Hate in Cyberspace: Regulating Hate Speech On the Internet

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Hate in Cyberspace: Regulating Hate Speech on the Internet

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................818
II. SPACE AND CYBERSPACE......................................................................................... 820
   A. Spacetime and the Flow of Events...........................................................................822
   B. The Spacio-Temporal Processes of Cyberspace.....................................................826
   C. Hate Speech on the Internet...................................................................................832
   D. The Practicality of Regulating the Internet ..........................................................835
III. COMMON LAW LIMITS ON CONTROLLING HATE SPEECH ..................................838
    A. Current Supreme Court Doctrine ..........................................................................839
       1. Imminent Threat of Harm..................................................................................839
       2. Marketplace of Ideas..........................................................................................843
       3. Content Regulations..........................................................................................849
    B. The Dangers to Democracy Posed by Outgroup Stereotypes...............................853
IV. HATE SPEECH LAWS IN OTHER DEMOCRACIES ..................................................858
V. REGULATING HATE SPEECH ON THE INTERNET .................................................863
   A. Commercial Solutions ............................................................................................864
   B. Establishing a Cause of Action..............................................................................869
   C. Obtaining Personal Jurisdiction...........................................................................871
VI. CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................873

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I. INTRODUCTION

The speed at which information can be spread throughout the United States and other countries has been greatly enhanced by the Internet. This computer-driven, technological medium consists of various modes of transmission, including discussion groups, interactive pages, and mail services. A wide variety of pictorial, auditory, and written information is available on the Internet. Persons with disparate goals can access and affect large audiences through it. Both those seeking social improvement and those promoting racist violence can now increase the magnitude, diversity, and location of their audiences. Persons advancing democratic ideals and those inclined to exclusionary elitism can use e-mails and electronic chat rooms to communicate with like-minded individuals located in different cities and in other lands.

There are millions of people who regularly connect to and interact on the Internet.1 It is a communications system that uses computer programs, computer parts, and algorithms to facilitate local, national, and international interactions.2 The Internet has globalized the spread of knowledge. It has made available more educational opportunities, increased citizens’ roles in government, given greater access to health related resources, made available library catalogues, and allowed people to find employment far from their homes.3 In those ways, it has been an invaluable tool for thriving democracies.

On the other hand, it has also been manipulated by cynical forces seeking to create social division and inequality.4 There are at least 800 Internet sites devoted to hatred against outgroups like minorities, homosexuals, and other identifiable groups, such as Jews.5 These sites thrive in the United States because of the few controls on their activities. In this country, the maintenance of unencumbered free speech is often considered the ultimate political value, regardless of indices that link

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1. While the exact number of Internet users fluctuates and is therefore not certain, recent estimates find that there are between 140 and 304 million users worldwide. See South Africa; Good Going on South Africa’s Gambling Industry, AFR. NEWS, Aug. 4, 2000, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/2000008040025.html (saying there are approximately 140 million users); Telecom Committee Urges Beauty Contest for 2000 System, BUS. DAY (Thail.), Aug. 4, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All. (claiming 170 million users); Walaika Haskins, Super Economy, PC MAG., Aug. 2000, at 82 (saying there were 304 million users as of March 2000).
2. See infra Part II.B (discussing the technical workings of the Internet).
hate speech⁶ to the perpetration of crimes against minorities.⁷ The role of hate speech in developing and sustaining anti-democratic social movements is discussed in Part II.B of this Article.

Besides theorists who hold that laws should not prohibit hate speech,⁸ there are those who argue that the Internet should not be regulated because it is extraspacial and, therefore, should be unencumbered by government regulations.⁹ No state, it is proclaimed, does or can have sovereignty in this extraterritorial cyberspace.¹⁰ The proponents of this doctrine fail to recognize that coded writings and images are transmitted

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6. Mari J. Matsuda provides useful distinguishing characteristics of dangerous hate speech: "(1) The message is of racial inferiority; (2) The message is directed against a historically oppressed group; and (3) The message is persecutorial, hateful, and degrading." Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320, 2357 (1989). To this definition, it should be added that hate speech is intended to harm its targets and has a substantial probability of doing so.

7. See Cedric Merlin Powell, The Mythological Marketplace of Ideas: R.A.V., Mitchell, and Beyond, 12 Harv. Blackletter L.J. 1, 2 (1995); Michael J. Sniffen, American Rate of Hate Killings Very Alarming Surpasses Germany, Says FBI, Record, June 29, 1994, at A20, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All (reporting that FBI Director Louis Freeh said the most frequent motive for 1993 hate crimes in the United States was racial bias). In 1998, more than half the hate crimes in the United States were motivated by racial bias. See Charles Dervarics, Congress Takes on Hate Crimes, ASAP, July 20, 2000, at 7, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All.


10. See E-mail from John Perry Barlow, to John Perry Barlow (Feb. 9, 1996, 17:16:35 +0100), at http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/John_Perry_Barlow/barlow_0296 (last visited June 20, 2000). "Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather." Id.
and received through physical processes occurring in specific jurisdictions.

This Article postulates that there is a unified reality within which electromagnetic signals are transmitted over the Internet. These signals have consequential influence on the plans and actions of those who transmit and receive them. It is therefore argued herein that disseminated information can affect and impact human lives. This is true not only in theory but also in practice on the Internet, where some persons convey racial and ethnic hate through various media, seeking to persuade others to act on animus. The Internet provides an extensive forum to persons intent on directing outgroup oppression. Instead of tolerating this antisocial activity, Internet hate speech, which poses a substantial threat to egalitarian democracy and its constituents, should be prohibited.

The first part of this Article discusses the structure of spacetime. It then shows how data transmission over the Internet occurs within that manifold and therefore is within the purview of legal regulations. Part II also covers the proliferating number of Internet sites that spread messages promoting racial and ethnic hatred and oppression. The third Part reviews and criticizes current United States jurisprudence on hate speech. Part III then explicates how hate speech undermines egalitarian democracy. Part IV gives a brief account of how Canada and Germany have managed to honor freedom of speech on the Internet while contemporaneously prohibiting hate propaganda. Finally, Part V considers whether it is appropriate to enact laws prohibiting the distribution of hate speech on the Internet, and if so, to what extent such expression may constitutionally be limited. This last Part of the Article formulates a cause of action against hate speech in cyberspace. It includes an analysis of jurisdictional issues and the ineffectiveness of private filtering systems.

II. SPACE AND CYBERSPACE

Cyberspace, a term first coined by William Gibson, provides a novel way to communicate and distribute ideas. This resource is so new that it has been incorrectly characterized as “not ontologically rooted in... physical phenomena, it is not subject to the laws of physics, and hence it is not bound by the limitations of those laws.” Others have called cyberspace “multi-dimensional, artificial, or virtual reality.... Objects seen or heard are neither physical nor, necessarily, presentations of physical objects, but are rather—in form, character, and action—made

up of data of pure information."\textsuperscript{13} This line of thinking leads to the notion that there is no "temporal reality in cyberspace."\textsuperscript{14}

Some authors have adopted the metaphor of the Internet as extraspacial to support their view that it cannot be regulated by territorial laws which, after all, are made for real spaces and jurisdictions. Proponents of that position conclude that no state can claim personal jurisdiction over Internet users.\textsuperscript{15} Cyberspace is regarded as separate and apart from reality.\textsuperscript{16} Cyberspace, so the argument goes, is a virtual reality, the contents of which "exist, in effect, everywhere, nowhere in particular, and only on the Net."\textsuperscript{17} David Johnson and David Post write, "'[t]here is no geographically localized set of constituents with a stronger and more legitimate claim to regulate it than any other local group.'\textsuperscript{18} Messages, they and others imply, are routed in some ephemeral way that supersedes the abilities of jurisdictions to regulate cyberspace. Essentially, they argue that geographically-based governmental authority and laws are inapplicable in this new communications medium because of its nonphysical nature.

These sweeping pronouncements suffer from an analytical misstep. They accept a postulate as being axiomatic. That is, they fail to examine whether the physical nature of the Internet and the messages transmitted over it really are extraspacial and, therefore, outside the jurisdiction of states with physical borders.\textsuperscript{19} By not evaluating what space is and whether the Internet is spacial, they argue circularly: Internet communications are nonspacial, therefore the Internet cannot be regulated by governments because it is nonlocal. This logical error has significant consequences because its proponents employ the argument as a given from which flows the conclusion that governments cannot enforce laws over this virtually nonspacial matrix.

This part of the Article seeks to remedy that mistake by first examining the nature of space and then determining whether processes on the


\textsuperscript{15} See, e.g., Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1376.

\textsuperscript{16} See id. at 1378.

\textsuperscript{17} Id. at 1375.

\textsuperscript{18} Id.

\textsuperscript{19} See infra Part II.D.
Internet occur in space. If transmissions on the Internet are sent and received in particular locations, then specific fora retain jurisdiction to prosecute illegal activities transacted on the Internet. By showing that everything occurring in cyberspace materializes within the spacetime manifold, this Article attempts to demonstrate that the Internet, like every other social space, can be regulated by carefully crafted laws.

A. Spacetime and the Flow of Events

Nature is uniform, but not static, throughout altering phenomena. Inductive reasoning, predictability, and repetitive patterns are derived from this uniformity.\(^2\) Seemingly dissonant and chaotic microscopic and macroscopic events are, upon observation, explainable by constant laws.\(^2\)

The object of physics is not only the formulation of consistent theory, but also the ascertainment of truths about nature.\(^2\) Accurate descriptions of nature are not limited by individual perspectives; instead, they are based on actual physical processes and relations.\(^2\) Transcendent reality exists independent of our subjective perceptions and individual expectations.\(^2\) The character of existence is not based on what we agree it to be; rather, our theories, to be verifiable and useful, must reflect an independent reality.\(^2\) There can only be one external space and time.\(^2\) A theory holding that there are multiple spaces and times posits fragmentary and subjective states whose images and perceptions are ultimately linked to unitary space and time, existing externally of the percipient. As Anthony Quinton, a philosopher, has noted:

Other spatial and temporal entities are fragmentary and private, a sort of ontological litter to be bundled into the wastepaper basket of the imaginary. . . . [W]e only count those things as real that can be fitted into the one coherent and public space and time, that such locatability is a criterion of being real.\(^2\)

Space is found in the positional relations of events and their parts; time manifests itself in the altering positions between events.\(^2\) Together

\(^{21.}\) See id.
\(^{22.}\) See id.
\(^{24.}\) See Lucas & Hodgson, supra note 20, at 261.
\(^{25.}\) See id.
\(^{26.}\) See Anthony Quinton, Spaces and Times, 37 Philosophy 130, 138 (1962).
\(^{27.}\) Id.
they form a spacetime manifold within which all events occur. The view
that space and time are unified by one existing medium of processes
revolutionized the understanding of physics from the Newtonian model
to the picture presented by Albert Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity.29

Newton conceptualized space as a potentially empty receptacle without
its own properties and unconnected to temporal variations.30 According
to Newton’s model, space is absolute, existing apart from any events.
Einstein, to the contrary, realized that the laws of nature are constant
relative to the location and the time that specific measurements are
taken, and therefore that space is not absolute.31 This does not mean
physical laws are relative and unpredictable. The results of experiments,
presented in predefined units of measurements, are repeatable for all
bodies with the same frame of reference. Experimental results must be
described not only relative to the specific location of the observations
but also relative to the specific time at which they were taken; thus space
and time are part of an intertwined frame of reference.32

The integrated model of space that emerged from Einstein’s Special
Theory of Relativity is four-dimensional.33 Space and time are bound in
a single reality, “spacetime.”34 It was Michael Faraday’s and James
Maxwell’s advances in the electromagnetic theory35 that made it clear to

29. See Lucas & Hodgson, supra note 20, at 1, 37.
30. See id. at 22.
discovered that a problem with Newtonian physics was that it failed to explain why the
speed of light remained constant regardless of the speed at which a percipient was
moving. See id. A light signal sent at time x appears to be traveling at the same speed
both for a person standing still and for another who is moving uniformly in the direction
of the light. This means that the speed of light is governed by a consistent and
predictable law that does not change based on the relative position of the observer. The
absolute theory of space fails to account for why time does not seemingly run slower
relative to the person approaching the light source as opposed to the stationary person.
Natural laws hold true relative to the location from which measurements are taken,
regardless of the speed at which the person collecting data is traveling.
33. Wertheim, supra note 12, at 174.
34. Id.
35. Faraday proved that magnetic factors help produce electricity. See Department
of Electrical & Computer Engineering, University of Maryland, A Gallery of Electromagnetic
Personalities, at http://www.ee.umd.edu/~taylor/frame4.html (last visited Sept. 20,
2000). Maxwell’s great contribution, leading to Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity,
was the concept of electromagnetic radiation. Id. at http://www.ee.umd.edu/~taylor/
frame6.html. There are numerous forms of electromagnetic radiation including light,
“radio waves, microwaves, infrared radiation, ultraviolet rays, X-rays, and gamma rays.”
Einstein realized that within space were “states which propagated themselves in waves, as well as localized fields which [are] able to exert forces on electrical masses or magnetic poles brought to the spot.”

