. Id.
Furthermore, when only the alien's own uncorroborated testimony is available, it must be credible and persuasive, and must point to specific facts that allow an inference that she has a good reason to fear persecution.\textsuperscript{127}

Application of this formulation will lead to insurmountable difficulties for many applicants. In practice, use of the formulation would nullify the result in \textit{INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca} and perpetuate the BIA's conclusion that the "clear probability" and "well-founded fear" standards do not differ. An insistence on "specific, detailed" testimony from an applicant, which provides facts that give rise to an inference of a good reason to fear persecution, is not significantly less burdensome than requiring an applicant to demonstrate that persecution is "more likely than not." Moreover, such a stringent test in the absence of objective corroboration will make possible a wide variety of arbitrary outcomes, even in similar factual situations.

An analysis of several cases decided prior to \textit{Cardoza-Fonseca} by the circuits that have adopted the Seventh Circuit's formulation articulated in \textit{Carvajal-Munoz} supports these hypotheses. The Sixth Circuit, affirming a denial of asylum and withholding of deportation by the BIA, found testimony by the applicant regarding persecution of his family and friends because of religious and political affiliations insufficient under the \textit{Carvajal-Munoz} formulation.\textsuperscript{128} The court considered significant the absence of any specific evidence that the applicant himself would be singled out for persecution.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{127}. \textit{Id.} Note, in fact, that the Seventh Circuit stated that "this evidentiary burden is very similar to that connected with the 'clear probability' standard, [but] it is not identical." \textit{Carvajal-Munoz v. INS}, 743 F.2d 562, 575 (7th Cir. 1984).

\textsuperscript{128}. \textit{Moosa v. INS}, 760 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1985). The applicant was a citizen of Iraq and a Shiite Muslim who had refused to join the ruling Baath Party. He testified that the Party had imprisoned his uncle and three brothers and had executed five of his friends. He also claimed that one of his brothers was partially paralyzed due to beatings received during incarceration. \textit{Id.} at 716. \textit{See supra} note 42 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{129}. \textit{Id.} at 719. The result in \textit{Carvajal-Munoz} was similar. There the applicant, a native of Chile and a former citizen of Argentina, claimed that he feared persecution in Argentina because of his birth in Chile, his past political activities, and his renunciation of his Argentine citizenship. 743 F.2d 562, 570. He testified of prior persecution by the Argentine police but not as to the specific circumstances of his arrests. \textit{Id.} at 570-77. The only objective evidence submitted consisted of articles documenting the political environment in Argentina. \textit{Id.} at 577. Because his testimony did not "describe credibly and persuasively specific detailed facts" demonstrating a good reason to fear persecution or actual persecution, the BIA's denial of the application was affirmed. \textit{Id.} \textit{See also} \textit{Yousif v. INS}, 794 F.2d 236, 239, 244 (6th Cir. 1986) (affirming the BIA's denial of asylum to an Iraqi Christian who claimed he would be persecuted due to his criticism of the Baath regime).
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has upheld a denial of asylum when a Guatemalan testified to having received a note warning him to “leave the country or ‘be subject to the consequences.’”¹³⁰ The applicant was held to have failed to meet the objective criteria required under the Carvajal-Munoz formulation because the note was not produced, and because there was no evidence establishing that the note was from a political group.¹³¹ In another case decided the same day, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a denial of asylum to an Iranian who was sympathetic with the Mojahedin, a group which helped to overthrow the Shah, but subsequently became anti-Kohmeini.¹³² The court ruled that the applicant’s testimony that he had been photographed at a Mojahedin meeting by agents of the Kohmeini government, and that another member of the group had been executed upon his return to Iran, was not sufficient to meet the objective criteria required by the “well-founded fear” standard.¹³³

