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Essay

Never Get Out’a the Boat

*Stenberg v. Carhart* and the Future of American Law

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Francis Ford Coppola’s *Apocalypse Now*¹ is a powerful film full of many gripping scenes. Since its release in 1979, the movie has provided viewers not only with haunting images of the Vietnam War, but also with a story that has a great deal to say about human nature and the nature of violent conflict. In its own way, the Supreme Court’s opinion in *Stenberg v. Carhart* tells an equally gripping story.² Unfortunately, the case is not a work of fiction, but a declaration of what our Constitution demands. Moreover, unlike Coppola’s graphic depiction of war, the majority’s depiction of partial birth abortion in *Stenberg* is deliberately understated. Despite these apparent dissimilarities, the movie—and one scene in particular—serves as a poignant commentary on *Stenberg* and, by extension, the future of American law.

*Apocalypse Now* is largely based on Joseph Conrad’s short novel, *Heart of Darkness.*³ In the film, Martin Sheen plays Captain Benjamin Willard, a Special Forces officer ordered to assassinate Colonel Walter Kurtz, a renegade American played by Marlon Brando. Confronting the

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¹ *APOCALYPSE NOW* (Zoetrope Studios 1979).
³ *JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS* (1902).
brutal truth of their command—the murder of a fellow American soldier—requires an honesty that Willard’s superiors cannot muster. Thus, they do not directly tell Willard to “kill Colonel Kurtz.” Instead, in the sanitized jargon of military operations, Willard is ordered to “terminate the Colonel’s command.” Indeed, the CIA case worker present at Willard’s briefing tells him “Terminate with extreme prejudice.”

To find Kurtz and carry out his mission, Willard is ferried up the Nung River to Cambodia on a Navy Swift boat manned by a crew of four. At one point on their journey, the men stop the boat and rest for a while along the river bank. “Chef,” a cook who serves as the boat’s machinist, goes into the jungle in search of mangoes, accompanied by Willard. As they make their way into the bush, Chef explains how a man trained as a saucier in New Orleans came to work as a machinist. Their friendly banter suddenly ends, however, as Willard hears something, tenses up and moves forward, pointing his M-16 in the direction of the sound. Willard’s quiet intensity frightens Chef. It might be “Charlie” lurking in the bush, waiting to ambush them. They stop, pause, a shadow moves, and a tiger bounds out of the jungle. The two men fire their weapons and Chef yells in terror as they run back to the boat. They stop, pause, a shadow moves, and a tiger bounds out of the jungle. The two men fire their weapons and Chef yells in terror as they run back to the boat. They jump on board and the boat races away, firing its guns into the jungle. Overwhelmed by the incident, Chef becomes hysterical. Not only must the men contend with the constant threat of death by the Viet Cong, but as Chef exclaims “I almost got eaten by a fucking tiger!” He screams at the top of his lungs, “Never get out’a the fucking boat! I gotta remember, never get out’a the fucking boat!” In a voice-over, Willard—a man trained in the art of killing, a man who knows the jungle—expresses his agreement: “Never get out’a the boat. Absolutely god damn right . . . Unless you were going all the way.”

In this scene, the boat and the jungle are not only places where the drama unfolds. They also function as metaphors for, respectively, a society in which human conduct is bound by the limits of moral restraint, and a place which has no such limitations. That is, not unlike the Pequod in Melville’s *Moby Dick*, the patrol boat in *Apocalypse Now* represents civilization. Compared to the near-total insanity and chaos of the wider conflict around them, the boat offers its crew and passenger a place of relative safety. On the boat the men eat and sleep and smoke together. They answer their mail and brush their teeth. Although the strictures of military discipline are somewhat lax, on the boat the men can protect themselves from the dangers of a hostile world. Indeed, in maintaining the rationality and order necessary to survive “the shit” of Vietnam, the boatmates share a common fate.

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*Herman Melville, Moby Dick; or the Whale* (1851).
To get off the boat is to abandon civilization and with it the moral order that makes social life possible. To get off the boat and venture into the jungle is to leave behind the norms of civil society and enter a place where violence is neither right or wrong, only “necessary.” It is a place beyond good and evil, where freedom knows no bounds. Without the constraints and security provided by social custom and the protection afforded by law, one must be willing to suspend one’s moral judgment and go “all the way.” That is, one must have the will to do what others cannot bring themselves to do. One must have the strength to act like the Viet Cong who, as Kurtz later recounts, hacked off the little arms of all the children in a village simply because the Americans had inoculated them against polio. A man who gets off the boat and ventures into the jungle must, as Kurtz says, be able “to kill without feeling, without passion, without judgment, without judgment, because it is judgment that defeats us.” No longer encumbered by the moral judgments of civilization, which temper the exercise of individual will, one is free to act in any way deemed desirable.

“Never get out’a the fucking boat.” Sound advice, not only for Swift boat grunts tempted to venture out into the jungle, but also for federal judges and elected officials, indeed, for anyone who hopes to live in a society in which the dignity of the human person is respected and ordered liberty is preserved.

In Stenberg v. Carhart, the Supreme Court “got out’a the fucking boat” and showed that it was willing to go “all the way.” All the way to declaring that the State may not protect a child in the process of being born. All the way to saying that what is indisputably a human being does

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5 See Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, 290 (2d Cir. 2006) (Walker, C.J., concurring) (stating that the Stenberg Court, “effectively held that the deeply disturbing—and morally offensive—destruction of the life of a partially born child cannot be banned by a legislature without an exception for the mother’s health (as determined by her doctor)”; id. at 312 (Straub, J., dissenting) (“I find the current expansion of the right to terminate a pregnancy to cover a child in the process of being born morally, ethically, and legally unacceptable.”); James Bopp, Jr. & Curtis R. Cook, Partial Birth Abortion: The Final Frontier of Abortion Jurisprudence, 14 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 4 (1998) (“Partial-birth abortion is the final frontier of abortion jurisprudence because it involves the killing of the child during birth.”). The Court in Stenberg noted that:

The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists describes the D&X procedure [(partial-birth abortion)] in a manner corresponding to a breech-conversion intact D&E [(dilation and evacuation)], including the following steps:

1. deliberate dilatation of the cervix, usually over a sequence of days;
2. instrumental conversion of the fetus to a footling breech;
3. breech extraction of the body excepting the head; and
4. partial evacuation of the intracranial contents of a living fetus to effect vaginal delivery of a dead but otherwise intact fetus.”

Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 928 (citing the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Executive Board, Statement on Intact Dilation and Extraction (Jan. 12, 1997)).
not, under the Constitution, enjoy the benefit of law.\textsuperscript{6} All the way to the brink of infanticide.\textsuperscript{7}

Of course, the Supreme Court does not say this directly. Because the majority recognizes the sheer barbarism of what they say the Constitution requires,\textsuperscript{8} they are unwilling to express themselves with genuine candor. Instead, like Captain Willard’s superiors, the \textit{Stenberg} court articulates its decision in language that conceals the true nature of the conduct involved, making it morally palatable to those who like to think of themselves as members of civilized society. But all of this is subterfuge. Behind the cloak of polite verbiage Willard’s superiors are ordering him to kill Kurtz

\textsuperscript{6} See generally Kathleen A. Cassidy Goodman, \textit{The Mutation of Choice}, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 635, 661 (1997) (“Partial-birth abortion must be viewed not only as a morally questionable practice in the already controversial realm of abortion, but also as an indicator of the direction the United States is moving with regard to respect for all human life.”); Stephanie D. Schmutz, \textit{Infanticide or Civil Rights for Women: Did the Supreme Court Go Too Far in Stenberg v. Carhart?}, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 529, 531 (2002) (“The gruesome detail with which this law describes the procedure it restricts indicates just how far we have denigrated the rights of unborn children.”).