Einstein asserted that in all spacetime frames of reference there are consistent natural laws both for mechanical and electromagnetic phenomena.

The existence of spacetime is an ontologically necessary condition for any specific being and process. Empirical occurrences and alterations can only be manifested and measured within the context of spacetime. The medium is interfused and intermingled in all natural laws and concrete manifestations.

Spacial coordinates reflect the characteristics of unified identities when they are interlinked by individuated time sequences of altering positions. Relative perspectives, which are tied to points of perceptions, are bound to and derivative from objective and nonrelative laws, limiting the possible range of coordinates in spacial appearance and temporal sequence. While in reality there is constant flow and change, spacial position can be abstracted to moments in time. The particular location of a specific particle is determined relative to the spacial location of other particles at a given point in time. Through the flow of time, particles are constantly changing positions, but perceptually, the alteration may be linked to some unity. Through the altering positions of particles, there remain specified qualities linking them to relative parameters of objects. These qualities remain during varying lengths of time, eventually losing characteristics that linked them to unified wholes.

...
The identity of an event over infinite variation is called "duration." Moments of durations have significance throughout the course of an event. Sets of particles are interlinked by the spacial locations and time sequences of smaller sets of related particles whose elements compose sets of durations. These sets are then composed of smaller sets, comprised of elements with shorter spaciometemporal distances. When applied to the physical world, this means that the duration of a molecule that comprises a particular chemical interaction is made up of smaller durations composed of lesser durations of atoms. These are made up of even smaller durations of subatomic particles like protons and electrons altering their position relative to each other through the course of relatively shorter periods of time.

It is fundamental to the theory of spacetime that events can be ordered. That is, at any given time \( x \) the state of particle \( a \) is derived and determined by the necessary influence of its unique vector, whose direction is chronologically "past-pointing." The unique attributes of \( a \) follow a "historical route" containing elements necessary to \( a \)'s existence. "Accordingly the unique individuality of the particle is nothing else than the fusion of the continued sameness of the adjective with the concrete individuality of the historical route." The content of an event reflects past manifestations whose pathway follows an identifiable direction that influences not only the event but also its future potentialities. If the same pathway could be identically repeated, we would expect the same outcome because of the consistency of natural laws. Thus, events occur in spacetime and contain unique characteristics more closely linked to some, and not other, past occurrences. This relationship is called "cause and effect."

While it is impossible to precisely determine the necessary consequences
of events, both deductive and inductive reasoning can be used to establish the probability of consequent events occurring from antecedent ones. Observer's are, of course, limited both by the extent of their knowledge of natural laws and by their profound ignorance of most of the circumstances surrounding and influencing the states of events. Therefore, the predictive power of theory is limited to the degree to which its predicates are accurate about phenomena. For example, advancements in electromagnetic theory make highly probable predictions about the trajectory of those electrons that are influenced by specific magnitudes of magnets. The electromagnetic processes that are associated with the Internet are predictable and traceable to root antecedents.

Thus, all physical processes including electromagnetic ones, happen in spacetime. The next section shows that processes transpiring over the Internet likewise occur in that four-dimensional matrix of reality. The consequence of this conclusion, as argued in Part V, is that the state can enforce laws against persons transmitting certain data over computer networks.

B. The Spacio-Temporal Processes of Cyberspace

This section briefly discusses the history of the Internet and then explains how it works. It describes how the transmission of information occurs by physical processes that can be traced to a source. Since sent materials and posted Web pages originate in specific places at determinable times, persons purposefully transmitting them are subject to the jurisdiction of the location from which they were sent.

Today's global network, the Internet, was developed through research grants from the United States Department of Defense's the Advanced Research Projects Agency. Initially, access to the network was only granted to computer science departments funded by the Department of Defense. The network, which was known as the Advanced Research Project Agency Network (ARPANET), began operating in 1969 transmitting data between computers at the University of California at Los Angeles, the University of California at Santa Barbara, Stanford Research Institute, and the University of Utah. The initial stages of experimentation provided critical observations on the use of protocols

51. For an exceptional presentation of the inability to discover necessary connections in particular occurrences, see 1 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 105-16 (David F. Norton & Mary J. Norton eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1739-40).
54. Id. at 41.
which enabled users to exchange information between various computers.\textsuperscript{55} The goal was to develop a system whereby communication links between two distant locations could continue even when one electrical route was destroyed.\textsuperscript{56} If a message was sent through one route which was inaccessible because of power outage or "military attack," the message would then be automatically rerouted through one of many alternate tracks.\textsuperscript{57} This would ensure uninterrupted communications during times of national crisis and reduce the risks associated with electrical malfunction.

In 1979, researchers established an interactive system, called USENET, for computer laboratories which were not funded by the Department of Defense.\textsuperscript{58} The USENET is made up of forums for interactive discussions on specific subjects.\textsuperscript{59} A user with access to a USENET server can post a message to a specific server which then automatically distributes it to adjacent servers.\textsuperscript{60} Anyone having access to the USENET can view the message and, if she or he wishes, reply. Since the appearance of USENET, a variety of other interactive Internet systems have developed. They include: "(1) one-to-one messaging (such as 'e-mail'), (2) one-to-many messaging (such as 'listserv') ... [3] real time communication (such as 'Internet Relay Chat'), [4] real time remote computer utilization (such as 'telnet'), and [5] remote information retrieval (such as ... 'World Wide Web')."\textsuperscript{61} The Internet is a series of interconnected computer networks. Although figuratively these communications media are virtual realities, when their workings are examined, they exhibit undeniable physical characteristics, operating in spacetime, not in supraphysical events.

Electronic mail (e-mail) transmits information from a specific source, whether individual or organizational, to designated computers. Listserv is an automatic mailing system. When a message is received at one computer server, it is automatically forwarded to a list of subscribers.\textsuperscript{62} Real time communication facilitates almost immediate exchange of

\textsuperscript{55} See id. at 120–24.
\textsuperscript{58} See HAUHEN & HAUHEN, supra note 53, at 39–45.
\textsuperscript{59} See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 835.
\textsuperscript{60} See id.
\textsuperscript{61} Id. at 834.
\textsuperscript{62} Id.
information between computers, similar to telephone conversations. Telnet can be used to receive data information which is saved on another computer. Internet library catalogs use telnet communications.

Remote information retrieval is perhaps the most popular form of Internet communications and includes the World Wide Web (Web). The Web was developed by the European Particle Physics Laboratory to propagate technical information about high energy physics. The Web has now spread widely outside academic communities. There is no central location for information storage. Documents contained on the Web are stored in specific computers and are located through unique addresses, known as links. While there may be a variety of spaces where information is stored, those spaces are real because they are public, accessible to all who have the necessary computer hardware and software, exist at specific times after which they can be retained or deleted, and originate from sources with individual Internet addresses.

Messages are transmitted over the Internet through the use of Open Systems Interconnection (OSI), which is the internationally accepted common reference model for transmitting data between telecommunications locations. This algorithmic model was created to simplify the complex operations involved in Internet communications. The simplification occurs through seven layers each assigned to receive input and responses from the preceding layers. The various processes involved in Internet communication are divided into these layers, each of which adds specific, necessary functions. The layers function on a variety of software and hardware levels. They are: "[A] Layer 7: The application layer ... [B] Layer 6: The presentation layer ... [C] Layer 5: The session layer ... [D] Layer 4: The transport layer; ... [E] Layer 3: The network layer; ... [F] Layer 2: The data-link layer ... [G] Layer 1: The physical layer." The rules used by each layer for communicating between points of transmission and reception are known as "protocols." These protocols are the essential building blocks of the Internet.

Persons utilizing the World Wide Web application layer usually use

63. Id. at 835.
64. Id. at 836.
65. Id.
67. E-mail from Bruce Zikmund, Technical Architect, Verdian Group, L.L.C. to Alexander Tsesis, Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of Chicago Department of Law, (Sept. 11, 2000, 10:48 P.M. EST) (on file with author).
69. Id.
the Hypertext Transmission Protocol (HTTP) presentation layer. This protocol provides rules for exchanging or delivering multimedia files, including those containing text or video images.71 The HTTP daemon is a Web browser program, like Netscape Communicator or Internet Explorer, designed to send requests for data streams from server machines.72 Files transmitted by HTTP can have references or links to other files saved on various servers throughout the Internet.73 Thus, Internet users can access a broad body of knowledge stored on a variety of electronically linked computers. The computer language used by HTTP for determining how Web pages are to be displayed is known as Hypertext Markup Language (HTML).74

HTML documents sent over the Internet are broken up into various units of data known as "datagrams" and physical parts called "packets."75 A file is divided into datagrams by the server computer. When it is received at the destination, the message is reassembled. Both of these operations occur at the transport layer, known as Transmission Control Protocol (TCP).76 Although the datagrams of a particular message all have a common place and time of origin, they can be sent to the destination by various routing computers. The destinations to which the datagrams are sent have unique Internet Protocols (IP).77 Each computer connected to the Internet has its own IP address identifier. The packets arrive to designated locations because they contain the addresses both of senders and receivers.78 Therefore, e-mails or Web pages are readily traceable, and it is feasible to determine the origin of a message that has been sent through various routers. This two layer process of TCP data

72. See id.
73. See id.
78. Id.
assembling and IP identifying the sender(s) and receiver(s) is often referred to by the acronym TCP/IP. At the data-link layer, datagrams are divided into eight-bit chunks known as octets. This layer gives a definite meaning to an otherwise meaningless stream of data.

Finally, the physical layer electrically and mechanically conveys data. Hardware sends and receives data packages. Electromagnetic waves are the medium used to communicate information through the Internet. Communication is accomplished by altering the amplitudes, frequencies, or phases of waves. Outgoing and incoming data are represented through digital information, a bit value of one or a bit value of zero, denoting the absence or presence of electrical charge. Electromagnetic waves transmitting data are sent from servers through continuously alternating electric and magnetic fields. These fields cause disturbances to other fields in space. The oscillating electrical fields that are transmitted cause disturbances in physical apparatuses at the receiving end. The oscillations caused at the receiving end mimic the oscillations at the transmitting end. There are a variety of physical network media, like Ethernet or Token Ring, available for transforming electrical charges into the lines, letters, and pictures appearing on computer screens.

The laws of electromagnetism, as discussed in Part II.A, follow universal natural laws operating in spacetime. Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity maintains that physical laws not only hold true for mechanical processes, but for electromagnetic ones as well. The events surrounding Internet transmissions are disregarded by persons who argue that "cyberspace... is not subject to the laws of physics" and that "[p]hysics does not exist in cyberspace." Even such an astute student

79. E-mail from Bruce Zikmund, Technical Architect, Veridian Group, L.L.C. to Alexander Tsesis, Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of Chicago Department of Law, (July 21, 2000, 11:31 AM EST) (on file with author).
81. See id.
82. E-mail from Bruce Zikmund, Technical Architect, Jeridian Group, L.L.C., to Alexander Tsesis, Assistant Counsel, City of Chicago Department of Law (July 21, 2000, 11:31 AM EST) (on file with author).
84. MELVIN MERKEN, PHYSICAL SCIENCE WITH MODERN APPLICATIONS 206 (3d ed. 1985).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 20–27.
86. See LUCAS & HODGSON, supra note 20, at 37.
87. WERTHEIM, supra note 12, at 228.
88. Seth Safier, Between Big Brother and the Bottom Line: Privacy in Cyberspace,
of Internet law as Lawrence Lessig has written that "the real world is made of atoms, cyberspace of bits; the rules of the atoms don't work very well when applied to bits... Hence rules that would contain atoms can't be applied well to bits." To the contrary, examination of space and the Internet indicates that electromagnetic transmissions over that medium follow the same laws as any other real event. Moreover, as Lessig recognizes, cyberspace can be regulated because it affects the real world: "Cyberspace] will be regulated by real space regulation to the extent that it affects real space life, and it will quite dramatically affect real space life. That is the amazing thing about this space—that this virtual place has such power over what we call the nonvirtual." However, unlike Lessig, this Article argues in Part V that laws, not merely software code or network architecture, are the best means of regulating dangerous messages transmitted over the Internet.

Internet data can be traced back to persons or organizations. A stream of electronic symbols crossing borders is part of an event that originates when someone communicates data. After data is sent, it is saved for a time on a server. From there, it is accessible by other users whom it can affect. The effects include linking users to other Web resources, introducing persons with similar interests, and stimulating receivers to act on inciteful messages. The duration of a sent message continues from its transmission through its storage, reception, and distribution.