Two circuits have refused to adopt a specific formulation of the standard, but have apparently assumed that the Seventh Circuit’s formula may apply.¹³⁴ The Fourth Circuit affirmed a denial of asylum to an applicant who had received a note from an El Salvadoran guerilla group which said “Join the BPR or you will regret it.”¹³⁵ Although one of the applicant’s friends had been tortured and murdered after his family received a similar note, other friends and family who received them were unharmed.¹³⁶ Also, the fact that the applicant’s uncle was the leader of a political opposition group was seen as insignificant because the applicant had disavowed the beliefs of his uncle’s group.¹³⁷ Although the note was introduced as objective evidence, the court believed that because “such notes are widely distributed throughout El Salvador and they are frequently nothing more than idle threats,”¹³⁸ the applicant had failed to demonstrate a “specific fact” giving him “good

¹³⁰. Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 780 F.2d 1488, 1490 (9th Cir. 1986). See supra note 42 and accompanying text.

¹³¹. Id. at 1493. It should be noted also that neither the immigration judge nor the BIA questioned the credibility of the applicant’s testimony.

¹³². Larimi v. INS, 782 F.2d 1494, 1495 (9th Cir. 1986). See supra note 42 and accompanying text.

¹³³. Id. at 1497.

¹³⁴. Cruz-Lopez v. INS, 802 F.2d 1518, 1522 (4th Cir. 1986); McLeod v. INS, 802 F.2d 89, 93 (3d Cir. 1986). See supra note 42 and accompanying text.

¹³⁵. Cruz-Lopez, 802 F.2d at 1519.

¹³⁶. Id.

¹³⁷. Id. at 1520.

¹³⁸. Id. at 1522. But see supra note 136 and accompanying text.
reason" to fear persecution.139

Although the Third Circuit has refused to consider whether the "clear probability" and "well-founded fear" standards differ,140 that court has stated that, even under the more lenient standard of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, a Grenadan's testimony that he feared persecution because of his political affiliations was insufficient.141 The applicant testified that he believed he would be imprisoned and tortured upon his return to Grenada for his opposition to the Gairy and Bishop regimes.142 He also presented evidence showing that factions of these former governments were still active in Granada.143 The INS, however, rebutted this evidence with a statement that the Granadian government had changed in 1983, and the court found the applicant's testimony and evidence regarding faction activity to be speculative.144 He therefore failed to set forth "specific, objective facts" supporting an inference of a good reason to fear future persecution.145

It is apparent from the above discussion that the burden on the alien in an application for asylum proceeding is still great, even under the less strict "well-founded fear" standard as applied by the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth circuits. Two Ninth Circuit cases give a good indication of the type of evidence and testimony that may be required to satisfy the standard. In one case the court reversed a denial of asylum to a citizen of El Salvador.146 The applicant testified that he had been a member of a right-wing party in El Salvador for two years, had been in the army, and had been a member of a citizen police squad which guarded against guerrilla infiltration.147 Because of his knowledge of these groups, the guerrillas attempted to recruit the applicant. When he refused to join them, they threatened to kill him.148 The applicant believed that the guerrillas would carry out their threat because five of his friends

139. Id. at 1522. In dissent, Chief Judge Winter argued that, assuming the "well-founded fear" standard is in fact more lenient than the "clear probability" standard, and assuming the formulation as adopted by the Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits is correct, Cruz-Lopez had demonstrated both the subjective and objective criteria required to meet the "well-founded fear" standard. Id. at 1523 (Winter, J., dissenting).
140. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
141. McLeod, 802 F.2d at 93. See supra note 134.
142. Id. at 92.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 93.
145. Id. (quoting Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1985)).
146. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1985). See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
147. Id. at 1280.
148. Id.
had been murdered in similar situations and his brother disappeared after a similar threat.\(^{149}\) He also introduced documentary evidence regarding the political situation in El Salvador.\(^{150}\) Both the immigration judge and the BIA believed this was insufficient to show a specific reason to fear persecution,\(^{151}\) but the court of appeals found the evidence sufficient even under the more stringent "clear probability" standard,\(^{152}\) and \textit{a fortiori}, under the "well-founded fear" standard.\(^{153}\)