\textsuperscript{7} Some have argued that partial birth abortion should not fall within the Court’s abortion jurisprudence since it involves the killing of a partially-birthed human baby, that is, infanticide. \textit{See}, \textit{e.g.}, Bopp & Cook, supra note 5, at 32 (“The partial-birth extraction and cranial decompression procedure constitutes infanticide and is not governed by abortion jurisprudence.”). Indeed, according to this analysis:

the abortion right applies only to those who are \textit{unborn}. A baby who is partially delivered cannot properly be termed \textit{unborn}. In the partial-birth abortion procedure as described by practitioners, the baby is three-fourths delivered. Only three inches of the baby could arguably be said to be \textit{unborn}. The baby as a whole is partially-born, not \textit{unborn}. As a result, abortion jurisprudence does not apply to a partially delivered child.

\textit{Id.} at 26. \textit{See also Nat’l Abortion Fed’n}, 437 F.3d at 312 (Straub, J., dissenting) (“In addition to vindicating the right to life of those in the process of being born, the State has a compelling interest in protecting the line between abortion and infanticide.”); Steven Grasz, \textit{If Standing Bear Could Talk... Why There is No Constitutional Right to Kill a Partially-Born Human Being}, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 23, 26 (1999) (arguing that “partial-birth abortion cases can, and should, be decided outside the legal framework of \textit{Roe} and its progeny”); Jill R. Radioff, \textit{Partial-Birth Infanticide: An Alternate Legal and Medical Route to Banning Partial-Birth Procedures}, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (1999) (arguing that partial-birth infanticide is an accurate description of what is commonly called partial-birth abortion because “the child dies during the birth process”). \textit{But see} Eric Johnson, \textit{Habit and Discernment in Abortion Practice: The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 as Morals Legislation}, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 549, 605 (2005) (arguing that although “it is true that to the layperson dilation and extraction bears a close resemblance to infanticide... physicians need not and probably will not perceive dilation and extraction as closely resembling infanticide, [therefore] there is no good reason to suppose that their use of this technique ultimately will prevent them from acquiring or maintaining a habit of respect for persons”).

\textsuperscript{8} \textit{See}, \textit{e.g.}, \textit{Stenberg}, 530 U.S. at 946 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Although much ink is spilled today describing the gruesome nature of late-term abortion procedures, that rhetoric does not provide me a reason to believe that the procedure Nebraska here claims it seeks to ban is more brutal, more gruesome, or less respectful of ‘potential life’ than” many other abortion methods.”). The ink spilled to which Justice Stevens refers appears in the \textit{Stenberg} dissents. As noted above, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion employs the restrained language of clinical medical texts. In other areas of practice, this technical verbiage provides a uniform way of referring to the subject of a medical procedure and the actions performed with respect to it. Here, however, this language not only serves the purpose of standardization, but of concealing the horror of the procedure it describes precisely in order to legitimize it.
by any means necessary, and the Supreme Court is declaring that the Constitution forbids the States from banning a practice in which a child, who is within inches of being fully born, can have its skull split open by a pair of scissors and its brains sucked out by a vacuum.

At the beginning of his majority opinion in Stenberg, Justice Stephen Breyer notes that the act of abortion can be described in disparate ways. He acknowledges that some people believe that the abortion license is necessary to ensure the “equal liberty” of American women, while others hold that “an abortion is akin to causing the death of an innocent child.”

Even here, however, Breyer finds it difficult to state the pro-life position in unvarnished form. Opponents of abortion do not believe that the act is merely akin to causing the death of an innocent child but that it is the deliberate and intentional killing of an innocent child. Regardless of the specific articulation, it seems that for Breyer such description is merely rhetorical gloss. He gives no indication that there is any truth beyond the political preference for or against abortion that would support or refute

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9 Id. at 920. The Second Circuit recently echoed Breyer’s observation regarding the disparate views held concerning abortion. Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 437 F.3d at 281 (“Some consider abortion the illegitimate killing of a person. Others consider abortion a legitimate medical procedure used by a pregnant woman, in consultation with her doctor, to terminate a pregnancy prior to birth. Those on both sides of the controversy acknowledge that the fetus is a living organism, starting as a collection of cells just after conception and developing into a recognizable human form as the time for birth approaches. The destruction of a fetus is a distressing event, whether one views abortion as the killing of a person or a pregnant woman’s personal choice concerning her body.”).

Justice Breyer considers these views “virtually irreconcilable.” Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 920. If by this he means that each side in the abortion debate has strongly held views and that neither side is likely to alter its perspective, he may well be right. As a logical matter, however, the two views are not mutually exclusive. That is, it may well be the case both that the abortion license gives women greater freedom to direct their lives than they would have if it was not available and that the abortion procedure causes the death of an innocent child. There is no formal contradiction in these two claims.

By contrast, those who once held that the earth was flat and those who held that the earth was round held mutually-exclusive views. The law of the excluded middle precludes the possibility of the earth being both round and flat in the same way at the same time. But those who held that the South needed slavery to compete on equal footing with the North and those who believed in the dignity of all persons, including enslaved African-Americans, did not hold “virtually irreconcilable” views. In the first case, the flat earther’s were proved wrong. In the second case, regardless of whether the claim concerning regional economic equality was true or false, the United States decided to subordinate this claim in favor of the liberty claim.

In the abortion context, social critic Naomi Wolf demonstrates how Breyer’s “virtually irreconcilable” positions can be reconciled by subordinating the life of the unborn child in favor of women’s equality. She calls for pro-choice advocates to stop “entangl[ing] our beliefs in a series of self-delusions, fibs and evasions.” Naomi Wolf, Our Bodies, Our Souls, The New Republic, Oct. 16, 1995, at 26, available at LEXIS, News Library, NEWRPG File. Part of this “radical shift in the pro-choice movement’s rhetoric” requires “contextualiz[ing] the fight to defend abortion rights within a moral framework that admits that the death of a fetus is a real death.” Id. For Wolf, “[f]ree women must be strong women, too; and strong women, presumably, do not seek to cloak their most important decisions in euphemism.” Id. at 32. Instead, the exercise of power must be accompanied by an honest recognition of what that power accomplishes. Thus, although she maintains “that a woman’s equality in society must give her some irreducible rights unique to her biology, including the right to take the life within her,” she insists that “we don’t have to lie to ourselves about what we are doing at such a moment.” Id. at 33.
such a description. There is only the "truth" constructed by the Court according to which abortion is a constitutional right, a right that the Court "has determined and then redetermined" in the course of a generation, first in Roe v. Wade and later in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. Thus, in giving constitutional sanction to partial birth abortion, the Stenberg court does not bother to deny that the subject of this gruesome procedure is in fact a human life, a human being, a child in the process of being born. Indeed the unspoken premise upon which the Stenberg decision turns is that the humanity or inhumanity of the entity aborted is irrelevant to the constitutionality of the act. Apparently, like Willard’s commanders, Breyer believes that some things are better left unsaid.

Unable to make the argument that a healthy six, seven, eight, or nine-month-old fetus subject to partial birth abortion is not a human being, the Court likewise finds itself unable to tell the American public that the question of the fetus’ humanity is irrelevant to the issue of whether or not the State may ban the procedure. Instead, the Court avoids the embarrassment of such a failed argument by ignoring the issue altogether. In doing so, it employs a strategy reserved for those privileged institutions that have the final say with respect to a given matter. As Justice Robert Jackson famously observed, the members of the Court "are not final beings alone."

10 Cf. John T. Noonan, Jr., The Root and Branch of Roe v. Wade, 63 NEB. L. REV. 668, 673 (1984) (arguing that the Roe court "felt free to impose its own notions of reality" such that "the biological reality" of the developing child in the womb "could be subordinated or ignored by the sovereign speaking through the Court").

11 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 921.


14 See Michael W. McConnell, How Not to Promote Serious Deliberation About Abortion, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1198 (1991) (book review) (arguing that in claiming that it need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins, the Roe court "was suggesting that the question of human life was irrelevant to the decision").

15 Paradoxically, the fact that the Court, like Willard’s commanders, is unwilling to speak the truth aloud is itself a sign of hope. If the Court had been confident in the absence of moral objection to its ruling, if it had thought that barbarism was now widely accepted, then there would have been no need for it to fail to admit the fact that a partially delivered baby is indeed a human person. Deep in the jungle, the Court could openly acknowledge the child’s humanity and still license others “to kill . . . without judgment, without judgment, because it is judgment that defeats us.” At the edge of the jungle, where the end of civilization and the beginning of barbarism blur together, the Court must still act in a strategic fashion, and so be sparing in its use of candor.

