Recent Appellate Court Decisions on Eyewitness Identification

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I. Due Process and Suggestive Identification Procedures

The United States Supreme Court was very concerned in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the threat to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments presented by suggestive identification procedures. In the 1967 case of Stovall v. Denno, the Supreme Court declared that the Constitution would be violated where the "confrontation . . . was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that [the defendant] was denied due process of law." The Court limited its more expansive reading of the broad language in its earlier decision in 1972 with the case of Neil v. Biggers. In Neil, the Court held that even unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures would still not violate due process if "under the 'totality of the circumstances' the identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive." The Court then listed five factors to consider in assessing the reliability of the witness' identification: (1) opportunity to view the perpetrator during the crime; (2) degree of attention; (3) accuracy of the prior description; (4) the witness's level of certainty when identifying the defendant at the time of the confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.

Five years later, doubts concerning the issue of suggestive identification procedures were resolved in Manson v. Brathwaite. The Court acknowledged "the corrupting effect" of suggestive identification, but it identified the central due process concern as being something other than grading the identification procedures used by the police. The Court declared, "reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony." In the thirty years since Brathwaite was decided, the Supreme Court has had little to say of the constitutional restrictions on suggestive identification procedures, in spite of many psychological studies disclosing unreliability in eyewitness testimony.

New York and Massachusetts were recently joined by Wisconsin. Last July, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided the case of State v. Dubose. The Wisconsin court concluded, "Studies have now shown that approach is unsound . . ." Basing its reasoning on the earlier Supreme Court decision of Stovall v. Denno, the Wisconsin court adopted the following rule of state constitutional law:

We conclude that evidence obtained from an out-of-court showup is inherently suggestive and will not be admissible unless, based on the totality of the circumstances, the procedure was necessary. A showup will not be necessary, however, unless the police lacked probable cause to make an arrest or, as a result of other exigent circumstances, could not have conducted a lineup or photo array.

While the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied that it was adopting a per se exclusionary rule, it acknowledged the similarity between its approach to state constitutional due process and the approaches taken in New York and Massachusetts. In these three states, therefore, unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures—or at least showup procedures in the case of Wisconsin—will violate the
state constitution and cannot be saved by showings of likely reliability.

B. State Constitutions and the “Level of Certainty” Factor

Other states have been unwilling to reject the Biggers-Brathwaite test in toto, but have rejected the fourth of the five factors listed in Neil v. Biggers, the one that would permit reliance on the level of certainty of the identifying witness. Many psychological studies have suggested that the witness’ certainty in his identification of the offender is, in fact, not a strong indicator of the reliability of the identification.15 A recent example of the rejection of this factor is a decision of the Georgia Supreme Court in 2005.16 Georgia had a pattern jury instruction modeled after the fourth Biggers factor, telling jurors that they may consider a witness’ level of certainty in his or her identification in assessing the reliability of the identification.17 In Brodes v. State, the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded: “In the 32 years since the decision in Neil v. Biggers, the idea that a witness’s certainty in his or her identification of a person as a perpetrator reflected the witness’s accuracy has been ‘flatly contradicted by well-respected and essentially unchallenged empirical studies.’”18 While it found the instruction harmless error in the case before it, the Georgia Supreme Court directed the state trial courts to discontinue use of the pattern jury instruction.19 Courts in Kansas, Massachusetts and Utah have taken similar approaches, rejecting the use of “level of certainty” instructions.20 However, the Connecticut Supreme Court recently decided that their state constitution does not require that this Biggers factor be abandoned.21

C. Corroborating Identifications

The two topics above deal with state courts interpreting state constitutions. Federal courts, of course, interpret only the federal constitution and are bound in this by decisions of the Supreme Court. However, in applying the totality test in deciding whether identification is reliable under the standards of Biggers-Brathwaite, federal courts, among others, have frequently required that, where the identification procedure is unnecessarily suggestive, the identification must be corroborated in some manner beyond the testimony of the identifying witness.22 As a Tennessee court put it in State v. Meeks, in addition to the five Biggers factors, there is a sixth factor not mentioned by the United States Supreme Court. That is “whether an eyewitness identification is supported by corroborating evidence.”23 However, there has been disagreement among the circuits on what the corroboration must go to. The First, Fourth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits hold that there must be corroboration, but that this corroboration satisfies due process requirements if it corroborates the defendant’s general guilt.24 On the other hand, the Second, Third and Fifth Circuits hold that corroboration of general guilt is not enough. There must be corroboration of the accuracy of the identification itself.25 There seems to be a similar split in state court decisions.26

II. Identification Procedures

Courts have rarely ventured into the task of dictating that particular identification procedures be followed. A noteworthy exception to this is a decision by the Connecticut Supreme Court last year holding, in effect, that whenever there is a risk of misidentification, the administrator of the identification procedure must instruct the witness that the perpetrator may or may
SYMPOSIUM ISSUE
The Benefits of Socially Supportive Interviewing for Child Eyewitnesses

Bette L. Bottoms, Ph.D.¹

Suspected child abuse victims must give reports to forensic investigators, such as police officers and social workers, and sometimes even to judges and jurors. This raises interesting questions about the accuracy and believability of children’s reports, questions that can be answered with psychological research. Results of such research are, in turn, ripe for direct application to policies and laws.