An even more striking example of the extreme circumstances necessary to satisfy the "well-founded fear" standard is presented in another Ninth Circuit case.\(^ {154}\) Del Valle, the applicant, received three notes and several phone calls from the El Salvadoran Squadron of Death demanding he join them as an informer.\(^ {155}\) His second cousin was subsequently abducted and murdered. Following another "request" to join the Squadron of Death, the applicant was attacked on the street, and then abducted by fifteen men who broke into his apartment.\(^ {156}\) The men took the applicant to "headquar-

\(^{149}\) Id.

\(^{150}\) Id.

\(^{151}\) Id.

\(^{152}\) Id. at 1284-85.

\(^{153}\) Id. at 1283. Note the similarity of the facts in the instant case with those in Diaz-Escobar v. INS, \textit{supra} notes 130-31 and accompanying text, and in Cruz-Lopez v. INS, \textit{supra} notes 134-39 and accompanying text, both cases involving affirmance of denials of asylum. And note again that in the instant case the court found the evidence sufficient to satisfy the stricter of the two standards. In fact, in discussing the "clear probability" standard, the court in \textit{Bolanos} made several pointed remarks regarding the practical effects of strict standards of proof upon aliens applying for withholding of deportation, and those remarks apply with equal or greater significance to asylum applications. The court noted that the imposition of a corroboration requirement (again, \textit{in withholding of deportation proceedings}) "would result in the deportation of many people whose lives were genuinely in jeopardy. Authentic refugees rarely are able to offer direct corroboration of specific threats." 767 F.2d 1285. (emphasis added). In a moment of black humor, the court noted that "[p]ersecutors are hardly likely to provide their victims with affidavits attesting to their acts of persecution." \textit{Id.} Finally, the court stated that "[i]f the alien's own testimony about a threat, when unfurled and credible, were insufficient to establish the fact that the threat was made, it would be 'close to impossible for [any political refugee] to make out a section 243(h) case.'" \textit{Id.} (quoting McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1981)). If the "well-founded fear" standard is indeed a more lenient standard, are these arguments not even more persuasive with regard to section 208(a) cases?

\(^{154}\) Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1985). See \textit{supra} note 42 and accompanying text.

\(^{155}\) Id. at 1409.

\(^{156}\) Id. These men were dressed in military uniforms, and the immigration judge and the BIA assumed they were "security forces" who believed Del Valle to be a member of opposition forces. \textit{Id.} at 1410.
ters" and blindfolded, interrogated, and beat him.\textsuperscript{157} He was released shortly thereafter and fled to the United States.\textsuperscript{158} The immigration judge denied the asylum application, and the BIA affirmed, but the court of appeals reversed, again finding sufficient evidence to withhold deportation and therefore, sufficient evidence to meet the "well-founded fear" standard.\textsuperscript{159}

The evidence in these cases was sufficient to meet the "clear probability" standard. One must question, however, how significant is the difference between the evidence in these cases and that in the cases discussed earlier in this section.\textsuperscript{160} If the difference between the two standards is meaningful as a practical matter, a question such as this should only arise in rare and unusual circumstances. In light of the cases discussed, there is reason to doubt that the "well-founded fear" standard, if applied as formulated in \textit{Carvajal-Munoz}, will result in any noticeable diminution in the burden of proof to an alien applying for asylum as a refugee under section 208(a) of the 1980 Refugee Act.\textsuperscript{161}