In 1970, the California Medical Association predicted the need for precisely this strategy in order to secure wide-spread acceptance of the abortion license. In an editorial in its magazine, the Association argued that “semantic gymnastics” would need to be employed to avoid “the scientific fact, which everyone already knows, that human life begins at conception and is continuous whether intra or extra uterine until death.” Editorial, A New Ethic for Medicine and Society, CAL. MED., 67, 68 (1970). The medical profession, it said, must deny what the editorial referred to as the "intrinsic and equal value for every human life regardless of its stage, condition or status" until such time as society would accept abortion without judgment. Id. Such obfuscation would, it said, be necessary to effect a mental disconnection, "to separate the idea of abortion from the idea of killing." Id.
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.\textsuperscript{16}

The \textit{Stenberg} decision not only manifests the Court's fallibility,\textsuperscript{17} but also exposes the folly of any institution that would hope to resolve such a sensitive and divisive issue without having "the courage to look the truth in the eye and to call things by their proper name."\textsuperscript{18}

Unfortunately, the Court does more than fail to call things by their proper name. Like Willard's commanders, the \textit{Stenberg} majority hides behind a rhetoric which is intended to strike the reader as neutral and unobjectionable. Indeed, the Court claims that "[t]here is no alternative way," that such language is necessary "to acquaint the reader with the technical distinctions among different abortion methods and related factual matters."\textsuperscript{19} Thus, the Court is able to describe an innocuous medical procedure in which "the doctor pulls the fetal body through the cervix, collapses the skull, and extracts the fetus through the cervix."\textsuperscript{20} Clearly, the humanity of the victim of this procedure is not among the "factual matters" addressed by the Court. By not judging the matter, the Court hopes to finally resolve it.

As such, Kurtz's prescription for victory in war aptly describes the Court's decision in the case. Indeed, it is an epithet for the morbid liberalism that currently defines the Court's jurisprudence. In \textit{Stenberg} the Court takes decisive action, but "without judgment, without judgment, because it is judgment that defeats us." The Court does not pause to consider the status of the child struggling to be born, victimized by the procedure it approves. Without judgment the Court is free to act. The irony cannot help but appeal to post-modern sensibilities. By not judging, the judges judge in favor of a virulent tolerance. Put another way, the majority has decided that in order to preserve the liberty that defines American civilization, the law must ensure that women are free to act with extreme prejudice toward children in the process of being born.\textsuperscript{21}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Brown \textit{v.} Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
\item \textsuperscript{17} On the potential fallibility of a court vested with final authority, see Jack Wade Nowlin, \textit{Constitutional Violations by the United States Supreme Court: Analytical Foundations}, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1123, 1196 (2005) (arguing that "the concept of constitutional violations by the Supreme Court has significant support as a matter of analytic jurisprudence and constitutional analysis"). For an argument questioning the finality or supremacy of Supreme Court decisions, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, \textit{Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals From the Twenty-Third Century}, 59 ALB. L. REV. 671, 691 (1995) (arguing that "[i]t is time to explode the myth of judicial supremacy and judicial exclusivity in constitutional interpretation—a myth that has lived long but ought not be allowed to prosper").
\item \textsuperscript{19} \textit{Stenberg v. Carhart}, 530 U.S. 914, 923 (2000).
\item \textsuperscript{20} \textit{Id.} at 927.
\item \textsuperscript{21} In this logic, those with an ear attuned to history may hear faintly in the background the voice of an American commander in Vietnam who, following the annihilation of the village of Ben Tre famously remarked that "It became necessary to destroy the town in order to save it." Adam Clymer,
The absence of judgment in Stenberg has been replicated by virtually every federal court to consider a subsequent state restriction on partial birth abortion.\textsuperscript{22} Indeed, the nearly lockstep fashion in which federal courts have struck down these statutes shows that, notwithstanding all their vaunted independence, judges with life tenure no less than soldiers can follow the orders of their superiors without question, without judgment. Of course, some might argue that curtailing, if not entirely eliminating, the judgment of lower courts is precisely the point of \textit{stare decisis}. Respect for established precedent and settled legal principle guarantees continuity and thus stability in the legal system in much the same way that the chain of command prevents enlisted men and officers of lower rank from second-guessing the military plans formulated by their superiors. Still, as important as the chain of command is, it cannot excuse or legitimate acts of barbarism.\textsuperscript{23} It cannot prevent even the lowliest front-line conscript from recognizing the humanity of a non-combatant and refusing to obey an order that directly targets innocent human life.\textsuperscript{24}

Even in times of war, civilization is not without its defenders. In 2003, Congress passed and President Bush signed a federal ban on partial birth abortion.\textsuperscript{25} The statute was immediately challenged by advocates of the

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\textit{House Revolutionary}, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1992, at 41, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. See also \textit{George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950–1975} (2d ed. 1986) ("The offhand remark of a U.S. Army officer who had participated in the liberation of the village of Ben Tre—"We had to destroy the town to save it"—seemed to epitomize the purposeless destruction of the war.").

\textsuperscript{22} See, e.g., Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2005) (striking down a Virginia statute); Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 249 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2001) (striking down an Illinois statute); R.I. Med. Soc'y v. Whitehouse, 239 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 2001) (striking down a Rhode Island statute); Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000) (striking down a New Jersey statute). The sole exception has been Women's Med. Prof. Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2003) (upholding an Ohio statute). Of the nine Circuit Court judges to consider the constitutionality of the federal ban on partial-birth abortion, one dissented from the conclusion that the statute is unconstitutional in light of \textit{Stenberg}. See Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, 296 (2d Cir. 2006) (Staub, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{23} How a lower court judge should resolve the conflict between his or her duty as a judge to apply the positive law and his or her duty as a human being to refrain from participation in acts of barbarism is beyond the scope of this essay. For a thoughtful essay on a related though somewhat more narrow topic, see John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, \textit{Catholic Judges in Capital Cases}, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 303 (1998) (arguing that faithful Catholic judges may not sentence even a rightfully convicted criminal to death).

\textsuperscript{24} The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides that any soldier who acts "with intent to usurp or override lawful military authority, refuses, in concert with any other person, to obey orders or otherwise do his duty or creates any violence or disturbance is guilty of mutiny." 10 U.S.C. § 894 (2000). A soldier may, however, disobey an order by his or her superior to murder non-combatants because such an order would not be made with "lawful military authority." See Calley v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650, 675 (1974) (quoting General Westmoreland who declared "that an unlawful order from a superior does not excuse or justify one of our soldiers killing an innocent civilian").

procedure in three federal actions filed in New York, San Francisco and Omaha. The district court in each of these lawsuits ruled that the federal statute, like its state counterparts, violated the constitutional freedom set forth in Stenberg. The Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal have in turn affirmed each of these respective decisions. To date, every court to consider the matter found that the statute was deficient because it lacked a “health” exception that would allow the procedure where, in the language of Casey, it was deemed “necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.” Although these words sound like words of limitation, from the beginning of its abortion jurisprudence, the Court has given the term “health” an exceedingly broad reading. Indeed, in Doe v. Bolton, the companion case to Roe, the Court defined “health” to mean “all factors—physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to the well-being of the patient.”

It is this nearly boundless understanding of “health” coupled with a woman’s inviolable desire to obtain an abortion that allows the Court to go “all the way.” Indeed, it mandates the result in Stenberg. Thus, it is hard to take issue with Justice Antonin Scalia’s conclusion that Stenberg is not “a regrettable misapplication of Casey” but the “logical and entirely predictable consequence” of that decision.

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Notwithstanding the rhetoric of “health” and the Stenberg court’s calculated efforts to understate the sheer horror of what it approves, some people can still read a map. Some people know when they’ve gone overboard. Some people can look at their surroundings and know in an instant that they have left civilization behind and are now heading deep into the jungle. After reviewing all the evidence in the New York lawsuit challenging the federal statute, District Judge Richard Casey concluded that partial birth abortion, “is a gruesome, brutal, barbaric, and uncivilized medical procedure.”