How accurate is children’s eyewitness testimony? Highly publicized claims that some reports of child abuse are false highlight the need to ensure that innocent adults are not being falsely accused of abuse. Unfortunately, the media have led most people to think that this is the only reason we should study children’s testimony. False reports are a terrible miscarriage of justice, but so are undiscovered cases of actual child abuse. There are around three million reports of child maltreatment annually in the United States, but that only scratches the surface.² In an anonymous survey that my students and I conducted with women at the University of Illinois at Chicago, around 22 percent of child sexual abuse victims, 39 percent of physical abuse victims, and 21 percent of emotional abuse victims reported that they had never told anyone about their abuse. Of those who did tell someone, fewer than 10 percent disclosed to authorities.³ So, much child abuse goes undisclosed and unreported, and that leaves children vulnerable to continuing abuse from unidentified perpetrators. Thus, we should not only study children’s eyewitness testimony to learn what techniques will guard against false reports, but also to understand what techniques will help reluctant witnesses disclose actual abuse. Much research in psychology has addressed exactly these issues.⁴

One technique that helps children be more accurate eyewitnesses is socially supportive interviewing. Burleson and colleagues⁵ have defined social support as a form of verbal or non-verbal interaction or communication that fosters a feeling of well-being in the target. There’s good reason to be interested in the effect of social support on children’s eyewitness reports, because forensic interviews and courtroom examination can be either socially supportive or intimidating. On the one hand, clinical intuition has long held that children should be interviewed in a warm, supportive manner rather than a more cold, intimidating way. On the other hand, defense attorneys and some courts claim that child-friendly interviewing will make children more willing to please an interviewer and therefore more suggestible. My colleagues, students and I have tested these competing predictions in four experiments.⁶ In each study, we used a basic eyewitness testimony paradigm used in the now-large literature investigating children’s eyewitness testimony. Specifically, children experienced a documented non-abusive event, and then were interviewed immediately or after a delay. After a non-cued free recall question (“Tell me everything you remember”), we asked detailed questions, some of which were highly misleading (“You took your shirt off, didn’t you?”). Interviewers were either warm and supportive or non-supportive (cold) during interviewing, as dictated by clinical theory and research.

Recent studies show the positive effects of supportive interviewing for child witnesses including greater accuracy.

Taken as a whole, these studies revealed a number of interesting things about the effects of interviewer-provided social support. First, social support increases the eyewitness accuracy of children ranging in age from three to eight years.⁷ Second, support increases accuracy in reports of both stressful and non-stressful events.⁸ Third, social support increases children’s accuracy if interviews are given immediately after the
original event, as well as if interviews are given after delays, even a delay of an entire year. The nature of the effect differs, however, as a function of delay. After delays, but less during immediate interviews, support improves free recall accuracy. Even after no delay, however, support reduces children’s compliance and helps them resist misleading questions, thereby decreasing their suggestibility. Fourth, there are probably two separate psychological mechanisms for decreasing suggestibility and increasing free recall accuracy. That is, the memory-enhancing effects of social support are likely to be caused by social support increasing cognitive abilities, such as attentional focus, and the suggestibility-reducing effects of social support are probably caused by social support increasing children’s “Resistance Efficacy,” or their feelings of empowerment and confidence about contradicting an adult’s misleading suggestions. Fifth, some children appear to benefit more than others from interviewer-provided social support, namely those who are: (a) low in working memory capacity (i.e., generally less able to attend to tasks without being distracted), (b) low in social support from other people in his or her life and (c) insecurely attached (preoccupied and less trusting of others during social interactions).

Finally, interviewer-provided social support (and the lack thereof) can also affect adults’ perceptions of children’s credibility. This is of great practical concern in a forensic context. If a child makes a disclosure of abuse, adults must decide whether that disclosure is credible before any action will be taken to remove a child from harm or bring a perpetrator to justice. If the case goes to trial, attorneys, judges, and jurors will also make judgments about the child’s credibility. On the one hand, adults might be skeptical of supportive interviewing, wrongly viewing such techniques as coercive, thinking: “If you are nice to children, they’ll just say whatever they think you want to hear.” On the other hand, adults might intuitively understand the integrity of supportive techniques, realizing that intimidation prompts more suggestibility and less accuracy. Which is it? Adults who watched videotaped interviews from my prior studies rated children interviewed in a non-supportive manner as being more accurate than children who were interviewed in a supportive manner, when, as described above, the reverse was true. So, even though socially supportive interviewing has positive effects on children’s actual accuracy, it might disadvantage child witnesses in terms of their perceived credibility.