\begin{enumerate}
\item[157.] \textit{Id.} at 1409-10. Del Valle was questioned regarding membership in an opposition group. \textit{Id.} at 1409.
\item[158.] \textit{Id.} at 1410. The immigration judge and the BIA assumed that Del Valle was released because the "security force" was satisfied he did not belong to an opposition group. \textit{Id.} at 1413.
\item[159.] \textit{Id.}
\item[160.] See \textit{supra} note 153. Clearly, the evidence in \textit{Del Valle} is much stronger than in any of the cases discussed above. See also \textit{Turcios v. INS}, 821 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1986), in which a denial of asylum by the BIA to an El Salvadoran was reversed. The applicant had been abducted, beaten, choked, and subjected to electric shocks by the National Police because he was believed to have been involved with guerrilla groups. \textit{Id.} at 1399. The immigration judge found Turcios' evidence lacking in credibility and evasive and the BIA found no error. \textit{Id.} at 1400-01. The Ninth Circuit held that Turcios' testimony established a "clear probability of persecution" and that, \textit{a fortiori}, the "well-founded fear" standard was satisfied. \textit{Id.} at 1401-03.
\item[161.] It is interesting to speculate at this point whether the "reasonable person" formulation adopted by the Second and Fifth Circuits, if it does indeed differ from the \textit{Carvajal-Munoz} standard, would be any more favorable in practice to aliens applying for asylum as refugees. In remanding a denial of asylum to the BIA, the Second Circuit, in \textit{Carcamo-Flores v. INS}, 805 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986), stated that "the Board should be sensitive to the position into which the person is, hypothetically, being placed. What is relevant is the fear a reasonable person would have, keeping in mind the context of a reasonable person who is facing the possibility of persecution, perhaps including a loss of freedom or even, in some cases, the loss of life." \textit{Id.} at 68.

The Fifth Circuit has considered several section 208(a) cases in 1986. The court first adopted the "reasonable person" formulation in \textit{Guevara-Flores v. INS}. See \textit{supra} note 56. In two prior cases the court had refused to adopt a formulation or to decide whether the "well-founded fear" standard was more lenient than the "clear probability" standard. See \textit{Bahramnia v. INS}, 782 F.2d 1243, 1248 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming denial of asylum when an Iranian applicant was a member of an anti-Khomeini group, two cousins were murdered and two jailed, but produced no evidence of attention of Iranian authorities drawn to him); \textit{Youssefinia v. INS}, 784 F.2d 1254, 1260 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming denial
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that there will likely be no meaningful effect on an alien applying for asylum as a refugee under section 208(a) after Cardoza-Fonseca, unless the objective component of the "well-founded fear" standard is liberalized. Requiring the alien to prove specific facts which lead to an inference of a good reason to fear persecution, in the absence of corroborating testimony or evidence, in most cases probably will lead to an insurmountable burden. In cases in which an alien has received oral threats, or written threats from an unidentified source, or has had friends or associates murdered but not family members, and has received no threats himself, it is likely that the person will be deported under the Carvajal-Munoz standard.

A more effective formulation of this standard is that articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which emphasizes the importance of considering the circumstances into which an alien could be placed by deportation. Specifically, the Second Circuit has articulated a formulation which requires satisfaction of an objective test by the applicant, without undue emphasis upon the proof of specific, particularized facts. Thus, there will be a reasonable chance in practice for an alien to meet the definition of refugee as set out in section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Refugee Act.

of asylum when Iranian applicant, son of informant of Shah's secret police and part-time informant himself, who had informed on a Mullah opposed to the Shah, produced evidence of speculative and incredible nature). Then, in Guerra-Flores, the court allowed reopening of the applicant's case at the BIA level, and held that an alien has a "well-founded fear of persecution" if "a reasonable person in her circumstances would fear persecution if she were to be returned to her native country." 786 F.2d 1242 at 1249. Because the applicant's case had been brought to the attention of the head of the El Salvadoran military, due to her being mistaken for a guerrilla leader and being in possession of "subversive literature" when she was arrested, the court believed she had made out a prima facie showing of a well-founded fear. Id. at 1250. Subsequently, the court affirmed two denials of applications for asylum, but in one case the standard as formulated in Guerra-Flores was clearly ignored. See Ganjour v. INS, 796 F.2d 832, 836 (5th Cir. 1986). In Farzad v. INS, 802 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1986), the Court applied the "reasonable person" formulation, but found no indication in the record that the Iranian applicant had been identified by Iranian authorities as an opponent of the Khomeini regime. Id. at 125. But see the Ninth Circuit discussion of unreasonable evidentiary burdens in Bolanos-Hernandez, supra note 153. See also infra notes 162-90 and accompanying text.