Recognition of this fact would cause most people to run out of the jungle and climb back on board the boat as fast as they can. But “health” gets in the way. Indeed, health as “well-being” makes the retreat back to civilization exceedingly difficult. In the bizarre world created by Stenberg, the Constitution demands that the state not interfere with the “gruesome, brutal, barbaric, and uncivilized” acts that are “necessary” to kill a child in the process of being born. After all, the emotional, psychological, or familial “well-being” of a woman may dictate that she be able to choose the method of her child’s execution. She may wish to be reassured that her baby will die quickly and without pain, or that her abortion will be conducted in such as way as to eliminate the possibility of a live birth, or simply in order to please the doctor whom she trusts, the doctor who simply wants to avoid any “unnecessary complications.” The point is that “well-being” is broad enough to encompass all of these sorts of considerations, as well as countless others. As such, “health” is no longer firmly rooted in medical science. It is now a word that artfully conceals the exercise of power “without judgment, without judgment.”

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Later in the film, the boat and its crew make their way up the river and Willard eventually locates Colonel Kurtz. He discovers, however, that Kurtz is truly insane. As Willard remarks, “Kurtz got off the boat” and “split from the whole fucking program.” The rotting corpses and severed heads that decorate Kurtz’s compound testify to this fact. But it is not an insanity derived from the absence of any rationality. Instead, Kurtz’s insanity is the result of subscribing to two contradictory rationalities simultaneously. In the film, this contradiction is presented as the paradox of war: to save civilization, man must abandon the moral limits of human conduct and act with brutal savagery. For Coppola, however, this is no paradox, only perverse absurdity. Indeed, the absurd way in which the war is conducted is a recurring theme throughout the film: the Armed Forces Radio tells nineteen-year-old GI’s trained to kill that the mayor of Saigon

wants them to hang their laundry up "indoors instead of off the window sills" in order to "keep Saigon beautiful!"; military commanders fly three *Playboy* centerfolds into the middle of the jungle to dance for the troops and are surprised to find that the boys want to storm the stage; an Army chaplain and a few soldiers celebrate mass on a smoke-filled landing zone as a tank flame-thrower torches an enemy bunker; and one American officer, obsessed with catching the perfect wave in Vietnam, has his soldiers surf as enemy rounds explode around them.

Early in the film we are told that Kurtz was "a good man . . . a humanitarian man, a man of wit and humor." But it is this absurd juxtaposition of civilization and war, of moral order and immoral violence, of the desire to protect life and the utter disregard for life that drives Kurtz insane. As Kurtz says moments before Willard kills him: "They train young men to drop fire on people, but their commanders won't allow them to write 'Fuck' on their airplanes because it's obscene!" For Kurtz the contradiction is unbearable. It causes him to collapse from the inside. As Willard puts it, Kurtz first broke from his superiors "and then he broke from himself. I've never seen a man so broken up and ripped apart."

The law suffers a similar collapse when it embraces two contradictory principles, two competing rationalities that cannot be reconciled with one another. *Stenberg* constitutionalized this kind of insanity, injecting it into our fundamental law by elevating an extreme conception of freedom above the obligation to treat every human being as a subject deserving of equal concern and respect. In doing so, the Court lifted human liberty to unnatural heights while simultaneously destroying its foundation. Indeed, the Court reasoned that to preserve the equal dignity of women in society it is necessary to abandon the moral limits of human freedom. Respect for women's autonomy requires that the state not intervene when a child in the process of being born is met with brutal savagery. In both an immediate and in an ultimate sense, however, the dignity and liberty of one individual

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32 The idea that the state must treat every individual as a subject of equal concern and respect is foundational for many liberal legal theorists. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191-92 (1985) (arguing that liberalism takes "as its constitutive political morality" the idea "that government must be neutral on what might be called the question of the good life"); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-73 (1977) (arguing that the state must treat people "with equal concern and respect," meaning that it must not unequally distribute goods or opportunities to some because it regards them as "worthy of more concern" nor may it "constrain liberty on the ground that one citizen's conception of the good life . . . is nobler or superior to another's"); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-4 (1971) (arguing that because "[e]ach person possesses an inviolability founded on justice" that "in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests"); id. at 60 (describing the first of two principles of justice as being that "each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others"). See also CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 59-68 (1987) (describing the importance of "equal respect" for others as being "a respect for persons" that obligates one to engage in rational discussion with others concerning matters in controversy).
cannot rest firmly on the right to destroy another innocent human being. Thus, by embracing an exaggerated understanding of human freedom, the Court corrupted the very notion of equal dignity and respect and laid clear the path into the jungle.

To be sure, liberty and equality are two principles, two rationalities that must be embodied in law. Indeed, each of these principles constitutes an indispensable aspect of human dignity such that each is necessary to safeguard that dignity in the legal and political order. At the same time, however, as commentators from Plato to de Tocqueville have observed, liberty and equality stand somewhat in tension with one another. Taken to an extreme, the principle of equality subverts liberty, and the principle of liberty undermines equality. That is, if equality is not limited to formal equality before the law, but is broadened to include equality of condition, then individuals may no longer distinguish themselves through the free exercise of their talents and resources. Similarly, unbounded liberty not only exacerbates the natural differences that exist among individuals, but if left unchecked, it renders even formal legal equality chimerical. The true dignity of the human person instead requires a proper ordering, a kind of equilibrium between these two competing principles.

Throughout most of our modern constitutional history, the Supreme Court has preserved a balance between liberty and equality. The Court has allowed Congress and the States to ensure some basic level of equality of condition through the provision of public services and social insurance benefits. In construing the meaning of equality under the Constitution, however, the Supreme Court has not insisted on equality of condition or equality of outcome. Instead, the Court has largely limited its interpretation to formal legal equality. This understanding of equality requires public authorities to treat all individuals with equal concern and respect simply by virtue of their status as human beings, and nothing more. Thus, in what is undoubtedly the modern Court’s most celebrated


34 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (striking down statute denying children born out of wedlock the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother and asserting that “illegitimate children are not ‘non-persons.’ They are humans, live, and have their being”). As noted below, however, the principle of equal concern and respect does not require the state to treat all human beings exactly alike in every respect. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (upholding statute
NEVER GET OUT'A THE BOAT

decision, Brown v. Board of Education, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government from segregating children in public schools on the basis of race. To do so would violate their inherent dignity.

Beyond the field of public education, this same concern for formal legal equality has informed the Court’s decisions in a variety of other areas. These areas include the right to vote, the composition of civil and criminal juries, the right to marry and the disposition of property.

The duty to treat all human beings with equality, that is, as subjects worthy of equal concern and respect, does not require the state to treat every individual exactly alike in every way. Indeed, the state has “a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently from others.” Rather, the state violates the principle of legal equality when its classification of human beings “rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.” Thus, for example, the government may not deny admission to a state-sponsored university on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion or gender. It may, however, restrict admission on the basis of perceived intelligence and aptitude for study. By contrast, however, the government may not limit or enhance an individual’s right to free speech, or freedom of religion, or due process based on perceived intelligence. Because they protect fundamental aspects of human dignity, the state may not choose to dispense these rights in any manner it sees fit and remain faithful to the principle of equality. As a subject of equal concern and respect by virtue of inheriting from their fathers by intestate succession even with convincing proof of paternity following the father’s death).

36 Id. at 494.
39 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Here, of course, the definition of marriage is limited to one man and one woman. The Supreme Court has held that laws prohibiting polygamy are constitutional. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164, 166 (1879) (upholding congressional power to outlaw “actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order”). Obviously, the heterosexual nature of marriage has been subject to radical revision today by a number of courts and legislatures. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (recognizing the right of same-sex couples to marry under the Massachusetts state constitution).
40 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (declaring unconstitutional an ordinance that treated housing transactions on the basis of race); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (banning the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants).
42 Id.
44 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding a racially neutral test for governmental employees even though a greater proportion of African Americans failed the test).
of his or her humanity, every human being is entitled to the enjoyment of these rights.