Two sets of events are connected "if there is a route connecting them, if each lies at some definite distance and in some definite direction from the other." Transitivity must be one of the characteristics of the route: where there is a path between event particles A to B and B to C, then there must be a route between A to C. The relationship between the source message, the sent datagrams, and received information is transitive. This section's elaboration of how data is sent over the Internet makes clear that even when the data is routed through intermediate servers, the source of messages can readily be traced. The historical route of individual bit streams can be determined by control data added at the various levels of OSI. Given a specific message, its constitutive

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90. Id. at 1406.
91. Quinton, supra note 26, at 130.
92. Id.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 66–70.
information, pathway, frequency, magnitude, and vector can be measured. Therefore, its source, intermediate locations, and final destination(s) can be determined.

The originator of the data influences the entire route, with all of its various gateway branches, that the message does, and potentially can, follow. She or he is causally responsible for the effects of the message throughout the entire duration during which the original electromagnetic stream is replicated. Furthermore, because the set representing the duration of that stream can be subdivided into subsets of shorter durations, the data originator is responsible for the sent information so long as the message continues to exist either on the computer where it was created or on a different computer where it was downloaded.

The only real spacetime is public spacetime. Only those things that can be located in "one coherent and public space and/[or] time" are real. All other images are fleeting, incongruous, and private. The very fact that Internet processes can be measured by physical apparatuses indicates that they occur in real space, public to anyone conducting experiments under specific conditions. The event of a user creating and transmitting particular data can never recur. However, through the event the sender can influence multiple other events during which users download or view the message from the Internet. Given a specific set of data, its exact wave frequencies and oscillations can be measured. Therefore, its place and time of origin, intermediate locations, and final destinations can be determined and traced to particular persons or organizations.

C. Hate Speech on the Internet

The utility of the Internet to spread views and opinions has been realized both by the advocates of democracy and by racist groups. The Internet is filled by a multiplicity of variegated commercial and private users. It is a boon for all sorts of advocacy. Among the views available for consumption on the Web are those that denigrate people based on their race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, and sexual preference. Hate groups take advantage of this relatively inexpensive medium for ideological distribution. They can spread pamphlets, letters, and images to groups of users who can anonymously participate in racist meetings, think tanks, and planning committees. One of the down sides of the Internet is that it provides a global forum for the advocates of intolerance and inequality.

94. Quinton, supra note 26, at 138.
95. See discussion supra Part II.A.
There has been a steadily increasing number of hate groups with Internet forums. In 1995, the Simon Wiesenthal Center found that approximately fifty hate groups had their own electronic bulletin boards. Klwanwatch and Militia Task Force, two agencies dedicated to monitoring racist hate groups, determined that in 1997, with the aid of the Internet, there was “an all-time high of 474 hate groups in the United States . . . , a 20% increase over 1996.” The number of Internet sites promoting hate and targeting “religious groups, visible minorities, women and homosexuals” had grown to at least eight hundred by 1999. In 2000, during unrest in the Middle East, hundreds of new Web sites and chat rooms deriding Jews bourgeoned. The Southern Poverty Law Center, which tracks hate group Internet sites, concluded that the Internet is a medium extensively used by hate groups calling for intolerance of and violence against outgroups.

Groups using the Net to spread their messages include the Ku Klux Klan and White Aryan Resistance. Their messages are not, in many cases, new; rather, they rely on age-old prejudices that have proven effective vehicles for inciting acts of oppression. For example, on its Web home page, Stormfront aggressively promotes white supremacy and nationalism, providing worldwide links to other hate-filled Internet sites and offering a fairly broad range of anti-Semitic articles, T-shirts, and videos for

98. See Surette, supra note 5, at A12.
100. See Southern Poverty Law Center, Intelligence Project, at http://www.splcenter.org/intelligenceproject/ipmain.btm.html (last visited May 19, 2001). The Southern Poverty Law Center created Klanwatch, which “tracks the activities of more than 500 racist and neo-Nazi groups.” Id.
sale. The Aryan Nation uses biblical passages to justify its racist
dogma. Moreover, the National Observer advocates using “biological
terrorism.” Such organizations embellish their propaganda through
colorful, interactive Web pages where like-minded people can join their
movements.

Many of these groups do not stop at discrimination and prejudice; they
recruit Internet users to engage in violent acts against outgroups and to
propagandize white supremacy. Notorious among these is the World
Church of the Creator, which calls for a “Racial Holy War” against
nonwhites. The National Socialist Movement sports a swastika logo
thereby praising Adolf Hitler on its Web page. The cover of its
magazine exclaims, “Total War Is the Shortest War!” It solicits people to
contact the National Socialist headquarters and begin training, presumably
to participate in their preparations for a race war. Patrick Henry On-
Line provides an opportunity for interested racists and anti-Semites to
contact and join any one of numerous racist militias. The militias, in
turn, prepare their members for a race war. Civil War Two sponsors a
racist and anti-Semitic secessionist page. These Internet sites
advocate and further the violent aspirations of hate groups seeking to
increase their memberships. Some hate groups have even taken to
recruiting children through catchy music and colorful games.

All of these disseminated ideas are linked to specific sources. With
the help of technology and Internet Protocols, electromagnetic waves

104. Id.
106. See Tony Perry & Kim Murphy, White Supremacist, 3 Followers Charged with
107. See Reid Kanaley, Hate Groups Love Internet: Free Speech Flaunts Its Evil
available at 1996 WL 6429902.
108. See Perry & Murphy, supra note 106, at A20; Toby Eckert, Hate Groups Find
rahowa.com (last visited Sept. 4, 2000).
13, 2001).
112. See National Socialist Movement, Why You Should Join the National Socialist
113. See Patrick Henry On-Line, at http://www.mo-net.com/~mlindstedt.index (last
visited Sept. 4, 2000).
114. See generally Southern Poverty Law Center, The Intelligence Project, at
http://www.splicenter.org/intelligenceproject/ip-mainbtm.html (last visited May 19,
2001) (providing information on some of these groups).
116. See Tanya Talaga, Neo-Nazis Trying to Snare Kids Through Net, TORONTO
transmitting hate propaganda can be traced to their place and time of origin. No matter how often the messages are transmitted, the source remains the same. Hate groups should be held responsible for the intended consequences of their Internet communications, regardless of whether they have already instigated violence or have a significant probability of later causing violence.

D. The Practicality of Regulating the Internet

Part II.B showed that it is simplistic to argue that messages transmitted on the Internet are not stored and relayed and do not affect real places at particular times (i.e., in spacetime). Like any other medium for information transmission, be it telephone or paper, the source of the message can be traced to someone or some group expressing ideas from someplace at a specific time. The creator of that message remains the same, regardless of how many times the information is resent and downloaded. Web pages, e-mails, and all the other forms of Internet communications are relayed by electromagnetic waves traveling through space. They are subject to the same laws of reality as any other electromagnetic process. Thus, the sovereign state where the information was initially stored and the location where it was received both have personal jurisdiction over the message creator, be it a group or person. If messages cross state lines, Congress can grant federal courts jurisdiction to hear cases. Such an analysis will serve to make Internet users accountable for their illegal actions rather than allowing an electronic free-for-all in which computer literate persons run roughshod over laws by using various network servers to disguise their whereabouts.

There is as clear a relation between messages sent from one computer

117. But see Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1370 (arguing that the Internet “radically subverts the system of rule-making based on borders between physical spaces”).

118. See supra text accompanying notes 82–84. But see Burnstein, supra note 13, at 78 (stating that cyberspace is “made up of data, of pure information” that are not physical objects).

119. But see Wertheim, supra note 12, at 228 (contending that the Internet is not subject to physical laws); Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1378.

120. A more detailed discussion on the jurisdictional issue of prosecuting online hate speech is provided in Part V.C infra.

via an Internet server to numerous users as there is between a statement
sent by a broadcasting station to a radio transmitter and then picked up
on multiple radios. The source and route of a message transmission can
be traced because each computer has its own IP identifier which remains
embedded in the message, even when it is sent thousands of miles from
the place of transmission. Relationships formed by long-distance Internet
communications are as ontologically real as relations established during
long-distance telephone conversations.

To maintain that the Internet is devoid of characteristics analogous to
other physical and social connections is inaccurate because it loses sight
of the physical processes involved in its operations. Courts have
repeatedly used spacial analogies to describe the spacio-temporal functions
associated with electronic communications and postings. For
example, Justice O'Connor pointed out that “[c]yberspace undeniably
reflects some form of geography; chat rooms and Web sites, for
example, exist at fixed ‘locations’ on the Internet.” The Western District
of Oklahoma, likewise, reflected that “[n]ews groups are interactive ‘places’ on the Internet into which anyone with access, anywhere in the
world, may place graphic or text messages.”

Besides the physical aspect of technology necessary to send and
receive Internet transmissions, inciteful ideas have an effect on the real
world. Purveyors of hate can use message boards and Web sites to
recruit and retain members. The growing network of hate groups is not
virtual but real. For instance, the information obtained on an antiabortion
web site, called “The Nuremberg Files,” was not at all extraspacial. A
jury found liable persons and organizations responsible for posting
information on The Nuremberg Files’ site, which listed the names,
addresses, and telephone numbers of physicians, like Robert Crist, who
provided abortion services. When three physicians were murdered,
their names were crossed off the list.\textsuperscript{129} Physicians whose names appeared on the Web site lived in fear knowing that they were targets of persons who, for ideological reasons, wished to murder them.\textsuperscript{130} Apparently an unknown gunman took the “wanted” sign seriously when she or he shot into Dr. Crist’s house.\textsuperscript{131} Defendants who maintained the site were found liable for the threatening language and ordered to pay over $107.9 million dollars in damages.\textsuperscript{132} The dangers of The Nuremberg Files Web site reverberated in real life in real communities.\textsuperscript{133}

If a hate message influences persons to attack someone, it does not matter whether the victim lives near or far from the location of transmission; the danger is just as great because the Internet is a global network. Whether the disseminator of bigotry can predict the consequences of e-mailing hate propaganda is irrelevant.\textsuperscript{134} What is consequential is whether such a person or group intentionally elicits violence or persecution and whether there is a substantial probability that the posting will lead to violent criminal activity.\textsuperscript{135} The temporal proximity of the act and the message are immaterial.\textsuperscript{136} What matters is the extent to which the bigot was influenced to act by propaganda posted on the Internet; that is, whether the hate message is part of an event culminating in the substantial probability of oppressive or discriminatory consequences.

Advocates of an unregulated Internet place insufficient import on the role of a representative democracy in protecting individual rights.\textsuperscript{137} The

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\textsuperscript{130} See id.

\textsuperscript{131} See Murphy, supra note 128, at A12.

\textsuperscript{132} See id.

\textsuperscript{133} The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals later vacated the district court’s decision, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (1999), finding that the electronic postings were protected by the First Amendment because they were part of a public discourse and posed no imminent harm. Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 244 F.3d 1007, 1015–20 (9th Cir. 2001).

\textsuperscript{134} Cf. Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1244 (1998) (arguing that it is no defense for an Internet provider to argue that it could not predict where information would flow because, just as an air polluter who does not know which way the wind blows, both are responsible for the consequences).

\textsuperscript{135} See infra Part V.B (providing an elaboration of these elements).

\textsuperscript{136} See infra Part III.A.1 for criticism of the clear and present danger test.

\textsuperscript{137} See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 405 (2000); infra Part III.B.
}
ephemeral communities of cyberspace\textsuperscript{138} include the democratically and the autocratically minded. It is unrealistic that hate groups will protect the rights of the very individuals whose interests they are attacking. Bigots are more likely to use a self-governing and anarchic system of cyberspace to unscrupulously abuse their power to block outgroup access to democratic institutions. This would have a destabilizing effect on society at large, not just on Internet users. An unbridled Internet would be detrimental to democracy and to the ideals of egalitarianism.\textsuperscript{139} It would hoard power to the strong and provide a breeding ground for hate groups.\textsuperscript{140}

In sum, the Internet is a social space through which events occur via electromagnetic waves. Like other electromagnetic occurrences such as telephone conversations, illegal transactions fall within the purview of states. Much like governments are empowered to regulate activities occurring within their borders, so too they can regulate this new social space known as cyberspace. Part IV parses this latter argument in greater detail.