162. See supra note 161.
163. Id.
164. The point at which the granting or denial of asylum becomes discretionary and the burden upon the United States and/or the applicant's community in allowing the individual to remain must be considered. The discretionary nature of the grant of asylum is, ultimately, the key to the impact of the Cardoza-Fonseca holding. Once the legal standard is defined, only in the most outrageous instances is the Attorney General likely to be found to have abused his discretion.
Recently, the BIA adopted this formulation in Matter of Mogharrabi. The Mogharrabis, husband and wife, were citizens of Iran, who had been admitted to the United States as non-immigrant students in 1978. They remained in the United States longer than authorized, and were ordered to appear at a deportation hearing. Although the Mogharrabis admitted they were subject to deportation, the husband applied for withholding of deportation and for asylum. Mogharrabi testified that he feared persecution in Iran because of an incident involving an agent of the Khomeini regime. An Iranian student, employed in the Iranian Interests section of the Algerian Embassy, physically assaulted and drew a gun on Mogharrabi during an argument in which the Khomeini agent threatened Mogharrabi after Mogharrabi made remarks critical of the Khomeini regime. Mogharrabi testified that cameras in the Embassy recorded the entire incident and that he is “now known to Khomeini officials and that as a result he has good reason to fear persecution if returned to Iran.”

The BIA’s opinion contains a well-reasoned analysis of the history of section 208(a) of the 1980 Act, of prior case law, and the Supreme Court decision in Cardoza-Fonseca. The Board first noted that the meaning of “well-founded fear” must be determined “in the contexts of individual cases”, but that “some guidance [could] be provided and would be helpful.” The Board made clear that they were not attempting to construct “a definitive statement on the meaning of well-founded fear” but were providing “a starting point for use in an ongoing effort to formulate a workable and useful definition” of the standard. The Board recognized that the Court in Cardoza-Fonseca had not defined the “well-founded fear” standard. The Board, however, cited the dicta in Stevic and the Cardoza-Fonseca Court’s emphasis that the standard was clearly a lesser one than the “clear probability of persecution” standard as “starting point[s] in defining the term ‘well-founded

165. Interim Decision #3028 (BIA, June 12, 1987).
166. Id. at 2.
167. Id. at 2-3.
168. Id. at 3.
169. Id. at 12.
170. Id. at 12-13.
171. Id. at 13.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 3-12.
174. Id. at 4-5.
175. Id. at 5.
176. Id.
fear." A pointed reference was made to language in Justice Blackmun's concurrence suggesting that immigration judges and the BIA should be guided in their derivation of a definition of the standard by the opinions of the courts of appeals. 178

There followed a detailed analysis of several of the cases discussed supra in the analysis section of this Note. 179 In particular, the Board discussed the formulation adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Carvajal-Munoz and its adoption by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits in Youkhanna and Cardoza-Fonseca, respectively. 180 But of primary significance was the opinion of the Board that the Fifth and Second Circuits had "offered a somewhat more concrete definition" in Guevara-Flores and Carcamo-Flores, respectively. 181 Specifically, the Board stated: "We agree with and adopt the general approach set forth by the Fifth Circuit; that is, that an applicant for asylum has established a well-founded fear if he shows that a reasonable person in his circumstances would fear persecution." 182 The Board quoted the Second Circuit's statement that the "reasonable person standard appropriately captures the various formulations that have been advanced to explain the well-founded fear test." 183 The Board noted that this formulation also comported best with official interpretations of refugee practice under the United Nations Protocol. 184