Similarly, in construing the principle of liberty, as a general matter, the Court has not viewed the law as an instrument of radical, individual autonomy. Indeed, in setting forth the meaning of "freedom under law" the Court has not been guided by the extreme view of liberty as license so much as a concern for ordered liberty.\textsuperscript{45} Thus, although the Court has typically interpreted the various individual rights granted under the Constitution in a generous and expansive manner, the Court has also found that these rights are subject to reasonable limitations required by the common good.

For example, although the Court has found that a competent adult may refuse to receive medical treatment,\textsuperscript{46} an individual may not decline to be vaccinated against a communicable disease that poses a risk to the public health.\textsuperscript{47} Parents have the right to raise their children and educate them as they see fit,\textsuperscript{48} but this right of family autonomy does not include the right to neglect children in their upbringing or engage in child abuse.\textsuperscript{49} Individuals have the right to freely practice the religion of their choice, and the state may not question the truth of any particular theological tenet to which they subscribe, but this freedom is not unbounded.\textsuperscript{50} Likewise, individuals may own, use, and dispose of property as they see fit, but the government may control the use of property through zoning restrictions, the provision of rights of access and environmental regulations, and the designation of landmark status.\textsuperscript{51} Indeed, an individual has no right to have a racially restrictive covenant enforced by the state in a real estate transaction.\textsuperscript{52}

Even the right to free speech—perhaps the broadest and most cherished liberty guaranteed by the Constitution—is limited by the principle of harm to others. This harm may take the form of reputational, psychological, or physical injury. Thus, for example, the state may, consistent with the First Amendment, allow a private litigant to sue for

\textsuperscript{45} The phrase "ordered liberty," which has become a staple in American constitutional law, originated in \textit{Palko v. Connecticut}, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).


\textsuperscript{47} Jacobson v. Massachusetts 197 U.S. 11 (1905).


\textsuperscript{49} Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).

\textsuperscript{50} United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982). More recently, the principle that sincere religious faith may be subject to the demands of the wider social order has been grossly distorted. See \textit{Employment Div. v. Smith}, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).


\textsuperscript{52} Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
damages for speech that constitutes libel. Likewise, the government may ban the creation and distribution of child pornography, precisely because of the severe harm inflicted on the children depicted in such materials. Likewise, the government may ban the creation and distribution of child pornography, precisely because of the severe harm inflicted on the children depicted in such materials. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the state may prohibit and punish speech that is designed to incite violence against others. That is, notwithstanding the express constitutional guarantee of free speech, a state may criminally punish advocacy speech that is intended to incite and likely to produce “imminent lawless action,” as well as “fighting words” directed toward a specific individual and likely to provoke a violent response.

There is no constitutional provision that expressly guarantees the right to abortion, yet the Court has fashioned a right that far exceeds the boundaries of the express guarantee of free speech. Indeed, Stenberg constitutionalized a right to violence, a right to harm another human being in the most gruesome way imaginable. In its First Amendment jurisprudence, the Court permits the state to curtail speech because of the state’s even more basic interest in curtailing the possibility of violence.

56 Id. at 447.
58 In Roe, the Court forthrightly acknowledged that “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy” and that the location of this right in the constitutional text is somewhat in doubt. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (noting that the right may be “founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty” or in “the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people”). Nevertheless, the Court held that such a right exists and that it “is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” Id. at 153. This tenuous connection with the constitutional text has been a source of much criticism surrounding the decision. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Constitutional Theory and the Search for the Workable Premise, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 579, 583 (1983) (“Although rhetorically tied to the meaning of ‘liberty’ in the Fourteenth amendment due process clause [sic], and loosely aligned with the penumbral analysis developed in Griswold v. Connecticut, Roe cut fundamental rights adjudication loose from the constitutional text.”). With the passage of time, however, the Court has grown more confident in pinpointing the source of this right. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (“Constitutional protection of the woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It declares that no State shall ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’ The controlling word in the cases before us is ‘liberty.’”). For a defense of unenumerated rights as such and the right to an abortion in particular see generally LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 77–112 (1990); Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overturned, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381 (1992).
59 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech...”). Cf. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 935 (1973) (arguing that the liberty protected in Roe is accorded “a protection more stringent, I think it is fair to say, than the present Court accords the freedom of the press explicitly guaranteed by the First Amendment”).
The violence in partial birth abortion is no mere possibility. It is a deadly certainty. Nevertheless, in Stenberg the Court held that the state may not act to prevent the extermination of a human life, a human being, a child in the process of being born, all in the name of freedom.

The Court is able to ignore this violence because, in the case of abortion, it has abandoned the idea of ordered liberty in favor of a maximal conception of human freedom. As the Court noted in Wisconsin v. Yoder, "the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests." Yet this is precisely the kind of liberty—the freedom to make one's own standards on matters of life and death, the freedom to kill a child in the process of being born—that the Court embraces in Stenberg. Although this understanding of freedom can be found throughout the Court's abortion jurisprudence, it is most clearly stated in Casey's now famous mystery passage: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." Although much maligned by those critical of the result in Casey, the passage is not without some merit. A society that values freedom will not want its government to supply all of the answers to life's questions. Indeed, a free society will, within the bounds of ordered liberty, welcome a plurality of responses to the question of value, the question of what kind of life is truly worth living.

At the same time, the freedom to define the "mystery of human life" celebrated in Casey cannot include the facts of human life, and ordered liberty does not require the government to remain silent and inactive with respect to these facts. The scientific fact of when human life begins—when a human life begins—has not been in doubt since the advent of the modern study of human reproduction. As Keith L. Moore succinctly states in his standard medical text on embryology: "Development begins at fertilization when a sperm fuses with an ovum to form a zygote . . . . The zygote is the first cell of a new human being." This new human life

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63 See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The History of Abortion: Technology, Morality, and Law, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 359, 402–04 (1979) (summarizing the discoveries that lead to the development of modern embryology in the early 19th century which, when "linked with the theory of cellular epigenesis, provided support for the theory that a new being came into existence with the fertilization of the ovum, and that this being thereafter developed without any change of its essential substance").
64 KEITH L. MOORE, BEFORE WE ARE BORN: BASIC EMBRYOLOGY AND BIRTH DEFECTS 23 (2d ed. 1983). Because this point is not in dispute, numerous other standard medical texts setting forth the same basic fact could be cited. A non-exhaustive list of such citations might include LESLIE BRAINERD AREY, DEVELOPMENTAL ANATOMY: A TEXTBOOK AND LABORATORY MANUAL OF EMBRYOLOGY 55 (7th ed. 1974) ("The formation, maturation and meeting of a male and female sex cell are all preliminary to their actual union into a combined cell, or zygote, which definitely marks the beginning
exhibits a radical discontinuity with the gametes that joined to form it, and with each of its parents. It is not a "part" of either its mother or its father. Instead, it possesses the genetic constitution, functional integration and material continuity of a distinct, new, human organism. Moreover, it will manifest this identity, its identity, the identity of a human being throughout each stage of its development as an embryo, fetus, infant, child, adolescent and adult. These basic facts of biology were well-known in 1973 when Roe was decided. They were true then, and they remain true today.

Justice Harry Blackmun, the author of Roe, recognized that neither the American public nor the logic of American law would accept an opinion that, on the one hand, recognized the humanity of the unborn child and, on the other hand, the right to kill such a human being. Because there was

of a new individual.