III. COMMON LAW LIMITS ON CONTROLLING HATE SPEECH

Hate groups have found a haven in the United States for their Internet sites because the Supreme Court has significantly limited the government’s ability to prohibit the distribution of racist, provocative materials.\textsuperscript{141} While the Court has found statutes constitutional that augment penalties for crimes inspired by hate,\textsuperscript{142} it has held unconstitutional laws penalizing the use of hate speech against historically persecuted outgroups.\textsuperscript{143} Therefore, groups and individuals can legally use Internet servers, located in the United States, to advocate persecution, oppression, and holy war, so long as they do not explicitly call for immediate violent

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\footnote{138. Cyberspace is too diverse to consider it a unified community. \textit{See Developments In the Law—The Law of Cyberspace}, 112 \textit{Harv. L. Rev.} 1574, 1598 (1999). \textit{But see id.} at 1590 (stating that “members of . . . online groups report . . . that they experience the feeling of being part of a community”). The sense of community experienced by participants of online groups does not create a socially conscious society. No social contract obligations bind independent cyberspace users. No legal ideals of justice or essential rights govern interactions between them. \textit{But see Kang, supra} note 4, at 1175–78 (positing the suggestion that persons who are joining certain cyberspace “communities” could be required to sign a “social contract”). Kang concedes, however, that cyberspace relationships are very rarely as close as face-to-face relationships. \textit{See id.} at 1177.}

\footnote{139. \textit{See Netanel, supra} note 137, at 498.}

\footnote{140. \textit{See id}.}

\footnote{141. \textit{See Peter Finn, Neo-Nazis Sheltering Web Sites in the U. S., Wash. Post}, Dec. 21, 2000, at A1.}


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actions. This Article now turns to current United States jurisprudence on inciteful speech and its shortfalls.

A. Current Supreme Court Doctrine

This section provides a brief survey of existing First Amendment doctrines. It is not meant to be an exhaustive analysis of Supreme Court case law on pure speech regulations. Three pivotal strands of thought affecting First Amendment jurisprudence are covered: (1) Brandenburg v. Ohio's "imminent threat of harm" standard; (2) Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States, which created the "marketplace of ideas" concept; and (3) R.A.V. v. St. Paul's blanket prohibition against content based regulations.

1. Imminent Threat of Harm

Modern First Amendment jurisprudence on incitement speech begins with Schenck v. United States. In a decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Supreme Court held that Congress can prevent people from using language that "create[s] a clear and present danger." Whether such public threat exists "is a question of proximity and degree." In a dissent to a later decision, Abrams v. United States, Holmes clarified his doctrine on inflammatory speech. "It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned." Since Holmes' pronouncements, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reiterated the difference between abstract advocacy of violence and the preparation to act on those ideas.

Further, the use of "fighting words," which are statements tending to

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146. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 82.
150. Id. An example of speech causing a clear and present danger is a shout of "fire" that causes panic at a theater. Id.
151. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
provoke ordinary citizens to violence, have never been protected by the Constitution. \(^{154}\) “[S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”\(^{155}\) Fighting words by definition “inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”\(^{156}\)

*Brandenburg v. Ohio* \(^{157}\) was the most recent Supreme Court declaration on the incitement doctrine. In that case, the Supreme Court enunciated the current rule for determining whether a statute, aimed at limiting volatile speech, infringes on individuals’ First Amendment rights. At issue was a film showing the defendant, who was the leader of an Ohio Ku Klux Klan chapter, making a speech which asserted that revenge might be taken against the United States government if it “continues to suppress the white . . . race.”\(^{158}\) Reversing the defendant’s conviction, the Court held that First Amendment guarantees of free speech prohibit the government from proscribing the “advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”\(^{159}\) The Court found that the Ohio statute, which Brandenburg was charged with breaking, violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it did not distinguish between persons who called for the immediate use of violence and those who taught an abstract doctrine about the use of force.\(^{160}\) In explaining and analyzing its decision, the Court failed to evaluate whether it was reasonable to think that, given the Ku Klux Klan’s history of racist violence, a rally supporting “revenge” was more than just a gathering of people discussing abstract ideas.

The Court’s determination that anti-incitement laws are constitutional only when their scope is limited to preventing immediate unlawful actions is based on the false assumption that the advocacy of future violence cannot have devastating effects. Sometimes, incitements for long-term preparations are not solely ideological, but realistic about the current and future prospects of success. The planning stages of crimes against humanity, like the Nazi Holocaust and American slavery, were fomented by years of racist literature and education.\(^{161}\) After decades of indoctrination, when

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\(^{155}\) Id. at 572.

\(^{156}\) Id.


\(^{158}\) Id. at 446. The film also depicted hooded persons setting fire to a cross and carrying firearms. Id. at 445.

\(^{159}\) Id. at 447 (emphasis added).

\(^{160}\) See id. at 448–49.

popular culture accepted anti-Semitism and racism, charismatic leaders were able to harness bigotry to kill and enslave. Given the historical documentation showing the gradual development of group hatred through propaganda, it is simplistic, disingenuous, and cynical to argue that only immediately inflammatory speech is socially dangerous. 162 "It is apparent . . . that under certain circumstances there will be stepwise progression from verbal aggression to violence, from rumor to riot, from gossip to genocide." 163

Racism, when tolerated, is not an innocuous part of political discourse. Violence against outgroups is not perpetrated in a social vacuum. There is a close, and virtually necessary, connection between advocacy, preparation, coordination, infrastructure development, training, indoctrination, desensitization, discrimination, singular violent acts, and systematic oppression. 164 Those things take time and have more impact than spontaneous acts of violence instigated by phrases uttered in the heat of the moment. The outlook of the imminent threat of harm test, on the

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164. See Matsuda, supra note 6, at 2335 (stating that violence is a "necessary and inevitable" part of racism).
other hand, is that dangerous, bigoted instigation is, in all circumstances, analogous to fist fights in which one party draws another into a spontaneous confrontation through verbal taunting. Empirical evidence on the widespread use of hate speech by nefarious social movements shows that this view is too narrow. To give two examples: it took decades for the image of the Indian savage to develop a strong enough following in America to legitimize expropriating their lands and removing them, and centuries of dehumanizing Arabic discourse has led to the continued perpetration of black slavery in contemporary Mauritania.

Intolerant diatribes not only cause dignitary harms to targeted groups, they also decrease overall social well being. The government need not wait for an uprising to act against an inciteful organization. The state should act against bigoted organizations before they manifest a clear and present danger of social destructiveness. Indoctrination that prepares followers for a race war is effective whether it is communicated through an in-person organizational meeting or through Internet gatherings. The message and its power to dehumanize an outgroup is the same, whether it is transmitted through sound waves or electromagnetic waves.

Hate speech seeks to undermine the egalitarian ideals of representative democracy because it adjoins followers to intolerantly and inhumanely treat groups of people professedly unworthy of human rights and dignities. It is not always predictable where and when a spark of prejudice will ignite persons to commit brutal acts. As the majority of the Supreme Court stated in *Gitlow v. New York*:

It cannot be said that the State is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when in the exercise of its judgment as to the measures necessary to protect the public peace and safety, it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has enkindled the flame or blazed into the conflagration.

However, the Court has not followed the *Gitlow* line of reasoning where hate speech is concerned; instead, it has sided with a narrower view about the types of inciteful speech that pose a threat to society.

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167. *See* Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951) (clarifying that government need not wait to act "until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited").


169. *See*, e.g., *Dennis*, 341 U.S. at 536–46 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Given the historical information about the long-term power of hate speech and about its lack of constructive social value, it is too dangerous to wait until there is an emergent threat to democracy.\(^{170}\) This reasoning holds equally true for all manner of messaging, especially when there is the potential of reaching a broad audience, including children, surfing the Internet.

2. Marketplace of Ideas

The second major doctrine on speech that came out of Justice Holmes’ era is his “market place of ideas”:

“[M]en... may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.”\(^{171}\)

The Supreme Court has, in numerous contexts, reiterated the continued validity of this doctrine.\(^{172}\)

At first, Holmes appears to be an advocate of objective truth, being tested in the ambers of dialogue and alighting like the Phoenix from the historical ash heap of false ideas. However, upon close scrutiny, Holmes’ writings reveal that “truth” for him is not the absence of fallacy. Rather, it is whatever ideology is accepted by the strongest segment of society.\(^{173}\) He was a moral and political relativist.

Holmes rejected “[i]nalienable human rights and absolute principles of law.”\(^{174}\) For him, the concepts of truth and common good are empty, while “desire and power are everything.”\(^{175}\) Holmes stated: “I am so

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\(^{171}\) Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

\(^{172}\) See generally Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (determining that the Internet was a new marketplace of ideas and holding some provisions of the Communications Decency Act unconstitutional); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (holding that commercial speech has some value in the marketplace of ideas); Red Lion Broad. Co. Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389–90 (1969) (upholding the “fairness doctrine”).

\(^{173}\) See infra text accompanying notes 174–75.

\(^{174}\) Paul L. Gregg, The Pragmatism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 31 Geo. L.J. 262, 294 (1943).

\(^{175}\) Id.
sceptical as to our knowledge about the goodness or badness of laws that I have no practical criticism except what the crowd wants.”

The marketplace of ideas is, then, a forum for herd mentality to direct the flow of law and to force others to follow it, regardless of whether the product is conducive to overall social well-being or only increases the happiness of those who dominate. Thus, the statement, “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted” does not refer to the establishment of legal truths that will improve society for everyone. As John Dewey pointed out, “[a]t times, [Holmes’] realism seems almost to amount to a belief that whatever wins out in fair combat, in the struggle for existence, is therefore the fit, the good, and the true.”

Holmes held speech in such high regard that he thought it justifiable for “the dominant forces of the community” to impose a “proletarian dictatorship.” He seemingly thought it irrelevant whether public discourse leads to a society striving for equal treatment of its subjects. The principal force behind laws is the will of those who are in power: “All that can be expected from modern improvements is that legislation should easily and quickly, yet not too quickly, modify itself in accordance with the will of the de facto supreme power in the community...” When the will of the powerful interest conflicts with the desires of those who “competed unsuccessfully,” it is only natural that legislation should reflect interests of the “fittest.” In the competing interests of the marketplace of ideas, we should expect that dominant forces will sway public opinion to believe their doctrine(s), whether secular or religious, and when it is to their benefit, the powerful will enforce their desires and sacrifice the welfare of outgroups.

Holmes was not merely stating the fact that governments are often formed through the subordination of the weaker members of society. For him, the determining measure of government’s value is its ability to carry out the desires of powerful interests:

What proximate test of excellence can be found except correspondence to the actual equilibrium of force in the community – that is, conformity to the wishes of the dominant power? Of course, such conformity may lead to destruction.

176. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock, in 1 The Pollock-Holmes Letters: Correspondence of Sir Frederick Pollock and Mr. Justice Holmes, 1874–1932 163 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1942).


181. Id.
and it is desirable that the dominant power should be wise. But wise or not, the
proximate test of good government is that the dominant power has its way.\textsuperscript{182}

In situations of conflicting interests, the rule of law should be guided by
the desires of the strongest.\textsuperscript{183} According to Holmes, the object of all
legislation is “the greatest good of the greatest number,”\textsuperscript{184} and the
question of whether in the long run it is more beneficial to respect the
highest good of minorities is as irrelevant as it is unpredictable.\textsuperscript{185}

What then of minorities? Did Holmes think there is any formal duty
government owes them? Yes—it must enact legislation that will keep
minority losses to a minimum by inculcating “an educated sympathy.”\textsuperscript{186}
However, Holmes had no sympathy for the passion of equality in
commercial interactions nor, probably, in intellectual ones.\textsuperscript{187} On the
other hand, in his personal life, he was an abolitionist and despised
demeaning depictions of blacks.\textsuperscript{188} Nevertheless, there is an opposite,
highly disturbing train of thought that runs throughout Holmes’ early
and later writings. For example, Holmes was of the opinion that the
powerful had the right to use sterilization\textsuperscript{189} in order to rid society of the
“unfit.”\textsuperscript{190}

Outgroups can only expect that their rights will be honored if they
gain power and rewrite laws currently discriminatory against them.\textsuperscript{191}
And then they might become the perpetrators of injustices. Force is the
remedy between two groups with divergent world views.\textsuperscript{192} “If the
welfare of the living majority is paramount, it can only be on the ground

\textsuperscript{182} Oliver Wendell Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 258 (1920).
\textsuperscript{183} See id. at 239.
\textsuperscript{184} Holmes, supra note 180, at 584.
\textsuperscript{185} See id.
\textsuperscript{186} Id. at 583.
\textsuperscript{187} Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John Wu (June 21, 1928), in Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes: His Book Notices and Uncollected Letters and Papers
196, 197 (Harry C. Shriver ed., 1936).
\textsuperscript{188} Id.
\textsuperscript{189} See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding law requiring the
mentally ill to undergo sterilization).
\textsuperscript{190} See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John Wu (July 25, 1925), in
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: His Book Notices and Uncollected Letters and
\textsuperscript{191} See Gregg, supra note 174, at 294.
\textsuperscript{192} See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (March 22,
1891), in 2 Holmes-Pollock Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes
(writing skeptically about the effectiveness of the League of Nations).
that the majority have the power in their hands."\textsuperscript{193} In the model of the state Holmes envisioned, class and racial conflicts, struggles, and animosities are inevitable.\textsuperscript{194}

The argument here is not that on the whole Holmes' judicial opinions are anticonstitutional or opposed to democratic ideals. In fact, his doctrine on the right of dominant powers required him, in his capacity as a judge, to follow the supreme law of the land, the Constitution.\textsuperscript{195} But his philosophical writings indicate that he accepted with equanimity the right of groups to throw off democratic order and replace it with a state that uses its power arbitrarily and does not respect the individual rights of any but the most powerful. \textit{Gitlow} represents Holmes’ view that any legislation passed by those in power is good, regardless of how oppressive it is to outgroups: “If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way.”\textsuperscript{196} Holmes acknowledged and accepted that the consequences of unlimited speech might be the disintegration of fair and equitable government, and the establishment of a repressive state.\textsuperscript{197} Holmes’ view on the subjugation and elimination of the weak might lead to at least authoritarianism, and at worst totalitarianism, and the denial of basic rights to minorities.\textsuperscript{198} Holmes’ writings make clear that he thought it irrelevant that the free trade of ideas would not necessarily establish or maintain a just society.\textsuperscript{199}

His view also loses track of the overarching goals of egalitarian democracy: fairness, justice, and equal representation to all, regardless of whether they are powerful. Holmes’ model of speech, which has been

\textsuperscript{193} Holmes, \textit{supra} note 180, at 584.