The Board went on to state, however, that their holding did not require a total discarding of the requirements for asylum set out in Matter of Acosta. 185 The Board suggested that by eliminating the word "easily" from the second requirement, they could still be "useful guidelines in assessing an asylum application" because "omission of the word 'easily' lightens the applicant's burden of proof and moves the requirements as a whole into line with Cardoza-Fonseca." 186 Finally, the Board noted that grants of asylum ultimately remain discretionary and that there must be "a clear delineation of findings" as to applications for withholding of deportation and asylum. 187 The application of the reasonable person for-

177. Id. (footnote omitted).
178. Id. at 6.
179. Id. at 6-10; see supra notes 120-61 and accompanying text.
180. Id. at 7-9.
181. Id. at 9.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 10 (quoting Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 1986)).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 11. See supra note 105.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 12.
mulation to Mogharrabi’s testimony led the Board to conclude that “a reasonable person in [his] circumstances would fear persecution if returned to Iran.” 188 His reasons for fearing persecution were found to be “plausible, detailed, and coherent” and his testimony was considered credible. 189

V. CONCLUSION

Despite the clear difference in statutory language and the relatively clear legislative intent, the Immigration and Naturalization Service had consistently held that aliens applying for asylum as refugees must meet the same standard as those applying for withholding of deportation. Several circuit courts, however, heeded the dicta of the Supreme Court in *INS v. Stevic* and held that the standard required under the asylum statute was indeed a lesser standard. Finally, the court confirmed the Stevic dicta assumption in *INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca*.

Questions remain, however, about what practical effect this ruling will have. In the circuits that have adopted a “lesser” standard prior to *Cardoza-Fonseca*, the practical effects were negligible. A formulation which allows persons with little or no access to documentary evidence or corroborative testimony the chance to demonstrate a “well-founded fear of persecution” must be adopted or the decision in *Cardoza-Fonseca* will be of no benefit to aliens seeking asylum in the United States. If the circuit courts accept *Matter of Mogharrabi* as a valid interpretation of the “well-founded fear” standard, and if the BIA sees to it that the standard is properly applied by district directors and immigration judges, the promise of *Cardoza-Fonseca* will be achieved. 190

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188. *Id.* at 13.
189. *Id.*
190. The *Mogharrabi* decision is very encouraging and provides some hope that a meaningful lesser standard may be adopted in future asylum proceedings as a result of *Cardoza-Fonseca*. However, a recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, decided shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in *Cardoza-Fonseca* was announced, may cast a pall on that hope. In *Gumbol v. INS*, 815 F.2d 406 (6th Cir. 1987), the court concluded that the applicant, an Iraqi Christian who had been beaten by members of the ruling Baath party, did not meet the lesser “well-founded fear of persecution” standard. *Id.* at 412. The court noted that the immigration judge had discounted the applicant’s testimony due to inconsistencies, and that the BIA had concluded that “even if all the petitioner’s allegations were accepted as true, [a] single incident is not sufficient to enable petitioner to avoid deportation under section 208(a) . . . .” *Id.* at 412. The court also considered it important that the applicant’s family had remained in Iraq and were apparently unharmed and that the applicant had never been arrested or impris-
oned for religious or political beliefs. Id. at 413. Of most significance was the court’s statement that “[w]e find that our decision in the instant case is consistent with the rule adopted by the Supreme Court in Cardoza-Fonseca.” Id. at 410 n.3. It is important to note, however, that Gumbol was decided prior to the BIA’s decision in Mogharrabi.

It is also important to note that the Department of Justice had recently proposed sweeping changes in asylum procedures, which would have, inter alia, removed the jurisdiction over asylum claims from immigration judges and transferred that jurisdiction to the INS. See the proposed rule at 52 Fed. Reg. 167, 32,552 (1987).

Because of strong objections to the proposed rules, the INS has withdrawn them, but has announced that new rules will be proposed. 52 Fed. Reg. 46,776 (1987). See also, Helton, Proposed Regulations on Asylum: An Improvement or Retrogression, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 18.