The possibility that the early embryo may subsequently divide complicates this matter somewhat. Advocates of abortion and various forms of assisted reproduction contend that the possibility of twinning precludes the recognition of the zygote as a human being. See Lawrence C. Becker, Human Being: The Boundaries of the Concept, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 334, 340 (1975) (arguing that because one cannot know how many human beings will develop from a given zygote, "[i]t surely will not do . . . to say that the process of becoming a human being ends at conception"); John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 445 (1990) (arguing that the fertilized egg and early embryo "cannot seriously be considered a person or even a rights bearing entity" since "[i]t lacks the neuromuscular requirements for cognition and sentience and is not even individual until after implantation and further development occur"). This literature has significantly expanded with the advent of embryonic stem cell research. For a balanced presentation of the opposing views regarding the use of human embryos in stem cell research see THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY: AN ETHICAL INQUIRY at ch. 6 (2002), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/fullreport.html. Even among those who oppose abortion, the possibility of twinning is a source of disagreement concerning the moral and legal status that should be accorded the embryo up until roughly the fourteenth day following fertilization when the possibility of twinning no longer exists. Compare Charles E. Curran, Abortion: Law and Morality in Contemporary Catholic Theology, 33 JURIST 162, 180 (1973) (opining that "individual human life is not definitely established" before the process of twinning), and Paul Ramsey, Abortion: A Review Article, 35 THOMIST 174, 188–94 (1973) (arguing that until the point of segmentation there only exists the potentiality of human life), with Germain Griesz, Abortion: The Myths, The Realities, and the Arguments 24–27 (1970) (asserting that twins are individuals even before they are distinct from one another), and Patrick Lee, Abortion and Unborn Human Life 90–102 (1996) (refuting the argument that as long as twinning can still occur all that exists is a mass of cells rather than an individual). Obviously, all induced abortions, at whatever stage of pregnancy, occur well after twinning and implantation in the uterine wall. Thus, although the issue is in need of resolution in determining the moral and legal status of techniques such as in vitro fertilization, cloning and embryonic experimentation and research, the matter is irrelevant to a proper moral and legal assessment of partial birth abortion.

The State of Texas devoted a substantial portion of its brief to the Court in Roe to an exposition of these basic facts of human development. See 75 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 227, 264–289 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1973).

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). To simultaneously recognize both the humanity of the unborn child and the right to kill that child would lead to an internal collapse similar to the one suffered by Kurtz. Blackmun could not fashion a principle capable of reconciling these two propositions. To avoid such an intellectual collapse in the opinion, Blackmun simply denied the humanity of the unborn
no genuine dispute with respect to the science of when human life begins, in order to vindicate the right to abortion, the Roe court was compelled to invent a controversy where none in fact existed. Thus, the Court referred to "the theory that a new human life is present from the moment of conception" and "the belief that life begins at conception." Although Blackmun makes frequent mention of "potential life," "potential human life," and "the potentiality of human life," he deliberately avoids engaging the medical literature that addresses the question of when a human being first comes into existence. Blackmun knew well the lesson that Breyer would later follow: some things really are better left unsaid.

Blackmun's reticence was, however, quite selective. Despite Blackmun's apparent need to provide a seemingly-comprehensive history of abortion from antiquity to the present in an opinion exceeding fifty pages, he was content to make a single, oblique reference to "the well-known facts of fetal development" without elaboration. These facts, it seems, were so well-known they could safely be ignored.

Having established the existence of a dispute, at least rhetorically, it then suited Blackmun's purposes to declare the matter insoluble:

We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.

Of course, it would not have been necessary "to speculate as to the answer" of when human life begins had the Court bothered to consult "those trained in the . . . discipline[] of medicine." The Court failed to do precisely that. Instead, Blackmun's only reference to the medical profession is a skewed history of the American Medical Association's (AMA) policy with respect to the permissibility of abortion. That is, Blackmun notes that the AMA adopted a policy favoring restrictive abortion laws in 1857 in order to protect "the independent and actual existence of the child before birth, as a child. Of course, where some fear to tread, others are all too happy to leap into the abyss. See Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (2d ed. 1993); Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide (1983); Wolf, supra note 9.
living being,”\textsuperscript{75} and that the AMA revised its policy in 1970 in response to certain “changes in state laws and by the judicial decisions which tend to make abortion more freely available.”\textsuperscript{76} Blackmun fails to note, however, that during the intervening period there was no change in the medical conclusion that the victim of abortion is a living human being. The only change in judgment was political in nature, not medical.

Confronting a question which he insisted did not have an answer, Blackmun could then assume a posture of judicial modesty.\textsuperscript{77} Indeed, by not speculating as to “this most sensitive and difficult question”\textsuperscript{78} he could portray the Court as exercising restraint in the service of freedom. The state, said Blackmun, could not restrict the pregnant woman’s freedom of choice “by adopting one theory of life.”\textsuperscript{79} Employing Kurtz’s strategy, Blackmun sought to resolve the matter by decisively acting “without judgment.”

There is, of course, nothing modest in pretending that science has not resolved the answer to a particular scientific question when in fact it has. And there is nothing restrained in ignoring the conclusions of the medical profession that represent the exercise of medical judgment simply in order to reach a particular result. There is, however, something plainly ludicrous in suggesting that a judge can decide a case without judging.\textsuperscript{80} Just as Kurtz’s jungle fighters exercise judgment in their murderous use of violence, so the Court’s prohibition against adopting a “theory of life” constitutes a judgment—a judgment that human life worthy of protection begins only after birth, a judgment that under the Constitution one member of the human family may be violently sacrificed at the altar of autonomy in order to vindicate the “dignity” of another.

In declaring that the state must, as a constitutional matter, ignore the humanity of the victim subject to abortion, the Court in \textit{Roe} abandoned both the principle of equal concern and respect and the principle of ordered liberty in favor of the idea of liberty as license. This license, as \textit{Casey} said, includes “the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life,” even if the process of self-definition entails extinguishing the life of another.\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Stenberg} lays

\textsuperscript{75} Id. at 141.
\textsuperscript{76} Id. at 143.
\textsuperscript{77} This conceit is still very much in evidence among Blackmun’s successors. See \textsc{Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution} 5–6 (2005) (championing “judicial modesty” as a means of helping “a community of individuals democratically find practical solutions to important contemporary social problems”).
\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Roe}, 410 U.S. at 160.
\textsuperscript{79} Id. at 162.
\textsuperscript{80} Cf. McConnell, \textit{supra} note 14 at 1198 (“Society has no choice but to decide to whom it will extend protection. It is not helpful to call this decision ‘private,’ for there is no more inherently political question than the definition of the political community.”).
bare the full implications of this license. The Stenberg court does not trouble itself with Roe’s fatuous claim that it “need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins.”82 The majority knows that the life at issue in the case has already begun. Indeed, it is in the process of being born. By embracing what it believes is a maximal conception of human freedom, the Court licenses the brutal killing of what is undeniably an innocent human being. Turning its back on civilization, the Court marches proudly into the jungle.

Accordingly, Stenberg makes apparent, as never before, the absurd contradiction that the Court has placed at the foundation of our legal system. This absurdity derives from the fact that the Court still routinely invokes the language of human dignity and the sanctity of human life.83 Indeed, these invocations appear scattered throughout the Court’s reported decisions. Thus, for example, in striking down the Texas anti-sodomy statute in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court informed us that it would “demean the[] existence” of homosexuals if the state could “control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”84 Likewise, the Court recently held that the State of Hawaii could not limit those eligible to vote for a state-wide office to people of Hawaiian ancestry because “it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities.”85 Similarly, a generation ago, in Cohen v. California, the Court held that the state could not prosecute a man for wearing a jacket emblazoned with the words “Fuck the Draft” because such a restriction on free expression would not “comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.”86

The point is not that these cases do not involve difficult questions of human dignity—of freedom and equality. The point, instead, is that from the juxtaposition of these cases with Stenberg we are led to believe that restrictions on speech, sexual conduct, and voting are offensive to human dignity, but that human dignity is not at issue in the case of partial birth abortion—or rather, that human dignity requires the state not to interfere with the brutal murder of a child in the process of being born. Thus,

82 Roe, 419 U.S. at 159.
83 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). In rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s use of the “mystery passage” from Casey to fashion a constitutional right to assisted suicide, the Supreme Court held that the state “has an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life.” Id. at 728 (citation omitted). Indeed, the Court relied on the observation contained in the Model Penal Code that “the interests in the sanctity of life that are represented by the criminal homicide laws are threatened by one who expresses a willingness to participate in taking the life of another.” Id. at 728–29. This interest includes “protecting vulnerable groups—including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons—from abuse, neglect, and mistakes.” Id. at 731.
although the language of human dignity, of equal concern and respect, still lingers on in precedent, and the Court continues to mouth these words in new decisions, the meaning of equality based on a common humanity is gone. When read against the background of Stenberg v. Carhart, each of these references to human dignity can be seen for what it is: a hollow declaration that decency and civility still reign, that barbarism does not define us, that we are not in the jungle. Some people, however, can still read a map. The unadorned facts that underlie Stenberg remind us where we are.