In conclusion, although there is more work to be done before we know all the answers, my and others’ research reveals that supportive interviewing carries no apparent risks and is especially useful for children with characteristics such as high distractibility who might otherwise be disadvantaged in a forensic interview. Thus, it should be used widely by forensic interviewers. Additionally, our research also suggests that courts and jurors need to be informed of its positive effects.

1 Bette L. Bottoms, Ph.D., is Professor of Psychology at The University of Illinois at Chicago. She is a Fellow of the American Psychological Association (“APA”) and Past President of the APA Division of Child, Youth, and Family Services and its Section on Child Maltreatment. Her research on the accuracy of children’s eyewitness testimony and jurors’ perceptions of children’s testimony was recognized with the APA Saleem Shah Early Career Award for Contributions to Psychology and Law Research. She is also the recipient of six teaching and mentoring awards as well as the Rising Star Award from the Today’s Chicago Woman Foundation in recognition of her career and community contributions. She has authored numerous scholarly articles and edited four books, including Children, Social Science, and the Law (Cambridge University Press) and Ending Child Abuse: New Efforts in Prevention, Investigation and Treatment (Haworth).


4 MEMORY AND SUGGESTIBILITY IN THE FORENSIC INTERVIEW (Mitchell E. Eisen, Jodi A. Quas & Gail S. Goodman eds., Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc. 2002); ENDING CHILD ABUSE: NEW
Notes on the Illinois Pilot Program on Sequential Double-Blind Identification Procedures

Roy S. Malpass

As a result of recommendations made by the Illinois Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment, the Illinois Legislature charged the Illinois State Police with conducting a pilot program to evaluate the effectiveness of the sequential, double blind identification procedure in the field. Sheri H. Mecklenburg was appointed Director of the Illinois Pilot Program and undertook to design the Illinois Pilot Program, seeking comments and approval from eyewitness researchers in the process. Reporting forms were developed, police personnel were given training on the new procedures and procedures were developed for deciding which lineups would be presented according to traditional or new procedures. These matters and much more are detailed in the Report to the Legislature of the State of Illinois: the Illinois Pilot Program on Sequential Double-Blind Identification Procedures (“the Report”).

The author was approached by Mecklenburg, asking for our participation as analysts. I agreed to act in this capacity with the assistance of Laura A. Zimmerman, Stephen J. Ross, Lisa D. Topp, Vanessa Uribe, Dannette De Leon, Sarah Ramirez and Jessica Belisle, all members of the Eyewitness Identification Research Laboratory at the University of Texas at El Paso. Periodically we received sets of case reports from the three participating jurisdictions. We were given a free hand to structure our analysis in our own way. We constructed the code book and implemented an analysis. While we contributed our analysis of the data, we did not participate in writing the Report.

Professor Ebbesen of the University of California, San Diego also agreed to serve as an analyst for the Pilot Program. Professor Ebbesen and his research group received the same case reports and constructed their own way of coding and analyzing the data. Professor Ebbesen’s group and the Eyewitness Lab at University of Texas at El Paso reached the same conclusions, although our conventions for coding the raw field reports for analysis differed in some respects, leading to somewhat different numbers. Ebbesen and Malpass never discussed anything about their task—had no conversation whatever—until they met during the Symposium held at the Loyola University of Chicago Law School on April 21, 2006.

Design

The study was designed to determine whether or not a new eyewitness identification procedure (a particular variant of double-blind sequential lineup) is superior to the simultaneous lineup procedure in current use. The specifics of implementation of the design are discussed in the Report. This study was not the extension of an academic research program and was not undertaken to untangle theoretical issues.

Results

The major results are displayed in Table 1, for the total sample, aggregating the results across the three jurisdictions. There are three outcomes possible in this study: suspect identifications, filler identifications and non-identifications. It is important to note that suspect identifications cannot be interpreted as either correct or false identifications, and non-identifications can not be interpreted as missing the offender or as rejecting a lineup that does or does not contain the actual offender. It is not known, for any lineup in this study, whether the suspect in the lineup is the actual offender. This can be known in laboratory studies, but not in the field without a considerable amount of additional research. We will return to this matter below.

The major results are these:

(Malpass, continued on page 6)
Table 1. Effects of Simultaneous and Sequential Lineups on Three Outcome Variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Simultaneous</th>
<th>Sequential</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Suspect ID</td>
<td>59.9%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filler ID</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No ID</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Witnesses who viewed a simultaneous lineup identified the suspect more often than those witnesses who viewed a sequential lineup (suspect identification rates of 59.9 percent and 45 percent respectively).
- Witnesses who viewed a simultaneous lineup chose a filler less often than those who viewed a sequential lineup (filler identification rates of 2.8 percent and 9.2 percent respectively).
- Witnesses who viewed a simultaneous lineup were less likely to choose no one than were those who viewed a sequential lineup (no identification rates of 37.6 percent and 47.2 percent respectively).