\textsuperscript{195} See Gregg, \textit{supra} note 174, at 291.

\textsuperscript{196} Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes and Brandeis, J.J., dissenting).


adapted by the Court in pure speech cases, stands in sharp contrast to the Madisonian tradition of speech as a facilitator for civil liberties, political representation, and exchange of ideas. Under the latter model, the government has an interest in maintaining open dialogue. Holmes’ market of ideas, on the other hand, is a virtually unregulated arena in which dominant groups are given license to indoctrinate and impose any political order, regardless of its selfish and intolerant propensities. Holmes acknowledges that a well-functioning democracy can be destroyed from within and does nothing to curtail that possibility.

Although a great admirer of Holmes, Justice Louis Brandeis’ notions on the role of speech in United States democracy diverge from Holmes’ notions. Brandeis was more inclined to “social and economic equality.” On the other hand, Holmes’ perspective is closely allied to Social Darwinism. While Brandeis believed that increased speech is beneficial for society, he observed that the role of discussion is to expose falsehoods and avert social evils like “tyrannies of governing majorities.” This is in direct contrast to Holmes, who contended that the masses have the right of power to manipulate speech to create any political system, including a dictatorship. Brandeis’ concern for repressing speech was that it could destabilize the United States: “[I]t is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies...” Thus, Brandeis’ view of free speech follows the Madisonian tradition, while Holmes’ view does not.

Hate speech does not further the interests of democracy because it advocates that certain social elements should be denied fundamental rights. Furthermore, passing legislation prohibiting it, like existing laws abridging other forms of discrimination, would likely reduce hate and facilitate mutual understanding.

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203. See supra text accompanying notes 179–83.
204. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis and Holmes, J.J., concurring).
205. See ALLPORT, supra note 163, at 472 (discussing the improvement of ethnic relations from laws prohibiting discrimination in housing, employment, education, and health services).
or individuals do not advance "uninhibited, robust, and wide open"206 dialogue about social improvement.207 Like fighting words, hate speech, plays "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and [is] of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."208 Purveyors of hate speech aim at spreading degrading falsities and proposing intolerant solutions which, like defamation, can be limited without violating the First Amendment.209 The Internet is a new forum for the worldwide circulation of messages intended to recruit and consolidate forces bent on discriminating, degrading, and destroying outgroups. Information sent through cyberspace does not act in a surreal world. It threatens real people, entrenches racist attitudes, and therefore undermines social, political, and economic equality. It is not a separate social community, but one that impacts and is impacted by others in the real world.

Beyond the theoretical difficulties of Holmes' marketplace of ideas it is simply untrue that the dissemination of vitriol defuses racism, sexism, or anti-Semitism.210 Experience disproves the notion that falsehood is always vanquished by truth.211 To the contrary, history teems with examples of times when lies, distortions, and propaganda empowered groups like the Nazis to repress speech and perpetrate mass persecutions. Years of anti-Semitic speech in Germany preceded the rise of National Socialism and the perpetration of the Holocaust.212 The foundation of death camps like Auschwitz was established on years of rhetoric dehumanizing and condemning Jews for German misfortunes. Even when both true and false beliefs are available, persons often cling to the false to retain power. In spite of the availability in the United States of literature against slavery,213 that institution did not end through rational

207. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (involving defamation against a person who was not a public figure or public official).
209. See Powell, supra note 7, at 35.
211. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 89 (Pelican Classics 1980) (1859); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 26-27 (1982) (arguing that in reality truth is not always triumphant over falsehood); Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133, 177 (1982) (stating that racial insults are not truth seeking since "they are not intended to inform or convince the listener. Racial insults invite no discourse, and no speech in response can cure the inflicted harm").
212. See Allport, supra note 163, at 57.
213. Even before the Revolution, leading orators denounced slavery. Thomas Paine and James Otis fervently argued that blacks were endowed with the same natural rights
discourse but through a bloody civil war.

Society derives no benefit from deliberately falsified scientific data, fabricated fallacies about the intellectual and economic attributes of people, and concocted stereotypes. The use of the Internet by Holocaust deniers and groups demeaning blacks as subhumans does not strengthen democracy. Hate propaganda injures targeted groups because, instead of informing and edifying through dialogue and deliberation, it degrades and foments insensitivity and brutality. Propagandists are interested in control, not truth; so when it is opportune for them, they resort to violence rather than discussion to settle their disagreements and differences. Bigotry has strengthened and helped to establish tyrannical, demagogic, and arbitrary regimes. It has shown itself, time and time again, to be essential in instigating violence against identifiable groups. Even if, after many injustices, truth eventually wins out, that is no consolation for the victims. Their sufferings are irreversible, in spite of future rectifications.

3. Content Regulations

The most recent trend of the Supreme Court jurisprudence on freedom of expression is the seemingly blanket prohibition against legislation targeting speech based on its racist content. Any cause of action against hate speech on the Internet must address the seminal case on this point, R.A.V. v. St. Paul.

The majority opinion represents the views of five Justices and differs to liberty as the white colonists. See WILLIAM SUMNER JENKINS, PRO-SLAVERY THOUGHT IN THE OLD SOUTH 23–24, 33 (Peter Smith 1960) (1935). In his letter to General Lafayette, written on November 25, 1820, James Madison acknowledged that the “original sin" of participating in the African slave trade had resulted in perverting laws that took away the civic rights of “persons of colour.” See Letter from James Madison to General Lafayette (Nov. 25, 1820), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 189, 190 (1865).

214. See Mahoney, supra note 165, at 798.
215. See supra Part II.C.
216. See Irvin Cotter, Racist Incitement: Giving Free Speech a Bad Name, in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE CHARTER 254 (David Schneiderman ed., 1991); Delgado, supra note 211, at 177.
219. See generally 505 U.S. 377 (1992); see also Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (another leading case prohibiting the censure of speech based on its content).
substantially from the three concurrences. The case arose when some juveniles set fire to a cross on a black family’s lawn. The youths were charged under a St. Paul ordinance that made it a misdemeanor to display, in public or private places, symbols (like Nazi swastikas and burning crosses) which are known to “arouse[] anger, alarm or resentment . . . on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.”

Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held the ordinance was unconstitutional “content discrimination.” He reasoned that it violated the First Amendment because the ordinance targeted only certain enumerated forms of inciteful speech, while unenumerated forms, like those about people’s political affiliations, were tolerated. Scalia acknowledged that St. Paul had a compelling interest in protecting the human rights of the “members of groups that have historically been subjected to discrimination.” To accomplish that end, the City could enact a blanket prohibition against fighting words, but it could not single out hate speech.

Justice White, who wrote a concurrence to R.A.V., asserted that the majority opinion deviates from Supreme Court precedents. His concurrence recognized that the Court had long accepted content-based legislation, targeting low-level speech. It is disingenuous, in his view, to argue that St. Paul could constitutionally regulate an entire class of utterances (i.e., fighting words) but that it could not regulate a subset of that class which “by definition [is] worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection.” Social harms can be diminished by banning all or some fighting words without limiting the potential for ideas to compete in the marketplace. Justice White believed that the majority ignored “the city’s judgment that harms based on race, color, creed, religion, [and] gender are more pressing public concerns than the harms caused by other fighting words.” The majority’s approach “invites” persons to express themselves with racist expressions, which, in terms of the First Amendment, are worthless.

Justice White voiced his concern that the majority’s decision would

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220. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
221. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 387.
222. Id. at 391.
223. Id. at 395.
224. See id. at 395–96.
225. Id. at 401 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
227. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 401 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
228. Id. at 407.
229. Id. at 402.
negatively impact future First Amendment case law. The majority opinion implies that racists’ and bigots’ expressions deserve more governmental protections than the peace and tranquility of targeted groups. The majority places hate speech on the level of political and cultural discourse by calling fighting words a form of “debate.” Although White acknowledged that the speech forbidden under the ordinance was unprotected by the First Amendment, he nevertheless contended that the law was overbroad since it prohibited expressions simply because they hurt people’s feelings and caused offense or resentment.

Justice Blackmun, in a separate concurrence, agreed with White that the St. Paul ordinance was constitutionally overbroad. On the other hand, he thought it constitutional for cities to prevent hooligans from “driving minorit[y residents from] their homes by burning crosses on their lawns.”

In yet another concurrence, Justice Stevens pointed out that many regulations are constitutional even though they target utterances based on content. For example, “a city can prohibit political advertisements in its buses while allowing other advertisements.” Therefore, the majority’s contention that all content-based regulations are unconstitutional is insupportable by First Amendment jurisprudence. Justice Stevens believed that just as a governmental entity could constitutionally restrict only certain forms of commercial speech, so too St. Paul could regulate only some forms of fighting words and not others. A city can determine which fighting words to prohibit based on the different social harms caused by them. In spite of his conclusions about the propriety of regulating hate speech, Justice Stevens found that the St. Paul ordinance violated R.A.V.’s First Amendment rights because it was overbroad.

All three concurrences complained that the majority deviated from precedents permitting some content-based restrictions on speech. Scalia’s opinion is committed to a government which is neutral to the

230. See id.
231. See id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 411, 414.
234. See id. at 416 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
235. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
236. Id. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
237. Id. at 425 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
238. See id. at 434 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
239. See id. at 436 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).

851
content of competing messages. It discounts or ignores the numerous instances of laws that discriminate based on the substance of communications. Content-based limitations have been found constitutional for the following forms of speech: operating adult theaters, threatening the President, electioneering within 100 feet of a polling place on election day, using trade names, burning draft cards, and distributing obscene materials. It is arguable that, like obscenity or threats made against the President, hate speech has little or no social and political value. Furthermore, like fighting words, hate speech, whether it aims at long- or short-term harms, is “of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”

The R.A.V. majority is fixated on the First Amendment to the exclusion of considerations of how that bulwark of freedom fits into the grand scheme of United States constitutional democracy. The opinion is based on a paradigm which places free speech in a nebulous realm, impervious to concerns for social, political, economic, and substantive equality. Its absolutist treatment of expression guards against depriving speakers of their autonomous right to communicate ideas but leaves untouched the diminution of freedom experienced by the victims of hate speech. Neither does Scalia’s opinion reflect on the violent racist history associated with burning crosses nor about the psychological effect on the victims and other black families living nearby. Scalia’s holding focuses on the value of speech, while giving short shrift to the social harms associated with hate speech.

R.A.V. creates the illusion that cross burning and other bigoted forms of expression are legitimate types of political debate. To the contrary,

244. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
250. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393–96.
hateful expressions, especially when they are advanced before private residences belonging to members of a victimized outgroup, destabilize the multifaceted racial and ethnic fabric of United States culture. Unrestrained bias foments disunion and endangers the civil liberties guaranteed under the Constitution.

Supreme Court precedents leave Internet hate speech ample pathways to become acceptable discourse in the United States. Hate speech does not contribute to dialogue on social and political justice; instead, it detracts by spreading rumors, innuendos, and outright libels. Current Supreme Court precedents, which prohibit legislation aimed at limiting hate speech, tolerate consequences that can ultimately prove destructive to democracy. Discrimination and intolerance should not be given the opportunity to win in the power market. Even if tolerance will eventually rise to the top, the harms victims experience while waiting for justice to burgeon are too heavy a price to pay for Holmes’ social experiment. The potential long-term dangers of bigotry can be measured from numerous historical examples of gradually inculcated linguistic paradigms that fomented injustices. The multiplying hate propaganda, transmitted through the Internet at the speed of light, should be checked because it threatens to popularize hatred and catapult the forces of inequality. The ideal of inviolable fundamental rights should not be sacrificed at the altar of an absolutist reading of the First Amendment.