References to human dignity and the value of human life are especially common in the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and in particular its review of capital punishment. Here, the Court has repeatedly set forth its belief that “[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less that the dignity of man.” Indeed, Justice William Brennan, perhaps the most forceful proponent of this view, insisted that “[a] punishment is cruel and unusual . . . if it does not comport with human dignity.” For Brennan, the “true significance” of such “barbaric punishments” as the rack, the thumb-screw, and the death penalty itself “is that they treat members of the human race as non-humans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded.” As such, these acts are “inconsistent with the fundamental premise” of our law “that even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity.”

During his tenure on the Court, Justice Brennan was an unwavering supporter of the abortion license. Although it is surely to Brennan’s credit that he could still perceive the fundamental human dignity of a violent criminal, it is more than a little ironic that, in the case of abortion, he approved of the treatment of “members of the human race as non-humans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded.” Beyond irony, it is absurd that our law acknowledges the “common human dignity” of a violent criminal but refuses to recognize this same dignity in an innocent child struggling to be born.

This absurdity is even more pronounced when the holding in Stenberg is juxtaposed with the panoply of federal and state efforts intended to extend the protection of law to unborn children, to acknowledge them as members of the human family. It is absurd for the law to make available to

88 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Carol Steiker, No, Capital Punishment is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 771 (2005) (suggesting that Brennan’s concurrence in Furman is the “most prominent exposition” of the argument that the death penalty violates human dignity).
89 Furman, 408 U.S. at 272–73.
90 Id. at 273.
91 Id.
grieving parents a cause of action for wrongful death and loss of society for the "death" of an unborn child caused by the negligence of another when the Supreme Court has declared that it cannot resolve the difficult question of when "life" begins. It is absurd for the law to allow for individuals to be prosecuted for homicide for deliberating causing the death of an unborn child when Roe and its progeny allow a woman to pay her doctor to deliberately exterminate the same child. If Stenberg is correct, if the unborn child has no legal standing up to and including the time of birth, then it is difficult to make sense of federal statutes like the Born-Alive Infants' Protection Act, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act ("Laci and Conner's Law"), and similar measures.

In Apocalypse Now, an American photojournalist and follower of Kurtz, played by Dennis Hopper, remarks that the Colonel is "clear in his mind, but his soul is mad." After Stenberg, the same could truly be said of American law, without exaggeration. The freedom of the autonomous self to kill a child in the process of being born is not ordered liberty. It is the disorder of liberty run amok. It embodies what Joseph Ratzinger recently referred to as "a dictatorship of relativism that does not recognize anything as definitive and whose ultimate goal consists solely of one's own ego and desires." Under this new regime, law is no longer the rational ordering of human conduct in support of the common good.

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92 See, e.g., Connor v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89, 93 (Mo. 1995) (wrongful death statute allows recovery for death of nonviable fetus). For a survey of states that treat fetuses as persons under wrongful death statutes, see Dena M. Marks, Person v. Potential: Judicial Struggles to Decide Claims Arising from the Death of an Embryo or Fetus and Michigan's Struggle to Settle the Question, 37 AKRON L. REV. 41, 53-70 (2004).

93 See, e.g., Bailey v. State, 191 S.W.3d 52, 54-55 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a pre-viable "unborn child is a person for purposes of first-degree murder" under a Missouri statute acknowledging that life begins at conception).


97 Among the various conceptions available, the "constitutive integral common good" represents "the most traditional sense of the common good." Daniel P. Sulmasy, Four Basic Notions of the Common Good, 75 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 303, 306-07 (2001) ("This is what Aristotle meant when he said man or people are political animals. St. Thomas said every man or every one of us is part of the community, so that we belong to the community in virtue of what we are. The relationship of being in the community is the value of the constitutive common good."). As Sulmasy further explains:

The constitutive common good refers to those more robust notions of the common good that hold that being in a community of relationships with other human beings is itself a good. Therefore, being in a relationship, being part of the community, being part of each other is itself a good. It is a good that either partly or completely desires what is the good for me. This means that part of my good is the good of the community... .

Id. See, e.g., Lee Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions Within Constitutional Interpretation: Orginalism Grounded in the Central Western Philosophical Tradition, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 909 (2005). For a rich discussion of the common good in what has
strong over the weak. It is the legal extermination of certain members of
the human species deemed inconvenient by those in power.

As such, our law now embodies a kind of insanity. It is, as Willard
says of Kurtz, "broken up and ripped apart" on the inside, wavering toward
collapse. The law is insane because it cannot rationally affirm the dignity
and equal worth of every human being and at the same time sanction the
intentional killing of an innocent human being in the name of freedom.
Indeed, in the hierarchy of values, human freedom cannot trump innocent
human life since the right to life enjoys a kind of logical priority over every
other right. The freedom to live is a necessary condition to the
enjoyment of every other kind of freedom, including the freedom to define
the meaning and mystery of human life extolled in *Casey*.

Moreover, the desire to maximize freedom cannot be the criterion
by which a human being is excluded from the protection of the law as a
subject of equal concern and respect. Put another way, the recognition of a
human being as a legal person, as a rights-bearer, cannot be contingent on
the desire of someone else to act in a particular way. Ordered liberty
demands that we tolerate the inconvenience of other people.

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become a seminal work, see *Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good* (Scott
Fitzgerald trans., 1947).

98 For an explication of what is meant by "logical priority," see S.L. Hurley, *Objectivity and
Disagreement, in Morality and Objectivity: A Tribute to J. L. Mackie* 54, 55 (Ted Honderich
ed., 1985) ("In general, to say that one concept or set of concepts is logically prior to another is to say
that the latter is properly accounted for and understood in terms of the former and not vice versa;
someone could grasp the prior concept without grasping the concept understood in terms of it, but not
vice versa. To deny a claim of logical priority is to deny that someone could correctly understand one
without understanding the other."). Plainly, the right to life enjoys precisely this kind of logical
priority over every other right. See, e.g., Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,
("The first right of the human person is his life. He has other goods and some more precious, but this
one is fundamental—the condition of all the others. . . . It does not belong to society, nor does it
belong to public authority in any form to recognize this right for some and not for others.").

Germany's Basic Law embodies this principle. It gives juridical expression to the logical priority
of the right to life. Indeed, as Donald Kommers observes, the German
Constitution must be interpreted in the light of public values derived from a reading
of the Basic Law as a whole and particularly from its list of guaranteed rights, a list
crowned by the inviolate principle of human dignity. . . . The German Court has
also declared that these objective values arrange themselves in a hierarchy . . . .
Human dignity, according to the Court, is the Basic Law's supreme value the chief
manifestation of which is the right to life [including the right to life for the unborn].

Donald Kommers, *The Constitutional Law of Abortion in Germany: Should Americans Pay Attention?*,
10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 9 (1994) (stating that other rights "must give way when [they]
conflict[] with the prior right to life").