As noted above, these results cannot be interpreted directly as accurate or erroneous responses. Nonetheless, assuming that the increase in non-identifications for sequential lineups compared with simultaneous lineups reflects a proportionate increase in correct rejections in a culprit-absent lineup, and that the decrease in suspect identifications from simultaneous to sequential lineups is proportionate with a decrease in correct identifications in a culprit-present lineup, then the sequential advantage for culprit-absent lineups will be more than offset by the sequential disadvantage for culprit-present lineups. This comparison is worsened if one considers that culprit-present lineups are probably the more frequent. It seems implausible that on the average law enforcement does not do better than a .5 probability of getting the right person in the lineup.

Reasonable people can begin with different assumptions, however. The proportions of suspect identifications contributed to correct and false identifications can be argued, and various probabilities that the culprit is actually in the lineup can be entertained.

Stability of the findings across jurisdictions is a matter of interest from the perspective of application. These findings are displayed in Table 2.

- For simultaneous lineups, suspect identifications vary over a range of 10.7 points, from 57.0 to 67.7, and non-identifications vary over a range of 10.1 points, from 32.3 to 42.4.
- For sequential lineups, suspect identifications vary over a range of 42.7 points, from 25.9 to 68.6, and non-identifications vary over a range of 34.4 points, from 28.6 to 63.0.
- The difference between simultaneous and sequential lineups also varies considerably, from +41.8 to -7.3.

Sequential lineups appear to be more sensitive to differences in jurisdiction/ location/ context/ background conditions, although it is not clear exactly what conditions these might be.

Table 2: Effects of Simultaneous and Sequential Lineups on Three Outcome Variables, by Jurisdiction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chicago</th>
<th>Evanston</th>
<th>Joliet</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suspect ID</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filler ID</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No ID</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Malpass, continued from page 5)

(Malpass, continued on page 7)
Discussion and Interpretation

The Illinois Pilot Program is a landmark eyewitness identification study, even among field studies:

- The Illinois Pilot Program makes a direct comparison between the traditional, intact simultaneous lineup procedures and a version of double-blind sequential lineups.
- It uses multiple jurisdictions.
- It contains more than 700 individual identifications.
- The criminal cases cover the entire range of crimes committed during the period of the study.

Field data are inherently noisy. Field studies are known for variability, and this is why laboratory studies are sometimes called “controlled” studies by way of contrast. There are many investigators, many contexts and many jurisdictions, and these lead to many variations in implementation. In some respects the noisy background may obscure relationships in the data that might be found under otherwise more controlled conditions. On the other hand, strong effects showing through the background variation would be robust. Additionally, confounding factors outside of the research design proposed as having an effect on study outcomes would also have to be strong (substantial empirical effect size), consistent and detectable to be taken seriously. Further, the noisy study environment is a valid reflection of the environment of application because it IS the environment of application.

It may take some time to frame new questions arising out of our attempts to interpret these results. The questions will lead to new and more informative research - certainly in the laboratory - and hopefully in field studies carried out in association with law enforcement. This is a very rich intellectual welfare program for researchers.

Clearly the problems with eyewitness identifications have not been solved, and as Barry Scheck pointed out in his remarks on the eve of the Loyola Conference, we should move forward to develop other areas of lineup reform while we clarify the contribution of sequential lineup presentation. Working relationships between law enforcement and academic researchers should be strengthened to study a range of identification questions.

Transposition from field categories to the categories of laboratory studies. An important thing to note in the interpretive process is that the three outcome categories of the field study cannot easily be disaggregated into the six (at least) categories of laboratory studies.

It would be possible to disaggregate the field study categories under two conditions: If we make assumptions about (1) the proportions of each field category to be distributed to each of the two cognate lab categories, and (2) the proportion of those figures to be considered, reflecting the a priori probability of the suspect being the perpetrator, or not.

Filler Identifications. Filler identifications are the only responses that have an apparent clear interpretation. The only thing that can be said, really, is that sequential lineups attract a non-trivially greater frequency of filler identifications, overall. This is descriptively true for all three jurisdictions, but statistically reliable for only two. The absolute percentage of filler identifications is small. There does not appear to me to be a theoretically solid way to use this result to make inferences about the interpretation of the real interest of this study: the accuracy of suspect identifications and non-identifications.

Double-blind simultaneous lineups as a comparison. The purpose of the study, as stated above, was to determine whether or not a new eyewitness identification procedure (a particular variant of double-