B. The Dangers to Democracy Posed by Outgroup Stereotypes

Racial prejudice breeds animosities that are manifest in accepted discourse, attitudes toward minorities, and institutional injustices. In times of distress, those sentiments, which are nurtured in the cradle of a bigoted society, mature into full-grown injustice, intolerance, and oppression. The repeated, unquestioned delegitimization of outgroup rights is at the foundation of many discriminatory laws and destructive actions. Without previous indoctrination and preparation it is impossible to ignite popular movements bent on denying minorities legislative, political, judicial, medical, and economic equality. Propaganda is essential for developing widespread adverse inclinations, harsh judgments, and aggressive practices.

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252. For a discussion of Holmes’ views, see supra Part III.A.2.
253. See Tsesis, supra note 162, at 729.
254. See Kretzmer, supra note 217, at 464.
Bigotry is not cathartic. To the contrary, it is inflammatory. The longer a group goes unopposed in communicating its aggressive hatred of minorities, the more it becomes habituated in defamatory statements and unjust acts.\(^{255}\) Social attitudes are entrenched in negative images about outgroups and popular dialogue incorporates stereotypes into puns and expletives. Once individuals perceive members of identifiable groups as legitimate targets of aggression, their personal dislikes are reinforced by negative social attitudes and rationalizations.\(^{256}\) When definitions and stereotypes are culturally established and personally internalized through oft repeated fallacies about outgroup characteristics, they facilitate arbitrary stratification and action. Racist, anti-Semitic, sexist, and gay-bashing messages embellish negative social mores and behaviors, prolonging their vitality and passing their malignant venom to succeeding generations.\(^{257}\)

Placing hate speech on the level of political discourse, as Justice Scalia did in \textit{R.A.V.},\(^{258}\) increases entrenched intolerance\(^{259}\) and legitimizes hate group participation in the political process. Hate speech is elicited to introduce and reinforce unjust biases, intolerance, and discrimination.\(^{260}\) When the rubrics used to describe cultural diversity are framed as undesirable and dangerous to ingroup interests, they increase disparagement and can lead to institutional and individual discrimination and violence.\(^{261}\) Systematic murder, genocide, and enslavement are justified through aspersive discourse about the dangers to society posed by outgroups.\(^{262}\) The myth of inferiority is told and retold in the framework of accepted and popularized discourse. It desensitizes common people to the plight of victimized minorities and justifies unequal treatment of them. Therefore, hate speech is detrimental and tends to undermine democratic ideals and institutions.

Democracies are ruled by representative governments whose responsibilities include protecting the rights of all their subjects, whether

\(^{255}\) See generally Allport, supra note 163, at 354–66, 497 (enunciating the view that "the display of aggression is not a safety valve, rather it is habit-forming—the more aggression one shows, the more he has").


\(^{257}\) See Delgado, supra note 211, at 135–36.

\(^{258}\) See supra Part III.A.3.


\(^{260}\) See Kretzmer, supra note 217, at 462.

\(^{261}\) See Miri Rubin, Imagining the Jew: The Late Medieval Eucharistic Discourse, in IN AND OUT OF THE GHETTO 177, 178 (R. Po-Chia Hsia & Hartmut Lehmann eds., 1995).

\(^{262}\) See id.
they be members of a minority group or part of the majority.\textsuperscript{263} Representative governments are obligated by the social contract to respect human rights and thereby secure well-being and enable people to fulfill the full range of their potentials. Civil liberties are secured through the constitutionally fair, nonprejudicial operation of laws and institutions.\textsuperscript{264}

This, at least, is the ideal. The reality is that democracies are not immune to social injustice and inequalities. What makes them preferable to other governmental systems is the existence of political mechanisms to amend unjust laws and rectify past wrongs. The United States is an example of this process. It has evolved from a nation with institutionalized slavery to one that is deeply committed to eliminating continued vestiges of inequality.\textsuperscript{265} Legitimate political debate seeks to decrease the incidents of discrimination, while hate speech intends to eliminate and infringe upon individuals' civil rights.

Without constitutional and legislative checks on power, the majority can run "roughshod" over the rights of minorities to life, liberty, and property.\textsuperscript{266} An unregulated system of speech, in which more powerful forces have greater access and control over informational distribution systems, might produce what Justice Holmes called a "proletarian dictatorship."\textsuperscript{267} It would be an abuse of representative democracy to use its institutions to destroy its foundations.\textsuperscript{268}

The purveyors of hate on the Internet cannot be trusted to safeguard the rights of minorities. Their support of bigoted theories and preparations for a race war are opposed to equal treatment under the law. Their Web sites and chat rooms should not remain self-regulating.\textsuperscript{269} To the contrary, criminal laws should be enacted acknowledging that hate propaganda harms individuals and society as a whole.\textsuperscript{270}

\begin{itemize}
  \item 263. See Netanel, supra note 137, at 407; see also Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (1996) (discussing the two ideals of liberal democracy: the participatory political process and the ideal of a limited government that cannot encroach upon certain individual rights).
  \item 264. See Netanel, supra note 137, at 407.
  \item 265. This has been accomplished, for example, through affirmative action. See, e.g., Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (discussing affirmative action in higher education).
  \item 266. Netanel, supra note 137, at 421.
  \item 267. Gitlow v. New York 268 U.S. 652, 673 (Holmes and Brandeis, J.J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes 179–89.
  \item 269. See Netanel, supra note 137, at 421.
  \item 270. For a model criminal law of this type, see infra Part V.B.
\end{itemize}
pose a threat, though not always an immediate threat, to representative democracy. They use slogans that have repeatedly been successfully employed to recruit and incite crowds against outgroups.

There is cause for concern that through repeated exposure to bigotry, the populace will be so desensitized that it will accept oppression as a matter of course. Stereotyping endeavors to create a cultural climate that is immune to empathy for anyone other than members of the ingroup. Its function is opposed to the groundings of the First Amendment.

John Stuart Mill, the philosophical source of Holmes’ marketplace of ideas doctrine, posited that open debate offers the opportunity to examine the validity of accepted opinions. The Internet is a remarkable facilitator for exchanging ideas and testing them against opposing points of view. On the other hand, the Internet has also provided hate mongers a huge forum to develop networks of destruction-minded communicators, awaiting the opportunity to repress outgroups’ rights. The extent to which dialogue furthers equality is more telling of its First Amendment value than is a competing marketplace in which the strongest forces always win, ambivalent to what beneficent or nefarious social program the winners support.

A disturbing pattern in the Supreme Court’s pure speech jurisprudence is that it typically lacks any analysis of the historical impact of hate speech upon victims and society generally. Moreover, the Court, in cases like R.A.V., fails to recognize that hate speech not only harms the individual against whom it is directed, but also intimidates other members of the targeted group, making them concerned for the safety of their families and friends.

Violent hate speech not only advocates anti-democratic ideals, it is an intrinsic part of an overall scheme to overthrow democratic institutions by attacking cultural diversity and inciting acts of destruction. Thus,

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271. See Mill, supra note 211, at 108.
272. When there is substantial information indicating that it is reasonably probable that the hate-mongers might succeed in their malfeasant plans, the state should take criminal action. See discussion infra Part V.B.
273. See Shiffrin, supra note 240, at 88 (stating that the truth value of statements is better tested against the premise of equality than whether racists win in the marketplace of ideas).
275. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
276. See Matsuda, supra note 6, at 2377 (“The constitutional commitment to equality and the promise to abolish the badges and incidents of slavery are emptied of meaning when target-group members must alter their behavior, change their choice of neighborhood, leave their jobs, and warn their children off the streets because of hate group activity.”) (citation omitted).
277. See Cotter, supra note 216, at 254.
hate speech on the Internet, which is disseminated by groups or individuals through a medium capable of distributing electronic messages anywhere in the world, represents a worldwide assault on outgroup safety and aspirations. The unrestricted creation and transmission of these messages threatens to destabilize and upset the political importance and involvement of diverse groups, whose participation is critical to the popular input aspect of the democratic process. The very purpose of bigotry is to exclude weaker groups from political debate and to deny them social boons like personal integrity and economic stability.

Aspersions are intended to reduce participation in governmental discourse and destructive messages are intended to intimidate and injure. Racial hierarchies, working to the disadvantage and detriment of the less powerful, are maintained, reinforced, and revivified by a state that legitimates the use of racist dialogue, especially when that dialogue makes no secret about its ultimate goal to discriminate and oppress the targeted victims.

Defamatory remarks about a person’s membership in a particular outgroup are often aimed against the entire group, not just the individual to whom they are addressed. Jurisprudence that views bigoted deprecations as harmful only to individuals fails, in the face of voluminous empirical evidence, to recognize the social harms connected to racist dialogue. Hate propaganda dehumanizes an identifiable group by deploying unverifiable innuendo and unsubstantiated statements. Once the stamp of suspicious and dangerous outsider is imprinted on the accepted linguistic paradigm, it lays the groundwork for future oppression and violence.

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278. See Kretzmer, supra note 217, at 487.
281. See Powell, supra note 249, at 126.
283. See Tsesis, supra note 162, at 740–63 (presenting and analyzing the verbal propaganda contributing to the Holocaust, Native American dislocation, and black slavery); Tsesis, supra note 165, at chapters 2–4.
285. See Mahoney, supra note 165, at 792.
to gradually diminish rights, enslave, and kill outgroups.\textsuperscript{286}

Representative government is obligated to prevent social deterioration which preys on a whole group of people. Action should be taken, if possible, before hate propaganda has ingrained itself into popular culture. Herd mentality is best avoided by strong laws, making clear society’s disapprobation of inequality and injustice. Legislation ensures minorities will not be tyrannized and exploited by powerful interests. Hate speech does not further political discourse; instead, it escalates the threat to law and order. With the ever increasing number of hate groups running Internet sites, the government must act rather than wait until, after a period of indoctrination and desensitization, the rights of outgroups are so eroded that there remains only a short step to violent persecution. The social interest of maintaining order outweighs the right of individuals to spread false and degrading statements about a particular group.\textsuperscript{287}

IV. HATE SPEECH LAWS IN OTHER DEMOCRACIES

Many western democracies have determined that their societies are better served by laws against expressions designed to silence and defame minorities than they would be by the virtually unlimited license for hate speech that exists in the United States. There is a general consensus among the international community that bigotry perpetuates racism and anti-Semitism.\textsuperscript{288} While the United States Supreme Court has determined that the First Amendment protects most racist speech,\textsuperscript{289} many other countries have enacted legislation recognizing that hate propaganda threatens both outgroup participation in democracy and their rights and dignities.\textsuperscript{290} Countries that have enacted laws penalizing the dissemination of hate speech include Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cyprus, England, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, and Switzerland.\textsuperscript{291} International treaties also support this principle. For instance, the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which the United States signed in 1966, obligates party states to criminalize “all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred” and ‘incitement to racial

\begin{subfootnotes}
\item[287] See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255–57 (1952) (weighing the value of group libel against “social interest in order and morality”).
\item[288] Mahoney, \textit{supra} note 165, at 803.
\item[289] See supra Part III.A.3.
\item[290] Ogletree, \textit{supra} note 247, at 501.
\end{subfootnotes}
The Internet poses a problem for countries with such antidiscrimination laws. It enables bigots to post Web sites; interact through real time chat rooms; and send e-mails from the United States, where they are legal, to other countries where they are illegal. The messages can be received in any country around the world since the electromagnetic transmissions travel across borders. So, an Internet site set up in Texas expressing neo-Nazi sentiments is accessible in Canada and Germany, where public neo-Nazi expressions are criminally punishable.293 The United States Supreme Court's short-sightedness is, therefore, causing waves around the world. In effect, United States jurisprudence, along with the incitement and danger to democracy attached to it, makes it more difficult for other countries to eliminate hate speech.

In order to enforce laws against hate propaganda, the Commissioner of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, Max Yalden, has stated that the Commission can prevent Internet sites from transmitting hate messages even when the source servers are based in other countries.294 Canada has jurisdiction over such cases so long as people receive Internet signals in Canada, regardless of where the messages originate.295 The Commission on Human Rights has found that recent technological advances, like the Internet, have made it more difficult for law enforcement agencies to prevent the dissemination of hate messages.296
Commission has already investigated inciteful Web sites like those maintained by Ernst Zunde and Heritage Front. To pursue these and other propagandists, Canada enacted the Canadian Human Rights Act, which prohibits the technological distribution of hate materials. The Act prohibits persons or groups from using telecommunications to expose any identifiable group to hatred or contempt or to incite others to discriminate.