99 This is the unfortunate argument put forth at some length in Jed Rubenfeld, *On the Legal Status
of the Proposition that "Life Begins at Conception,"* 43 STAN. L. REV. 599 (1991). This approach to
the issue of constitutional personhood, which might fairly be described as the fallacy of "backing-in" to
the concept, makes the content of the category "person" contingent on the effect that the possible
inclusion of some members, (i.e. unborn children) will have on other privileged members (i.e. women
who wish to abort their pregnancies). See, e.g., id. at 601 (arguing that "the consequences of deeming a
fetus a person must be recognized as relevant to the decision of when (if ever) a fetus acquires this
status" and that "[b]ecause it establishes the point at which a woman's constitutional right may be
Given humanity's remarkable capacity for compartmentalization, rationalization and denial, the fundamental contradiction that now besets American law does not mean that the collapse of our legal system is imminent. Even those who are insane, like Kurtz, can manage to function fairly well day-to-day. But, if *Stenberg* is not reversed, its continued presence will mark the solidification of a deep-seated intellectual incoherence in the law, an incoherence that will have a corrosive effect on our legal system in myriad ways. Indeed, the longer we stay in the jungle, the harder it will be to recall what authentic civilization looks like and to imagine how it might be recovered.

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At the beginning of the film, when Willard's commanders first order him to kill Colonel Kurtz, Willard is incredulous. He thinks he understands the order, but is uncertain. Could they really mean for him to murder a fellow American? And so he asks for clarification: "Terminate the Colonel?"

The current appeal to the Supreme Court of the cases striking down the federal ban on partial birth abortion allows the American public to seek clarification. Could the Court have really meant what it appeared to say in *Stenberg v. Carhart*? Did the Court really mean to get out of the boat and wander into the jungle?

Specifically, this appeal allows the public to demand explicit answers to a number of questions: Did the Court in *Stenberg* really mean to say that the humanity of the entity subject to partial birth abortion is irrelevant to the question of whether it comes within the ambit of the law's protection? Did it really mean to say that the humanity of a child in the process of being born is irrelevant to its status under the Constitution? If so, the American public deserves to have that proposition stated with utter clarity.

Likewise, if the Court concedes that the victim of partial birth abortion

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100 See supra note 27.

*See supra note 27.*
is indeed a “human being” but maintains that it is not a “person” under the Constitution,\(^\text{101}\) then the Court must explain its criteria for constitutional personhood. Indeed, if the categories of “human being” and “person” are not coextensive, then the Court must explain why that is the case since—with the notable exception of slavery\(^\text{102}\)—our law has always regarded them as such. Because law is a matter of public reason and not simply the expression of individual will, the language of judges must be more honest and forthright than the euphemistic orders of military commanders seeking to avoid the dictates of their own conscience. A judge may not avoid the dictates of the law in order to reach a result that he or she deems desirable. If there are human beings who are not entitled to the protections afforded by legal personhood, then it is incumbent on the Court to explain why this is so without ambiguity.

Throughout its abortion jurisprudence the Court has clearly struggled with its own legitimacy in attempting to justify the nearly absolute right it created in *Roe*.\(^\text{103}\) Indeed, a preoccupation with the Court’s status as the

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\(^{101}\) The distinction between being a “human being” and being a “person” is a crucial one that occupies an important place in the literature concerning the moral and legal status of abortion. See Lee, *supra* note 64; Arthur Lefk, *The Left Dictionary of Law: A Fragment*, 94 YALE L.J. 1855, 1996–97 (1985) (discussing the legal definition of the term “alive”); H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., *The Ontology of Abortion*, 84 ETHICS 217 (1974) (discussing the humanity of the fetus); Noonan, *supra* note 10; Mary Anne Warren, *On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion*, 57 THE MONIST 43, 53–57 (1973). The question presented in the text above is not meant to assume that all “human beings” are “persons” under the Constitution. On the contrary, the question is intended to prompt an honest and intellectually rigorous answer from the Supreme Court, an answer which here to date has been sorely lacking. For a contemporary discussion of “personhood” that regards the concept as problematic and reflective of a deep anxiety in law see, Note, *What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a Legal Fiction*, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (2001), and Jens David Ohlin, *Is the Concept of Person Necessary for Human Rights?*, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 209 (2005). For a particularly helpful discussion of the meaning of “personhood,” see Daniel Wikler, *Concepts of Personhood: A Philosophical Perspective, in Defining Human Life: Medical, Legal, and Ethical Implications*, supra note 99, at 12.

\(^{102}\) See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (1 How.) 393, 407 (1857) (holding that blacks, whether free or slave, had “no rights which the white man was bound to respect”). Although far less dramatic in the scope of its application, another notable exception is *Buck v. Bell*, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding the forced sterilization of mentally handicapped individuals in state institutions). As noted in *supra* note 66, some have argued that even if the being *in utero* is recognized not only as a “human being” but as a “person” who enjoys rights, abortion should still be permitted in any case. This argument was most famously put forth in Judith Thomson, *A Defense of Abortion*, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971). See also Donald H. Regan, *Rewriting Roe v. Wade*, 77Mich. L. REV. 1569 (1979) (applying Thomson’s thesis in the context of American constitutional law). Originally, Lawrence Tribe rejected Thomson’s argument as “interesting but problematic.” See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, *AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW* 1348 n.76 (2nd ed. 1988); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, *AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW* 926 n.44 (1st ed. 1978). Nevertheless, in his book on abortion, Tribe enthusiastically embraced Thomson’s argument without explaining why her reasoning was no longer “problematic.” See TRIBE, *supra* note 58, at 135 (concluding that the *Roe* court could have said that “[e]ven if the fetus is a person, our Constitution forbids compelling a woman to carry it for nine months and become a mother”).

\(^{103}\) See e.g., Ely, *supra* note 59 at 947 (concluding that *Roe* is “a very bad decision . . . . It is bad because it is bad constitutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be”). Still, the effort to justify the substance of the Court’s decision in *Roe* and the constitutional role it entails continues. For a recent, interesting contribution to the
ultimate source of constitutional meaning—and not the merits of the case—was largely responsible for the Court’s decision in Casey. Answering the questions described above would require the Court to honestly confront the role it has assumed within our republic and the sources of authority that make the exercise of that power legitimate under the Constitution.

But honesty is always accompanied by risk. Fearful that a thorough and intellectually honest response to these questions would expose the true nature of the Court’s decision and threaten the Court’s stature as an institution, Breyer and the other signatories to Stenberg may simply be incapable of this sort of candor. Still, no matter how awkward it might be for the Justices to answer these questions in a manner free of obfuscation, it is not impertinent for us to insist that they do so. The rule of law requires as much. Indeed, the rule of law not only requires the Court to answer these questions directly, it also requires the Court to demonstrate, as best it can, that the Constitution demands the answers it puts forth. In Stenberg v. Carhart the Supreme Court “got out’a the fucking boat” and led us into the jungle. With partial birth abortion once more before the Court, we again stand at the water’s edge. The jungle lies only a few steps away, and seeing now only dimly the outlines and shadows that mark it, the freedom it promises is powerfully enticing. Thus, the Court and the


For example, Michael Stokes Paulsen argues that “Casey is not much concerned with [the abortion] question at all. Casey is concerned with the question of how overruling Roe might affect the public’s perception of the Court’s legitimacy and its claimed right to ‘speak before all others for their constitutional ideals.’” Paulsen, supra note 17 at 680. Indeed, “Casey is, in other words, concerned not with what the Constitution says, but with what people might think of their High Priests in black robes. For these reasons, and no other stated ones, the Court in Casey adhered to Roe, ‘whether or not mistaken.’” Id.

In Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the Court provided its articulation of this principle:

The Court’s power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law means and to declare what it demands. The underlying substance of this legitimacy is of course the warrant for the Court’s decisions in the Constitution and the lesser sources of legal principle on which the Court draws. That substance is expressed in the Court’s opinions, and our contemporary understanding is such that a decision without principled justification would be no judicial act at all. But even when justification is furnished by apposite legal principle, something more is required. Because not every conscientious claim of principled justification will be accepted as such, the justification claimed must be beyond dispute. The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make. Thus, the Court’s legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.

Id. at 865–66.
people it serves must decide: Do we turn our backs on civilization and head further into the bush, embracing the illusion of freedom in the barbarous license of state-sanctioned killing? Or do we turn once more to recognize the fundamental dignity of every human being, the equal dignity which informs ordered liberty and which makes authentic civilization possible? In pondering our response, without a doubt, the best advice that can be had comes from a film about violence and morality, candor and the tenuous nature of civilization: Never get out’a the boat!