The Human Rights Act follows a line of Canadian laws prohibiting the use of hate propaganda and recognizing its tendency to incite others to act destructively. The Canadian Criminal Code contains a cause of action against the public incitement of others to hatred:

> Every one who, by communicating statements in any public place, incites hatred against any identifiable group where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the peace is guilty of (a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or (b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Moreover, the willful promotion of hatred through public statements about an identifiable group is punishable by up to two years imprisonment. Incitement to commit genocide is punishable by up to five years imprisonment.

Canada's hate propaganda law has been upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada. In Regina v. Keegstra, the Court found section 319(2), which bars the willful promotion of hatred, is constitutionally justified. The case involved a social studies teacher who was disseminating hate propaganda on students by telling them that Jews were “child killers” who fabricated the Holocaust. The Court held that it was legitimate to criminalize this type of speech since it harms both individual victims and society as a whole. The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the

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297. See id.
300. See id.
301. Id. § 319(1).
302. Id. § 319(2).
303. Id. § 318(1). Genocidal acts are defined as those done to destroy all or part of "any identifiable group." Id. § 318(2).
304. See JONES, supra note 291, at 210.
308. See id. at 713–14.
constitutioanlity of section 319(2) a second time in Regina v. Andrews. The Court upheld the conviction of two white nationalists who published the Nationalist Reporter, which promoted white supremacy. Their publication contained messages like “Nigger go home,” “Hoax on the Holocaust,” “Israel stinks,” and “Hitler was right[,] Communism is Jewish.” In Andrews, the Court found that the guarantee to the freedom of speech in the Charter of Rights is not absolute, and limitations on hate propaganda are constitutional and compatible with a free democratic society.

In Canada, judges are authorized to issue warrants for the confiscation of hate propaganda from premises where they are kept. The Canadian Justice Department considers electromagnetic materials, like computers and computer disks, containing such propaganda to be subject to confiscation.

Germany is another democracy committed to free expression which, nevertheless, recognizes the social menace posed by hate speech and penalizes it. The German Basic Law, upon which its constitutional system is based, includes a provision, Article 5, guaranteeing freedom of expression. Article 5 covers the right to freedom of speech via “audiovisual media,” like television broadcasts and Internet messages.

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310. Id.
312. See id. The Court determined that hate propaganda was valueless in spite of the protection for speech in Canada’s Charter of Rights & Freedoms, which is more “comprehensive” than that in the First Amendment. Lasson, Holocaust Denial and the First Amendment, supra note 280, at 72.
315. See McGuire, supra note 293, at 764.

Article 5 of the Basic Law provides:
(1) Everybody has the right freely to express and disseminate their opinions orally, in writing or visually, and to obtain information from generally accessible sources without hindrance. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting through audiovisual media shall be guaranteed. There shall be no censorship.

861
However, this constitutional right is not absolute. It is subject to "limitations embodied in the provisions of general legislation, statutory provisions for the protection of youth, and the citizen's right to personal respect."

Germany has passed several laws designed to allay the short and long term risks of unchecked hate speech. Internet users are personally responsible for the content they transmit, but Internet service providers are not accountable for third-party information that they automatically and temporarily store. Individuals and groups are subject to imprisonment for attacking the human dignity of others by: (1) inciting people to hate particular segments of the population; (2) advocating "violent or arbitrary measures against them"; and (3) slandering them. Further, it is criminal to publicly distribute or supply any "writings that incite to race hatred or describe cruel or otherwise inhuman acts of violence against humans in a manner which glorifies or minimizes such acts of violence or represents the cruel or inhuman aspects of the occurrence in a manner offending human dignity." These laws can be brought to bear against persons who use the Internet to post, exhibit, and otherwise make accessible denigrating messages about outgroups. Germany has codified the tenet that the right to personal and group dignity outweighs the interest of persons wanting to express destructive messages.

Other German laws also balance the right to free speech against the preservation of democratic institutions. The German Criminal Code forbids persons from using "flags, insignia, parts of uniforms, slogans

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317. [Footnote text]
318. [Footnote text]
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321. [Footnote text]
and forms of greeting" to propagate undemocratic political parties like the National Socialist party.322 Article 21.2 of the Basic Law bans political parties that pose a threat to democratic order.323 Nonpolitical organizations are also banned from overthrowing constitutional order.324

These examples suggest that United States pure speech jurisprudence is anomalous and that it is generally accepted, by democracies like Canada and Germany, that preserving human rights supersedes the right of bigots to spread their venomous messages.325 The history of racism in the United States, from Native American dislocation, to slavery, to Japanese internment, makes clear that here, as in other democracies, intolerance and persecution can exist in spite of the socially held ideal of equality. Even though the Declaration of Independence promises liberty and justice for all, not all groups have shared equally in that bounty. Safeguards should be enacted to prevent the forces of bigotry from harnessing Internet resources to strengthen socially regressive movements.

V. REGULATING HATE SPEECH ON THE INTERNET

The Internet is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it makes easier and more efficient education, research, and debate. On the other hand, it poses a new threat to representative democracies because it provides access to more national and international hate speech forums than ever before. The spread of invective on such a grand scale is not innocuous,326 nor is it necessary for ascertaining truth.327 The long-term effects of hate speech328 ought to give pause to those who wish to leave the Internet unregulated. When the consequence of inaction is the persecution and oppression of an identifiable group, social norms, markets, and computer architecture are not enough.329 What is needed is a legal scheme to regulate the Internet because the messages transmitted through that

322. Wetzel, supra note 319, at 104–05 n.11 (quoting art. 86a StGB).
323. CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 316, at 115 (quoting GG art. 21.2). “Parties which by reason of their aims or the conduct of their adherents seek to impair or do away with the free democratic basic order . . . shall be unconstitutional.” Id.
324. Id. at 109 (quoting GG art. 9.2).
325. For further detail on the hate speech laws of other common law democracies see JONES, supra note 291, at 190–223.
326. See supra Part III.
327. See supra Part III.A.2.
328. See supra Part III.A.1.
social space have physical, psychological, and cultural effects on real places and real people. Free speech may be limited when it is intentionally manipulated to negatively impact the fundamental rights of others.

A. Commercial Solutions

Several commercially available filtering devices block Internet sites based on their contents. One way of limiting the audience to which bigots' messages are spread is for users to voluntarily install filters. Some persons have argued that the availability of these devices makes it unnecessary and undesirable for the government to become involved in censuring the Internet. Instead, so the argument goes, individuals can purchase and activate any of the available filtering software comporting with their individual moral or social perspectives. The filters are considered preferable to regulations, and less likely to raise First Amendment issues, because companies, groups, and individuals, rather than the government, maintain control over message transmissions and receptions. This view has become increasingly widespread.

330. On the issue of how the Internet functions in space, see Part II.B.
331. Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 1275, 1315 (1998) (offering a theory that holds "free speech is a right that is limited by the fundamental rights of other persons and the community").
332. See generally Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering, 38 JURIMETRICS 629 (1998) (arguing for the need to prevent exploiting the Internet as a place to display pornography by altering computer architecture). Among other benefits, this would improve the ability of cyberspace users to determine what information the sending computer could record about the users preferences (as, for example, by modifying the Cookies function). Cookies are bits of information sent from Web site sources to the computers accessing those sites. This allows the source computer to retrieve information, often for commercial purposes, from the accessing computer during future exchanges of information between them. See Cookie, at http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,289893,sid9_gci211838,00.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2001).
The code system Lessig has in mind is analogous to the V-Chip, which makes it easier for parents to control what their children are watching on television, or a design enabling law enforcement agencies to tap telephones. See Lessig, supra note 329, at 532–33. However, this system is inadequate for regulating hate speech on the Net. Given the argument that hate speech is dangerous to the retention of democratic institutions, the potential consequences require criminal laws. As argued in this section, Part V.A, voluntary application of hardware or software is insufficient protection for society.
334. See id.
There are several relatively effective filters on the market including CyberPatrol, NetNanny, SurfWatch, and HateFilter. These enable parents to block objectionable messages from being received by their browsing youngsters. They censor for particular words or contents indicating the undesirability of particular Internet messages or sites. For example, when it is activated, the HateFilter denies access to Internet sites "advocat[ing] hatred, bigotry or violence against Jews, minorities and homosexuals." One problem with these filters is that they cast too wide a net and, inappropriately, block out nondiscriminatory Web sites. America Online learned this lesson when it prevented people from accessing sites with the word "breast." Unfortunately, the blocked areas included sites dealing with subjects like breast cancer. This was far afield from the intended outcome, which was to keep pornography out of children's hands. Likewise, using word sensitive filters to block out hate propaganda is a good beginning, but it might also prevent researchers from exploring necessary historical and sociological information on the Web. Students, for example, would be blocked from accessing sites containing racist terms but posing no danger of inciting anyone to commit acts of violence.

The parameters of these filtering devices are drafted by organizations bound by mission statements, altruism, and marketing considerations. The filters are riddled with software bugs. CyberPatrol classifies the following useful and innocuous Web sites as "FullNude" and/or "SexActs": (1) MIT Project on Mathematics and Computation; (2) The National Academy of Clinical Biochemistry; (3) Department of Computer Science, Queen Mary & Westfield College; and (4) Chiba Institute of Technology in Japan. The inaccuracy with which automatic tools filter out useful materials makes it impossible for those running the software to reach

338. Gearty, supra note 337, at 11.
339. Krantz, supra note 337, at 48.
340. Id.
helpful speech on important subjects.\textsuperscript{342} Furthermore, it is difficult for the purchasers of filtering devices to find out everything that is blocked and the guidelines that went into the equation since that information is considered proprietary.\textsuperscript{343}

Beyond the technical problems of regulating hate speech with filters, there is the reality that the bigotry remains accessible to everyone who does not have one of the filtering devices. Even though some people choose to avoid Internet communications with hate groups, the many venomous Web sites, news groups, and e-mails continue disseminating violent messages to anyone interested in meeting other prejudiced people.\textsuperscript{344} Filtering devices are inadequate for repelling the socially destabilizing force of hate messages. The filters do not prevent unstable people from accessing those hate-filled Internet sites to draw ideological sustenance, further inflame their bigotry, and feed and tantalize their insatiable hunger for violence against outgroups. Laws preventing dangerous forms of hate speech, enforceable by state and federal governments, not just voluntary purchases and installations of commercial products, are necessary to protect individual rights and to guarantee social welfare.

Other commercial arrangements also provide tenuous, though well-intentioned, limits on hate speech. Internet service providers like America Online have a policy against the use of hate speech.\textsuperscript{345} Offenders can have their accounts revoked.\textsuperscript{346} However, the vast number of messages that bombard search engines like Yahoo! make them unwilling breeding grounds for neo-Nazi groups.\textsuperscript{347} Nevertheless, a French court recently ordered Yahoo! to block an auction of Nazi memorabilia from reaching browsers in France because such commercial activities are illegal there.\textsuperscript{348} This case is novel because it imposed French law on a Web site located outside the country.\textsuperscript{349} It is too early to determine whether this case will withstand the test of time in France or be followed in other countries with laws against hate speech.\textsuperscript{350}

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\item \textsuperscript{343} R. Polk Wagner, \textit{Filters and the First Amendment}, 83 MINN. L. REV. 755, 763 (1999).
\item \textsuperscript{344} See Weintraub-Reiter, supra note 333, at 170.
\item \textsuperscript{345} See Scene Webworld\textit{Nazi Site Banned: We want you!}, UK NEWSQUEST REGIONAL PRESS, Sept. 6, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All.
\item \textsuperscript{346} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{347} See Keith Perine, \textit{The Trouble With Regulating Hate}, INDUSTRY STANDARD, July 24, 2000, available at 2000 WL 31584076.
\item \textsuperscript{348} See Yahoo! Loses Nazi Case, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 4, 2000, at B4.
\item \textsuperscript{349} See Richard Raysman \& Peter Brown, \textit{Yahoo! Decision in France Fuels E-Commerce Sovereignty Debate}, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 12, 2000, at 3.
\item \textsuperscript{350} Yahoo! Recently filed a legal challenge in a U.S. District Court in San Jose, arguing that France cannot enforce the decision because the French court lacked personal
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The World Wide Web Consortium, an organization hosted by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, originated yet another way of restricting access to Internet sites. It developed software for rating materials containing subjects like pornography and violence.\textsuperscript{351} The system does not actually filter materials; instead, it establishes rules for transmitting them.\textsuperscript{352} Organizations, governments, and agencies can develop Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) based systems, tailored to their particular agendas.\textsuperscript{353} But these systems are far from perfect. An extreme example of an undemocratic manipulation of PICS is the Chinese government’s prevention of Internet users from accessing United States government sites simply by blocking all Internet addresses ending in “.gov.”\textsuperscript{354}

It would be a mistake to exclusively place in the hands of commercial interests the power of deciding whether and to what extent hate speech should be blocked. When civil liberties are at stake, the power to preserve them rests squarely on democratically elected governments.\textsuperscript{355} Filters are a positive development for the maintenance of civil society; however, they fall short of the mark because they rely on private organizations to bear the torch of justice. For-profit companies are not beholden to humanistic principles, like the advancement of equality, because their interests are private. Even not-for-profit companies have targeted interests. On the other hand, a representative democracy is

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\item[351.] See Weintraub-Reiter, supra note 333, at 169; Denise Caruso, The Problems of Censorship Only Increase When Moved to the Private Sector, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at D6. Professor Lessig, an expert on cyberspace law, believes the threat posed by PICS “is a greater danger to free speech than public regulation” because it would allow private parties, like companies, to block materials based on viewpoint. Caruso, supra, at D6.
\item[353.] See Weintraub-Reiter, supra note 333, at 169.
\item[354.] See Nadine Strossen, Symposium, Should Cyberspace Be a Free Speech Zone?: Filters, “Family Friendliness,” and the First Amendment, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1 (1998); Weintraub-Reiter, supra note 333, at 169.
\item[355.] Cf. Caruso, supra note 351, at D6 (writing about the government obligation to guarantee free speech).
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obligated to increase overall well-being while preserving civil rights.356 Overreliance on the tender mercies of private powers relegates governmental duties to private prejudices, incentives, and priorities.357 Already, there is an elitism on Internet sites limiting access based on profession, knowledge, and affiliation.358 Recent improvements in video chat technology increase the ease of discriminating on the basis of immutable physical characteristics, like race and gender, to keep undesirables out of chat rooms and Web sites.359

The extent of the social impact from derogatory Internet transmissions and membership requirements depends on the historical significance of various degrading and inciteful stereotypes.360 Portrayals of outgroups are most dangerous when they exploit images that have been extensively developed over long periods of time. Some examples of this are the depiction of Jews as ruthlessly power hungry, of blacks as uncontrollably sex-depraved, of Native Americans as drunken savages, and of Gypsies as thieves. Web sites that are designed to perpetuate these sorts of stereotypes361 and to induce others to act against the objects of the defamatory statements have an impact on real people. They do not exist in a nonspacial world whose boundaries are separate from the world of actions and reactions. Hate crime is the end result of averse paradigms about minorities coupled with the promotion of actions against them.362 Orators calling for oppression and persecution against identifiable groups increase racial and ethnic tensions.363 The potential dangers to harmonious democratic order posed by widespread hate propaganda364 call for laws punishing its dissemination.365

357. See Netanel, supra note 137, at 452.
359. See Netanel, supra note 137, at 454.
360. See id. at 453; Rubin, supra note 261, at 178.
361. See generally supra Part II.C for a discussion of Internet sites run by hate groups.
362. See Kretzmer, supra note 217, at 463.
363. See Rubin, supra note 261, at 178.
364. See supra Part III.B.
365. But see Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1392–93 (using a non-physical-world metaphor for cyberspace to conclude that the Net should be self-governed by system operators).

868
B. Establishing a Cause of Action

In light of the dangers posed by hate speech and the insufficiency of commercial solutions, the most viable alternative to reducing discrimination is a criminal statute punishing the dissemination of hate speech on the Internet. Gordon Allport, one of the foremost experts on the psychology of bigotry, points out that since it is manifest that discriminatory laws increase prejudice, it is logical to think laws prohibiting discrimination will decrease the incidence of prejudice. Likewise, since hate speech increases racism, laws are the best incentive for reducing intolerance and for altering social outlooks because such legislation makes clear that hate propaganda is not a legitimate form of political discourse. It is the paradox of any legal reform that remedies for social evils raise the possibility of new dilemmas. However, abstract uncertainties about potential evils should not constrain legislators from passing laws narrowly designed to curb expressions whose only object is to endanger the lives, professions, properties, and civil liberties of the less powerful.

Some laissez-faire is preferable for commercial transactions, but the stakes involved in protecting human rights are more valuable to a representative democracy and require uniform federal laws to ensure them. Legislation will help purge bigotry and make democracy safer against unprincipled groups seeking its demise. Representative government implies the protection of civil rights through counter-majoritarian laws, drafted to guard against the unprincipled and wanton

366. See ALLPORT, supra note 163, at 469.

367. See supra Part III.A.

368. See Matsuda, supra note 6, at 2360–61. “Racism as an acquired set of behaviors can be dis-acquired, and law is the means by which the state typically provides incentives for changes in behavior.” Id. at 2361.


371. See JONES, supra note 291, at 5.
Legislators should not wait until the forces of hatred harness their followers to act violently. A carefully tailored law should be enacted even though, like any other law in real space, it may fall short of complete effectiveness. An overactive zeal for caution against infringing upon First Amendment rights should not deter legislators from taking steps to prevent the downfall of liberal democracy. Society’s interest in stability and diversity outweighs individual and group interests in expressions intended, eventually, to destroy constitutional institutions. Unrestricted speech, especially when it is exploited to increase the privileges of the most powerful, should not trump other’s fundamental rights to personal safety and equal participation in representative democracy. Laws against hate speech, while reducing the autonomy of some, will augment the freedoms of persons traditionally holding less power on account of their color, race, ethnic group, sexual orientation, or gender.

The following is a model criminal law against the use of hate propaganda on the Internet. It takes into account the spacial quality of cyberspace and the increased dangers associated with the spread of vitriol to a wide audience:

(1) Anyone using the Internet, an electromagnetic media, whether in this state or in a foreign state, to communicate or post statements calling for the discrimination, violence, persecution, or oppression of an identifiable group;

(2) Where it is substantially probable or reasonably foreseeable that the dissemination of such communications could elicit such acts; and

(3) Where the communicator intends the message(s) to promote destructive behavior;

(4) Shall receive a term of imprisonment of at least three months and not exceeding three years;

(5) In addition to the term of imprisonment, the court may impose

372. See Netanel, supra note 137, at 415.
373. See Lessig, supra note 89, at 1405.
374. See Matsuda, supra note 6, at 2380–81.
375. See Heyman, supra note 331, at 1280.
376. Carlos Santiago Nino argues persuasively that “one may restrain the autonomy of some if this results in increasing the autonomy of people who are less autonomous than those whose autonomy is being diminished.” NINO, supra note 263, at 61. Nino’s view is based on John Rawls’ “difference principle” which maintains that “[s]ocial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both . . . to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 72 (rev. ed. 1999).
377. This model is based on the Canadian and German legislation presented in Part IV of this Article.
community service not to exceed four hundred hours.

(6) Defenses: No one shall be convicted under this law if: the statements were uttered as an expression of opinion on a scientific, academic, or religious subject and/or the statements were made to eliminate the incidence of hatred toward an identifiable group. Nothing in this section shall be construed to mean that Internet Service Providers may be held responsible for the information communicated by other information content providers. 378

C. Obtaining Personal Jurisdiction

Courts only have authority to adjudicate criminal matters about the proposed Internet hate speech statute if they have personal jurisdiction over defendants. The laws of the United States, and many other countries, require that criminal trials commence in the defendant’s presence. 379 Several exceptions permit trials to proceed even when a defendant cannot be at court throughout the proceedings. 380 However, in most cases, jurisdiction over Internet hate propaganda cases will require that the defendant either be present in the United States or that she or he be extradited here. 381

Traditionally, extradition treaties were limited to listed offenses, 382 but

378. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1991 & Supp. 2001) (providing immunity to the common carriers of Internet sites). An “information content provider” is defined as: “[A]ny person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” Id. § 230(f)(3). A district court in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), held that in civil cases no liability attaches to those Internet distributors which do not know the content of a defamatory publication. An Internet distributor is analogous to a “public library, book store, or newsstand.” Id. at 140. See also Sunstein, supra note 200, at 1796. But see supra text accompanying notes 354–57.


380. For example, defendants can be removed from the courtroom for disruptive conduct. Fed. R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(3). The trial will also proceed without the defendant if she or he fled after its commencement. Fed. R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(1).


the recent trend in the United States has been to make extradition available when "the offense is punishable by a specified minimum sentence."\textsuperscript{383} To request extradition, the United States must have probable cause that a crime has occurred, and the sought person must be properly identified.\textsuperscript{384} As in international criminal cases, states that have ratified the Uniform Extradition Act can also request cosignatories to extradite criminals.\textsuperscript{385} The proper venue for trying such cases is either at the location of the crime or, where the crime affects several districts, the defendant can be tried in all of the affected districts.\textsuperscript{386}

The United States can try citizens or noncitizens for actions taken outside this country that have consequences within it.\textsuperscript{387} It is a well-established principle that a state has the jurisdiction to punish acts taken outside the jurisdiction but intended to affect or affecting someone or something within it.\textsuperscript{388} A nation has an extraterritorial right to protect its interest from criminal acts undertaken outside its limits.\textsuperscript{389} Hate speech sent from a computer in one jurisdiction to another, where the sender should have known or knew such a message would violate significant public interest, like a prohibition against the incitement of bigotry, should be criminally sanctioned.\textsuperscript{390}

If the model criminal statute proposed in Part V.B is adopted, the proper jurisdiction for the trial will be the place where the hate propaganda was posted on the Internet (which can be determined by the IP address of the source) or the jurisdiction(s) where the message(s) cause a negative impact. Even if the United States chooses not to adopt that statute, it should nevertheless honor extradition requests from other countries, like Germany and Canada, where hate speech is illegal. The

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\item \textsuperscript{383} See id. at 383, 384.
\item \textsuperscript{384} See, e.g., In re Extradition of Garcia, 890 F. Supp. 914, 922 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (discussing the requirement that probable cause be found before an extradition treaty between Mexico and America can be applied).
\item \textsuperscript{386} See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 Vill. L. Rev. 1, 43 (1996).
\item \textsuperscript{387} See United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1512 (S.D. Fla. 1990) ("The United States has long possessed the ability to attach criminal consequences to acts occurring outside this country which produce effects within the United States"), aff'd by United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997).
\item \textsuperscript{388} See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) ("Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its power.").
\item \textsuperscript{389} See Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234 (1804).
\item \textsuperscript{390} See Model Penal Code § 1.03 (1999). States can try acts occurring outside their boundaries "when the conduct bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of this State and the actor knows or should know that his conduct is likely to affect that interest." Id. § 1.03(1)(f).
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United States should not continue being a safe harbor for hate groups distributing harmful messages to countries where they are not permitted to operate. Information sent on the Internet does not only exist in a virtual world, it touches the lives and increases the potential for violence in the real world. It matters not that the information is sent through a flow of electrons 391 or through words on paper. Both are physical processes engaging audiences and calling them to action.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Internet is a global network providing connections for many forms of speech. All the processes of message transmission occur in real space through a system of identifiable algorithms. The information is posted on the Web by individuals or groups intending it to be read by and to affect a limited or expansive audience.

The worldwide potentials for the Internet offer a mechanism for spreading democracy and commercial entrepreneurialship throughout the world. However, the Internet is also a breeding ground for hate groups who use it to expand their membership and to solidify their forces. The packages of information about how to instigate a racial war or to limit the opportunities for identifiable groups do not exist in a virtual world, absent from reality. False messages which are intended to stifle and exploit existing negative stereotypes impact individuals' lives and the societies where they reside. They strengthen the purveyors of racism, anti-Semitism, sexism, and gay-bashers. They also intimidate traditional scapegoats and limit their ability to exercise the full extent of their fundamental right to autonomy.

Criminal penalties should be imposed on persons who intend harm and violence against identifiable groups. Hate speech is not only dangerous when it calls for immediate action. History is replete with examples of extensive, organized manipulation of hate propaganda that, over a long term, became part of the accepted social dialogue, making hate movements popularly accepted. The Holocaust, Native American removal, and black slavery developed after years of indoctrination made active anti-Semitism and racism socially and legislatively acceptable. 392

Tolerance and egalitarianism should not be sacrificed at the altar of an

391. Cf. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that Internet commerce occurs through a "stream of electrons").
392. See Tsesis, supra note 162, at 740–55.
absolutist free speech doctrine. It is in the public interest to manifest disapprobation for hate speech and to distinguish it from legitimate forms of political dialogue. False statements about identifiable groups do nothing to further mutual respect for inalienable rights. Government should not allow Internet users to foment worldwide intolerance and inequality. Instead, it should realize the potential global threats posed by hate speech on the Internet, the very purpose of which is to destroy democracy and oppress outgroup members.